Promoting Couple Support in Cancer. by Brennan, James Hugh.
A  P o r t f o l io  o f  St u d y , P r a c t ic e  a n d  R e s e a r c h  
Su b m it t e d  f o r  T h e  D o c t o r a t e  o f  P s y c h o l o g y  (P s y c h D )  
i n  Cl in ic a l  P s y c h o l o g y  C o n v e r s io n  P r o g r a m m e  
U n iv e r s it y  o f  Su r r e y
P r o m o t in g  C o u p l e  
Su p p o r t  in  Ca n c e r
James Hugh Brennan
1999
ProQuest Number: 11015183
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11015183
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE O F C O N T E N T S .............................................................................................................................................. II
LIST OF FIG U R ES A N D  T A B L E S ......................................................................................................................... V
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S .................................................................................................  VI
O V E R V IE W   .............................................................................................................................................................. 1
Personal Study Plan ..............................................................     2
Critical Review 1 ..............................................................................................................................................2
Critical Review 2 ..............................................................................................................................................3
Clinical Audit....................................................................................................................................................3
Research Project.............................................................................................................................................. 5
References.......................................................................................................................................................11
CRITICAL REVIEW  1 ............................................................................   14
Post-traumatic  stress disorder a n d  the D iagnosis of c an cer-  A  Review ............................... 14
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................... 14
The Clinical Diagnosis of PTSD........................................................................................................................15
PTSD and psychological symptoms in cancer................................................   16
Summary and Methodological Limitations...................................................................................................... 22
Theoretical Implications............................................   24
Breaking the News of Cancer.............................................................................................................................27
Conclusions..........................................................................................................................................................31
References............................................................................................................................................................. 32
CRITICAL REV IEW  2 ........................................     40
A djustment to Cancer: A  Critical Review  of the Concept.............................................................. 40
Introduction................................   40
Problems of Definition....................................................................................................................................... 41
Adjustment as a process of adaptation to change............................................................................................. 42
Coping...................................................................................................................................................................43
Adjustment as Psychosocial Transition............................................................................................................ 47
Loss o f Control............................................................................................................................................... 51
Loss o f Engagement........................................................................................................................................52
Loss o f Social Support................................................................................................................................... 54
Adjustment and Quality of Life..........................................................................................................................55
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................................ 56
References............................................................................................................................................................. 57
CLIN IC AL A U D IT   ................   64
POST-QUALIFICATION TRAINING AND PRACTICE..........................................................  64
Professional Work History................................................................................................................................. 64
Clinical Experience.........................................................   64
Staff Support / Supervision / Team Building.................................................................................................... 64
Management Experience..........................................    65
Teaching / Training............................................................................................................................................. 65
Personal Training................................................................................................................................................. 66
Papers / Publications..................................................................................................................   66
Selection, Reflection and  Clinical Psychology ....................................................................................69
Abstract..................................................................................................................................................................69
Selection, Reflection and Clinical Psychology ....................................................................................................................................................................................................71
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................... 71
Psychological Knowledge and the Construction of Meaning......................................................................... 72
What personal qualities are needed among clinical psychologists?............................................................... 75
Empathy............................................................................................................................................................75
Intuition............................................................................................................................................................76
~  Hi ~
Reflexivity (and Clinical Supervision)..........................................................................................................77
Gate-keeping the profession...............................................................................................................................78
Trainee Survey..................................................................................................................................................... 79
Method............................................................................................................................................................. 79
Results..............................................................................................................................................................79
Summary..........................................................................................................................................................82
Course Directors Survey..................................................................................................................................... 83
Method............................................................................................................................................................. 83
Summary o f  Results from Course Directors' Survey................................................................................ 83
Other approaches to selection  .................................................................................................................85
Conclusions..........................................................................................................................................................88
References............................................................................................................................................................. 90
Appendix 1: Trainee Survey...............................................................................................................................92
Appendix 2: Course Directors’ Survey............................................................................................................. 94
Appendix 3: Course Directors’ Responses.......................................................................................................96
RESEARCH STUDY...........................................................................................................................100
Abstract................................................................................................................................................................100
Promoting Couple Support in Ca n c e r ........................................................................................................ 102
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................102
1.1 Social Support and Stress........................................................................................................................103
The Matching Hypothesis............................................................................................................................105
1.2 Social Support and Adaptation to Cancer............................................................................................ 106
1.3 Partner Support....................................................................................................................................... 109
1.4 Impact of Chronic Illness on Partner Relationships............................................................................ 112
1.5 Gender and the Burden of Care..............................................................................................................118
1.6 Summary and Conclusions..................................................................................................................... 123
1.7 Research Aims........................................................................................................................................ 124
1.8 Implications for an Intervention.............................................................................................................125
1.9 The use of video technology to promote behaviour change...............................................................126
1.10 Hypotheses.........................................................  127
2. M ETHOD .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................128
2.1 Design.......................................................................................................................................................128
2.2 Participants............................................................................................................................................... 129
Colorectal cancer...............................................................................................................................  129
2.3 The Intervention Video............... ..........................................................................................................129
Making the Intervention Video................................................................................................................... 130
2.4 Measures..................................................................................................................................................133
2.4.1 Patient Questionnaire.....................................................................................................................134
2.4.2 Partner Questionnaire....................................................................................................................136
2.4.3 The Initial Video Feedback Questionnaire ............................................................................... 136
2.4.4 The Follow-up Video Questionnaire  .................................................................................136
2.5 Procedure................................................................................................................................................. 137
2.5.1 Ethics...................,............................................................................................................................. 137
2.5.2 Implementation 13 7
2.6 Statistical Analysis.................................................................................................................................. 139
3. RESULTS ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................141
3.1 Demographic Features of the Sample.................................................................................................... 141
3.1.1 Participants, Refusals and Drop-outs.............................................................................................141
3.1.2 Demographic and Personal History Variables............................................................................. 142
3.2 Comparison of the Video and Control Groups at Time-1...................................................................143
3.2.1 Comparison o f  Patients in the Video and Control Groups at Time-1....................................... 143
3.2.2 Comparison O f Partners in the Video And Control Groups at Time-1..................................... 145
3.2.3 Differences between Patients and Partners on key Variables.................................................... 146
3.3 Comparison of Change Scores in the Video and Control Groups......................................................146
3.3.1 Effect o f the Video on Patient Subjects........................................................................................... 147
3.3.2 Effect o f  the Video on Partner Subjects.......................................................................................... 150
3.4 Relationship between Communication Variables and Psychological distress.................................. 153
3.4.1 Relationship between Patient-assessed Communication Variables and Patient Distress......154
3.4.2 Relationship between Partner-assessed Communication Variables and Partner Distress....156
3.4.3 Association between Patient-Assessed Communication at Time-1 and Patient Distress at Time-
2 .......................................................................................................................................................... 157
3.4.4 Association between Partner-Assessed Communication at Time-1 & Partner Distress at Time- 
2 ......................   158
3.4.5 Association between Relationship Variables at Time-1 and Psychological Distress at Time-2 
............................................................................................................................................................ 158
3.5 Gender Differences........................................................................  160
3.5.1 Effect o f the Video Intervention on Females’ Perception o f  Most Important Support.............161
3.5.2 Gender Differences in the Perception o f  Partner Communication.............................................161
3.6 Initial Video Feedback............................................................................................................................162
3.7 Follow-up Video Feedback Questionnaire...................................  163
4. DISCUSSION. ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................166
4.1 Review of Research Aims...................................................................................................................... 166
4.1.1 Study Aim..1 .......................................................................................................................................166
4.1.2 Study Aim..2 ...................................................................................................................................... 173
4.2 Limitations and Weaknesses of the study............................................................................................ 175
4.2.1 Design.................................................................................................................................................175
4.2.2 Measures............................................................................................................................................ 176
4.2.3 Randomisation........................................................................................................................... :......177
4.2.4 Sample Size and recruitment............................................................................................................177
4.2.5 Sample Selection............................................................................................................................... 178
4.2.6 Confounding Variables.................................................................................................................... 179
4.2.7 Tumour Site........................................................................................................................................180
4.2.8 The Video Intervention......................................................................................................................181
4.3 Conclusions............................................................................................................................................. 182
5. REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................185
6. APPENDICES... ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................197
Appendix Al: Final Edit List of the Video Intervention..............................................................................198
Appendix A2: The Video: "Facing it Together" (accompanying this document)
Appendix B: Local Research Ethics Committee Approval.........................................................................207
Appendix C: Consent Forms and Letters to Subjects................................................................................. 212
Appendix D: Research Questionnaires......................................................................................................... 226
Patient Questionnaire........................   227
Partner Questionnaire..................................................................................................   240
Initial Video Feedback Questionnaire (Facing it Together.................................................................... 248
Follow-up Video Feedback Questionnaire (The Video)..........................................................................249
Appendix E: Leaflet —  “Facing it together” ............................................................................................. ...250
MPHIL DEGREE AND DISSERTATION...................................................................................... .251
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURE A : Study Design  __________________________________   128
TABLE A: Summary o f  key measures (Patient Questionnaire)_______________________________________________________________________134
FIGURE 1: Age Distribution o f patients in the video and control groups___________________________________________________ 142
TABLE I: Demographic Characteristics o f  Video and Control Groups_____________________________________________________143
TABLE 2: Comparison o f  Patient Subjects in the Video and Control Groups on Key Outcome
Variables at Time-1 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 144
TABLE 3: Comparison o f Partner Subjects in the Video and Control Groups on Key Outcome
Variables at Time-1 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 145
TABLE 4: Comparison o f  Change Scores among Video and Control Patient Subjects_______________________ 148
TABLE 5: Comparison o f  Video Patients at Time-1 and Time-2____________________________________________________________________149
TABLE 6: Comparison o f  Control Patients at Time-1 and Tim e-2 ______________________________________________________________ 150
TABLE 7: Comparison o f Change Scores among Video and Control Partner Subjects_______________________ 151
TABLE 8: Comparison o f  Video Partners at Time-1 and T im e-2 _________________________________________________________________ 152
TABLE 9: Comparison o f  Control Partners at Time-1 and Time-2______________________________________________________________ 153
TABLE 10: Correlation Matrix between Patient-assessed Communication and Psychological
Variables at Time-1 (N=42)__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 154
TABLE 11: Correlation Matrix between Patient-assessed Communication and Psychological
Variables at Time-2 (N=42) __________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 155
TABLE 12: Correlation Matrix between Partner-assessed Communication and Psychological
Variables at Time-1 (N=42) __________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 156
TABLE 13: Correlation Matrix between Partner-assessed Communication and Psychological
Variables at Time-2 (N=42)__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 157
TABLE 14: Correlation Matrix between Patient-assessed Communication Variables at Time-1 _and
Psychological Variables at Time-2 (N=42)_________________________________________________ 157
TABLE 15: Correlation Matrix between Partner-assessed Communication Variables at Time-1 and
Psychological Variables at Time-2 (N=42)____________________________________________________________________ 158
TABLE 16: Correlation Matrix between Relationship Variables at Time-1 and Psychological
Variables at Time-2 among Patients___________________________________________________________________________________________ 159
TABLE 17: Correlation Matrix between Relationship Variables at Time-1 and Psychological
Variables at Time-2 among Partners___________________________________________________________________________________________ 159
TABLE 18: Gender o f  Preferred Supporter by Gender o f  Subject (Time-1)_________________________________________________ 160
TABLE 19: Effect o f  Video on Female Subjects '  Choice o f  Partner as Main Support_____________________________161
TABLE 20: Gender Differences in Patients ’ Perception o f Partner communication at Time-1___________ 162
TABLE 21: Initial Video Feedback Questionnaire by Patients/Partners and Gender_____________________________163
TABLE 22: Follow-up Video Questionnaire -  Number o f times video watched_________________________________________ 163
TABLE 23: Follow-up Video Questionnaire -  Perceived Effect o f  Watching Video: 1 ___________________________164
TABLE 24: Follow-up Video Questionnaire -  Perceived Effect o f  Watching Video: 2 __________________________ 165
~  v i  ~
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Without the generous advice, support and encouragement of the people below, it would have 
been impossible to submit the portfolio which follows.
Video Production
First, I am enormously grateful to Anula, Bette, Chris, David and Lucy whose moving and 
honest testimonies brought the video to life and gave it emotional power. Their courage on the 
day of filming in being prepared to relive some of their distress will be a lasting memory.
Without the technical knowledge of film-maker Richard Maxwell (Max), and the resources of his 
company Soft Focus Films, the production of a video would have been infeasible. Max helped 
me make the film at cost and, through his contacts, arranged other essential technical help at 
cost (thank you Phil Hurst, Khalid Khan and Chloe Wyatt). In this regard, special thanks to 
White Hart Studios and in particular Vicky Shinton, their on-line editor, who worked with me on 
the video throughout one very exhausting Sunday night. Mark Barrington was intimately 
involved in shooting and editing the film and I am indebted to him for his humour and 
thoughtfulness throughout.
The Research
The patients and partners who took part in the study did so at an exceptionally vulnerable time 
in their lives; their generous help has been very much appreciated. Thank you to the many staff 
of the Bristol Oncology Centre who helped me recruit subjects; in particular, the radiographers, 
as well as nursing staff in the Outpatient Department and the Chemotherapy Day Unit. Thank 
you to Dr Stephen Falk and other consultant oncologists for allowing me access to their 
patients, and the Clinical Trials Department for their useful suggestions. I am grateful to Nancy 
Pistrang and Chris Barker for giving me a copy of their research protocol and their 
encouragement. Finally, special thanks to Dr Alan Preece, Head of the Biophysics Department, 
for his long-standing logistic, technical and moral support.
Academic
I am in the unusual position of having had three successive academic supervisors, though only 
the last of these, Dr Emma Dunmore, has been able to be of substantive support. However, Dr 
Dunmore more than made up for this lack of continuity and I gratefully acknowledge the 
detailed advice and genuine interest that she has provided and shown. Graham Iwi gave me 
invaluable tutoring on SPSS and helped me think through many aspects of the statistical 
analyses; I am extremely grateful for all the time he generously gave me. Many thanks to 
Rachel Griffiths for her voluntary help with so much of the data entry. I am also indebted to the 
several colleagues who commented on early drafts of the clinical audit paper.
Personal
This thesis has been produced during an especially busy time of my life. However, I am 
fortunate to have had the support of the people I love most in the world. First, thank you to my 
parents who had me to stay for two crucial weeks of intensive writing; their support and love 
has been the bedrock of my life. Thank you to my three small children, Tom, Kate and Zoe 
(who arrived half way through); they have provided me with a daily dose of joy and inspiration.
Finally, thank you to my wife, Harriet, who has ‘lived’ this thesis almost as much as I have. She 
has given me her sustained encouragement, space and time in which to work, and, as always, 
numerous opportunities to think through with her my ideas or worries. To write about partner 
support is to highlight one’s own failings in this area; I am truly fortunate to have a partner 
whose kindness and support are so central to her being.
OVERVIEW
This doctoral portfolio is almost exclusively about the psychological effects of cancer.
In view of the fact that one in three people will develop cancer in their lifetime, and 
that a third of these people will develop significant psychological problems, it is fitting 
that clinical psychology is increasingly turning its attention to this important area of 
human experience. Psycho-oncology is a small but growing field with many 
significant questions still to be answered.
It could be argued that the public’s dread of cancer, as a physically wasting and 
unremittingly painful disease, is misplaced. The growth of palliative medicine from its 
origins in the hospice movement, have led to enormous advances in symptom control. 
Rarely is physical suffering an issue where palliative care services are well developed. 
However, the psychological effects of cancer probably bear a much closer resemblance 
to common images of the disease as wasting and painful. The trauma of diagnosis 
heralds turbulent and far-reaching changes in a person’s psychological and social 
world, many of which slowly eat into the fabric of people’s lives. As yet, the small field 
of psychosocial oncology has had little impact on the urgent need to help people 
negotiate this time of personal crisis and prevent some of the suffering associated with 
it. Thus, all three parts of this portfolio concerned with cancer attempt to take an 
implicitly preventative perspective.
The first review paper examines the evidence for whether the diagnosis of cancer 
constitutes a trauma leading to post-traumatic stress disorder, and what this implies for 
improving the way in which the diagnosis is delivered. My interest in this area stems 
from my patients’ apparent need to talk about this particular moment in their cancer 
journey, the bad experiences many of them recount, and their often persistent and 
intrusive memories of it.
The second paper concerns what the lay person refers to as the process of “coming to 
terms with cancer”; in other words, the psychological adjustments that people make in 
the process of restoring some quality to their lives in light of the implications of their 
disease. This prolonged period of psychosocial transition is the fertile ground from 
which psychological disorders develop yet, despite their crucial role, the processes of 
adjustment have rarely been articulated or even described within the field of 
psychosocial oncology.
The clinical research is a randomised controlled trial of an intervention designed to 
prevent psychological problems by enhancing the effectiveness of couple support. The 
motivation for this research again came directly from my clinical work. Over the past 
few years, I have met countless women who have expressed profound disappointment 
and disillusionment at the level and quality of support they have received from their 
male partners; a story I have virtually never heard from a man.
Finally, I have attempted to inject the clinical audit paper with something of a personal 
tone in the belief that, more than most professions, clinical psychology necessitates 
personal involvement. The paper attempts to address some of the innate 
contradictions which appear to exist within clinical psychology, taking the trainee 
selection process as an example.
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PERSONAL STUDY PLAN
CRITICAL REVIEW 1 
Is the Diagnosis of Cancer a Traumatically Stressful Event? A Critical 
Review of the Evidence.
The symptoms of distress and disorder which commonly follow the diagnosis of 
a life-threatening event have a number of parallels with the symptoms of Post- 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). There is a recent surge in both theoretical 
and experimental understanding of PTSD as well as a number of recent 
attempts to find PTSD symptoms in newly diagnosed patients. However the 
latter literature is small and appears to lack a theoretical conception of PTSD 
phenomena.
The proposed literature review will critically examine attempts to explain the 
symptomatology of post-diagnosis distress in terms of PTSD. It will use current 
theoretical understanding of PTSD in order to make testable predictions of the 
psychological processes which may be occurring during the post-diagnostic 
period. The review may include:
* Introduction
* Concept of a traumatic stressor and PTSD
* What would constitute evidence that diagnosis is a traumatic stressor?
* Qualitative review of the diagnostic procedure and its effects
* Relationship between psychological morbidity and methods of delivering 
diagnoses, if any empirical work exists
* Diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder
* Current theories of PTSD
* ? Links between PTSD and psychological symptoms in cancer and other 
diseases (AIDS, MS, Motor Neurone Disease etc, cardiac disease?)
* Controlled studies on PTSD following a diagnosis.
* Research questions and implications for how bad news is broken, service 
delivery and therapeutic interventions
CRITICAL REVIEW 2 
A Critical Review of the Concept of Psychological Adjustment to the 
Diagnosis of Cancer
The concept of adjustment is widely used in the health psychology literature 
though it is rarely defined or operationalised. The term is often used to describe 
outcome measures that often simply denote the presence or absence of 
psychopathology. There is an apparent lack of any explicit theoretical basis for 
the way in which the term adjustment is used.
Thus this proposed literature review will consider the concept of ‘adjustment’ as 
it is used in the cancer literature, as well as problems of defining it. Further 
areas to be explored may include:
* What are the components of a normal adjustment? What is being 
‘adjusted’?
* Implicit and explicit theories of adjustment
* Relationship between ‘adjustment’ and ‘coping’
* Coping theory
* Other cognitive theories of adjustment
* Traumatic stress
* ‘Psychosocial transitions’
* Evidence for factors which affect adjustment:
* Personality (Watson’s mental adjustment to cancer, etc)
* Personal history (prior exposure, sensitisation)
* Psychological/psychiatric history
* Control through information
* Self-efficacy vs learned helplessness
* Social support as buffer
* Summary of problems with the concept of adjustment
* Relationship to quality of life
* Research questions
CLINICAL AUDIT
The practice of clinical psychology rests on the assumption that, by the end of 
their training, practitioners have received sufficient instruction in the theory and 
intervention techniques of the discipline to be allowed to practise safely. It will 
be argued that the most important variable in whether or not a person develops
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into an effective practitioner may be missing from the clinical training 
programme.
It will be asserted that it is the personality and personal history of the 
practitioner which will in large part determine the nature of interactions with 
clients and colleagues, not the techniques which they may be able to offer. 
Increased self-awareness is often one of the more tangible benefits of 
psychological intervention for many patients but how much self-awareness is 
expected of the psychologist? One of the goals of most psychotherapies is to 
allow individuals to regain control over their lives, in order that they can make 
decisions freely with due consideration of internal and external pressures acting 
upon them. Are we able to practise what we preach? How much of our career 
development is the result of unexamined conflicts which we are attempting to 
resolve through the practice of clinical psychology? And what effect may this be 
having on our clients? What implications does this have for the way in which 
clinical psychologists are trained and assessed, and monitored over the course of 
their career?
This paper will deliberately be something of a personal statement in order to 
make a professional point: that a quest for self-awareness is not necessarily 
wrong and may, indeed, represent a necessary source of motivation for 
individuals to enter the profession. However, it points to the need for training 
courses and the profession to address issues of personal therapy, clinical 
supervision and unconscious motivation throughout the career of the individual.
I will argue that there are inherent contradictions both in assessing clinical 
psychology trainees on a purely academic basis, as well as introducing methods 
(used by psychoanalysts) whereby trainees’ personal therapy is used as part of 
their assessment.
RESEARCH PROJECT 
Promoting Social Support among Couples Affected by Cancer
Introduction
One in three people develop cancer in their lifetime; one in four people will die 
from it (Cancer Research Campaign, 1989). Between 15 and 20% of cancer 
patients will develop moderate to severe psychological disorders requiring 
mental health intervention. A further 30% will develop an adjustment disorder 
involving symptoms of anxiety or depression (Massie and Holland, 1990). This 
high incidence of psychological distress and disorder in such a prevalent disease 
poses a profound challenge to the small but growing field of psychosocial 
oncology (Maguire, 1995). It would be unrealistic to assume that there will ever 
be sufficient clinical resources within the National Health Service to meet this 
level of need. What is urgently required is a better understanding of the 
psychological processes which lead to these clinical disorders, and some 
empirically validated ways of preventing them from developing.
The diagnosis of cancer is, for most people, a traumatically stressful event which 
precedes the rapid onset of a bewilderingly complex medical treatment involving 
a combination of surgery, radiotherapy, chemotherapy and/or hormone 
treatments. For many, it is that start of a personal ‘cancer journey’ that may 
take many months to complete, during which time the individual may have had 
to make dramatic changes in their lifestyles and role relationships. In view of 
the stress of these many changes, and the uncertainties surrounding a life- 
threatening illness such as cancer, it might seem, intuitively, unsurprising that so 
many people develop high levels of anxiety and depression. Indeed, it has been 
argued that the diagnosis of cancer involves a great deal of human distress that 
is appropriate to the situation and it would be a mistake to ‘pathologise’ or 
‘medicalise’ these experiences; on the contrary, they may lead to personal 
growth and development (Brennan and Sheard, 1994). However, the clinical
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disorders that so often develop following the diagnosis of cancer are real and the 
purpose of the proposed study is to investigate one possible way of mitigating 
the stress of cancer and thereby preventing the development of psychological 
disorders.
There are a number of possible approaches to prevention that would appear to 
hold promise. A few examples follow:
• helping patients maintain their motivational structures by encouraging 
them to stay engaged with life (e.g. mastery and pleasure activity 
scheduling)
• helping patients regain a sense of personal control through obtaining 
information about their disease and its treatment and through 
learning to be more assertive with health care professionals
• providing a brief intervention to enhance patients’ self-esteem (e.g. 
focusing on the role relationship changes in the patient’s personal 
and working life.)
• providing patients with access to low-level social support (e.g. 
volunteer ex-patients) during the period soon after diagnosis.
• enhancing the role of the patient’s partner in providing emotional 
support to the patient.
It is the last of these that this proposal seeks to address.
Background
Since the 1970s, associated in the U.K. with the pioneering work of Brown and 
Harris (1978), a growing body of literature has supported the assertion that 
social support may act as a buffer against stress. In spite of conceptual and 
methodological problems within this field, the assertion appears to. be valid in 
the case of cancer (Wortman, 1984); that is, social support may constitute an 
important resource in coping with cancer.
Studies have shown that people with cancer require significant amounts of 
empathic support from other family members yet prefer not to seek advice or 
information from this source (Neuling and Winefield, 1988). Furthermore, it is
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emotional, empathic support that appears to be most important where the 
individual perceives that they have little control over the stressor (Cutrona,
1990). A perception of lack of control is certainly the case in cancer. Other 
studies have shown that when people have an emotional concern they are most 
likely to turn to their spouse or partner (Barker, Pistrang, Shapiro and Shaw, 
1990).
On the basis of these findings, Pistrang and Barker (1992) studied who women 
turn to for emotional support when they have breast cancer. They found that 
while 51% of those who had a partner regarded their partner as their ‘most 
important helper’, 38% of those who had nominated their partner as their 
preferred helper prior to breast cancer no longer regarded him as their 
preferred helper. The authors noted that women reported more problematic 
communication with partners than with friends and relatives. They concluded 
that their data suggest that “the communication problems with partners were 
more to do with men’s difficulties in dealing with feelings, rather than an 
inability to understand the women’s concerns.” (p. 190)
Using subscales from the Symptom Check List (SCL-90R) and the Profile of 
Mood States, Bi-polar form (POMS-BI), Pistrang and Barker (1995) later 
reported that satisfaction with the partner helping relationship was associated 
with psychological well-being in breast cancer patients. Good communication 
with the partner was characterised by high empathy and low withdrawal, though 
women with partners were generally more distressed than women without 
partners. These authors also found that support from relationships outside the 
partner relationship did not compensate for the lack of a confiding relationship 
with the partner. They concluded that a poor partner relationship appears to 
be a risk factor in women’s psychological responses to breast cancer.
In an interview study of 56 Swedish couples in which the woman had breast 
cancer, other authors (Omne-Ponten, Holmberg, Sjoden and Berstrom, 1995) 
found that the husband’s assessment of the marital support, communication and
relationship was significantly related to the patient’s psychosocial outcome at 13 
months, though the study failed to use a standardised measure of psychological 
distress.
There is growing evidence that spouses of cancer patients suffer high levels of 
psychological distress. In a recent study (Glasdam, Jensen, Madsen and Rose, 
1996), 120 spouses of consecutive patients with primary cancer were asked to 
complete a Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale. 18% scored as cases on the 
anxiety subscale (with a further 32% scoring as borderline cases) and 6% scored 
as cases on the depression subscale. Interestingly, although spouses reported 
that their contact with family and friends had been maintained or even 
intensified, only a third reported feeling any support from these sources. This is 
a potentially important finding since it is likely that people who are well 
supported are better able to give support.
In conclusion, it would appear that the patient-partner relationship has an 
important influence on the psychological adjustment of the patient. There may 
be a number of reasons why spouses fail to provide optimal support for their 
partners though one of these may be the fact that the carer-spouse may feel 
poorly supported themselves. Moreover, clinical experience suggests that 
patients sometimes ‘protect’ their spouses from their own distress and fail to 
discuss important issues they would otherwise wish to explore for fear of being a 
“burden” on their already distressed partners. Partners, in turn, may attempt to 
be over-protective or overly ‘positive’, or they may simply be afraid of further 
upsetting the patient by discussing their own distress. However, clinical 
experience also suggests that men and women differ greatly in their capacity to 
provide support and that the “high empathy and low withdrawal” components 
discussed by Pistrang and Barker may be especially challenging for men.
Most of the research in this area has focused on women with breast cancer and 
their male partners. The research has not specifically looked at the differences 
between men and women in terms of whether their different abilities to
communicate affects the psychological adjustment of both patients and spouses. 
As yet there have also been no attempts to evaluate an intervention to affect the 
patient-spouse relationship during the period of adjustment to cancer. It is these 
issues that the present research seeks to address.
Hypotheses:
1. That cancer patients, receiving an intervention designed to enhance 
partner support, will have lower levels of psychological distress than 
those who receive standard care alone.
2. That the partners of cancer patients, receiving an intervention designed 
to enhance partner support, will have lower levels of psychological 
distress than those who receive standard care alone.
3. That the intervention will improve the patient’s perception of the 
effectiveness, helpfulness and supportiveness of their communication 
with their spouse, and will lead to higher satisfaction with the relationship 
relative to the control group.
4. That patients’ perception of support and empathy from their partners 
will be associated with good psychological adjustment.
5. That males are more likely than females to perceive their spouses as their 
primary source of support in equivalent roles of patient or partner, and
6. That the intervention will lead more females to regard their spouses as 
their primary support.
7. That female patients will perceive their spouses to communicate lower 
empathy and supportiveness, and higher criticism and withdrawal than 
male patients.
METHOD 
Subjects
Married or co-habiting couples, of whom one partner has first diagnosis of 
cancer (i.e. 50% male patients). Diagnosis within the past three months.
Partner must not have had cancer themselves at any stage. Current treatment 
must be with the aim of cure, and the prognosis should be at least one year.
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Preferably cancer site should be the same or comparable for both men and 
women, so that the disease or treatment does not bias the results. Colorectal 
would be an ideal choice since its incidence is similar between the sexes and is 
the second most common cancer site.
Proposed Design and Procedure
Randomised control trial over a 1 year period.
Patients will be recruited at first oncology out-patient appointment. They will be 
invited to participate in a research project to look at ways people, both patients 
and their spouses, cope with their diagnosis and treatment.
Patients and spouses who consent to participate, by returning their consent 
forms, will then be sent pre-intervention questionnaires (to be completed 
independently and returned separately in stamped, addressed envelopes). These 
questionnaires will assess:
1) Personal and demographic information (Time since diagnosis, age, 
class, premorbid psychiatric history, size of family, duration of 
relationship, etc).
2) Recent or concurrent treatment, if any (e.g. surgery, radiotherapy, 
chemotherapy, hormone treatments, psychological interventions.)
3) Current satisfaction with relationship (identify problems), (standardised 
questionnaire; such as Dyadic Adjustment Scale?)
4) Psychological functioning (HAD and SCL-Anxiety, SCL-depression 
and SCL-Hostility), some measure of self-esteem?
5) Patients’ perception of the level and quality of disclosure with the 
partner about the experience of cancer (using the same measures as 
used by Pistrang and Barker’s in order to compare results)
Once the pre-intervention questionnaires have been returned from the couples, 
the couples will be randomised to either the experimental or control arm. They 
will then be sent video-recordings to be watched together at home, with a brief 
questionnaire about how useful and relevant they found the video. They will be 
asked to return the videos and questionnaire to the researcher by post within 
one week.
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Three months after watching the video, the couples will be reassessed on 
measures 2, 3, 4, and 5. They will also be asked to rate retrospectively the 
usefulness of the video. Again, questionnaires will be mailed to the subjects.
INTERVENTION 
Control Intervention
The Control Group will receive a video, also to be watched by the couple 
together: same length and format as experimental group but using ‘benign’ 
advice. They will also be given a leaflet with the same advice as on their video.
e.g. Try having a short rest each day. Do as much as you feel able to do but 
don’t overdo it. Take it one day at a time. Before you know it the treatment 
will be over. Do ask the staff if you have any questions.
Experimental Intervention
(A) Patient testimonies concerning partner support
(B) Bulleted written advice on screen with talk-over by ‘professional voice’.
(C) Leaflet with key bullet points reiterated as reminder for patient and spouse 
to keep. Both partners have their own identical leaflet.
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CRITICAL REVIEW 1
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND THE 
DIAGNOSIS OF CANCER -  A REVIEW
Introduction
Although cancer is increasingly regarded as a chronic disease by professionals, 
many people continue to view the diagnosis of cancer as their worst fear for, in 
the public’s mind, cancer is equated with certain, imminent death (Weisman and 
Worden, 1976). It seems likely therefore that most people would regard the 
diagnosis of cancer as a traumatically stressful event. In the weeks and months 
following the diagnosis the patient and their family must cope with the varied 
and difficult consequences of this news, including treatment side-effects, 
frequent hospital visits, changes to social roles and relationships, as well as 
adjusting to other emotional and existential implications of this life-threatening 
illness (Weisman and Worden, 1976). It is perhaps little wonder that 
psychological disorders, particularly anxiety and depression, are common 
among cancer patients, with prevalence rates of between 30 and 50 per cent. 
(Derogatis, Morrow, Fetting et al, 1983; Brennan and Leach, 1996).
The diagnostic criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the revised 
3rd edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMIII- 
R: American Psychiatric Association, 1987), specifically excluded patients with 
medical illnesses. Illness was not considered to be “outside the range of normal 
human experience” or a stressor of sufficient magnitude to produce the 
syndrome of PTSD. However, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD in the 4th 
edition of the DSM of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) no longer emphasise the importance of the event itself but 
also consider the psychological experience of the person in the event (e.g. 
intense fear and helplessness.) More specifically, the definition of the traumatic 
event includes “being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness”. Consequently, 
people with cancer may now be considered to be at risk for PTSD.
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It is reasonable to ask whether there is sufficient empirical evidence to support 
the notion that the diagnosis of cancer itself can lead to PTSD. If this is the 
case, what steps might be taken to mitigate the trauma of the diagnosis so as to 
prevent the development of PTSD? This review will limit itself to adults with 
cancer, rather than survivors of childhood cancer.
The Clinical Diagnosis of PTSD
The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the development of 
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme stressor (Criterion 
A). The nature of this stressor involves actual or threatened death or serious 
injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity or that of others (DSM-IV: 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
The three groups of characteristic symptoms in PTSD include:
Criterion B: repeated reliving of the trauma through intrusive memories, 
flashbacks or dreams, producing intense distress.
Criterion C: avoidance of cues which elicit memories of the trauma -  these 
cues can be environmental or intra-psychic, e.g. a memory. Several of these 
features may be subsumed under the general term dissociation phenomena. 
Criterion C includes a “sense of a foreshortened future (e.g. does not expect to 
have a career, marriage, children or a normal life span)” (p.428). In cancer this 
is often a realistic and common concern (Weisman and Worden, 1976) but 
perhaps so common as to be functionally useless as a diagnostic discriminator.
Criterion D: increased arousal (sleep problems, irritability, poor concentration, 
hypervigilance and exaggerated startle response.) As will be seen below, 
Criterion D has rarely been systematically measured in cancer patients.
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In order to meet the full diagnostic criteria of PTSD, components of these three 
groups of symptoms must be present for more than one month (Criterion E) 
and the disturbance must be seen to cause significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational or other important areas of functioning (Criterion F).
PTSD and psychological symptoms in cancer
A number of studies have attempted to study PTSD symptomatology among 
cancer patients. Cordova et al (1995) assessed 55 primary breast cancer 
patients (stages I to III), 6 to 60 months after the end of their treatment. 71% 
had had a mastectomy, 29% had had a lumpectomy and most subjects had had 
adjuvant radiotherapy or chemotherapy. They were assessed using the Impact 
of Event Scale (IES) (Horowitz, 1979), the PTSD Checklist -  Civilian version 
(PTSD-C) (Weathers, Huska and Keane, 1991), and a quality of life/general 
health measure.
Forty-nine per cent of subjects indicated that they experienced repeated, 
disturbing memories of their “experiences with cancer”, and between 5% and 
10% of subjects appeared to merit a DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD. Although this 
is roughly equivalent to base-rate PTSD among women in the general 
community (Resnick, Kilpatrick et al, 1993) the authors point out that their 
study limited itself to cancer-related experiences so may underestimate the 
prevalence of PTSD among its sample. This study is weakened by its small 
sample size, its retrospective nature and its exclusive use of self-report measures.
Other retrospective cross-sectional studies have reported similarly high levels of 
intrusion and avoidance at various intervals after active treatment has ended 
(Ostroff, Mashberg and Lesko, 1989; Kornblith , Anderson, Celia, et al, 1992a; 
Komblith , Anderson, Celia, et al, 1992b; Kornblith, Herr, and Ofman, 1994; 
Greenberg, Goorin, Gebhardt et al, 1994), suggesting that psychological
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reactions to diagnosis, treatment and the psychosocial consequences of the 
disease are highly persistent.
The effect of concurrent stress was studied by Baider and Kaplan De-Nour 
(1997) who surveyed three groups of early breast cancer patients an average of 
three years after their diagnosis. The group with concurrent stress (recent 
immigrants) had the highest distress on the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
(Derogatis and Spencer, 1982) and the highest intrusion and avoidance scores 
on the IES. The group with no additional stress had the lowest distress and 
intrusion scores, while those with a history of trauma (Holocaust survivors) fell 
between the other groups
A prospective Norwegian study (Tjemsland, Soreide, and Malt, 1996a) assessed 
106 consecutive female patients with early breast cancer (stage I or II) before 
surgery, only one or two weeks after their diagnoses, by means of a psychiatric 
interview, the IES, and the General Health Questionnaire-28 (Goldberg and 
Williams, 1988). Subjects reported high levels of intrusion and avoidance. The 
two highest scored items were: “I’ve had waves of strong feelings about the 
illness” (an intrusion item endorsed by 95% of subjects) and “I’ve felt as if the 
illness hadn’t happened or as if it was not real” (an avoidance item endorsed by 
87% of the subjects). Levels of distress were predictably high in view of the 
temporal proximity to the diagnosis. There was a statistically significant 
association between IES intrusion and ‘casehood’ on the GHQ.
When the patients were reassessed six weeks after surgery, their traumatic stress 
symptoms were significantly lower (Tjemsland, Soreide, and Malt, 1996b). High 
scores on intrusive anxiety had dropped from 44% of subjects to 18%, and 
avoidance had dropped from 29% to 14%. However, half the patients reported 
having difficulty falling asleep because of “pictures or thoughts about the illness 
coming into my mind”, and half the patients admitted avoiding talking about 
their illness. Many patients continued to have dissociative symptoms such as 
feelings of unreality and numbness, or continued to have bad dreams about the
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illness. On the whole, however, IES variables in the pre-surgery phase were 
poor predictors of the same variables six-weeks post-surgery. In summary, by 
the time the patients were retested, their initially high levels of anxiety and 
intrusion had declined dramatically, yet 8% of the sample were considered to 
have a possible PTSD.
Matched pairs offers a stronger design and this methodology has been pursued 
by a few authors. Celia and Tross (1986) compared 60 male Hodgkin’s disease 
survivors with 20 age-matched healthy men (acquaintances of some of the 
survivors). Participants had been disease-free and had received no treatment for 
the previous 6 to 140 months (median 24 months). Subjects were administered 
the BSI, a sexual functioning scale, the IES, Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965), and a semi-structured interview to examine global 
adjustment. For the IES, control subjects were asked to consider a self-specified 
stress (e.g. personal injury, death of spouse).
On most measures there was little difference between the two groups.
However, while the survivor sample showed greater appreciation of life than 
controls, they also showed significantly more avoidance and intrusion. Although 
this study supports the general finding of increased intrusive and avoidant 
thinking in cancer survivors, it provided no information regarding the presence 
of PTSD. Furthermore, the control group was not randomly selected which 
may have introduced some bias in the results.
A more recent study also used matched pairs but is weakened by small numbers, 
being part of a PTSD field trial for DSM-IV (Alter, Pelcovitz, Axelrod, et al, 
1996). Interviews were conducted with 27 randomly selected female patients, 
three years after their diagnosis of cancer (22 of the 27 had had breast cancer). 
A matched control group, demographically comparable, was identified in the 
community through a random-digit dialling procedure. None of the community 
sample had had cancer themselves. Current and lifetime PTSD was assessed 
using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III (SCID). A diagnosis of
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lifetime disorder was made when symptoms of PTSD occurred at any time more 
than six months prior to the interview. Psychological distress was measured 
using the Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90) (Derogatis, 1977).
None of the control group showed any indication of PTSD while among the 
cancer survivors, one was shown to have current PTSD and a further six met 
lifetime criteria for PTSD (all related to their “cancer experience”). Those with 
lifetime PTSD had significantly higher psychological distress scores than those 
not meeting PTSD criteria. In summary, those with a previous history of PTSD 
as a result of their cancer suffered significant continued distress three years later.
One prospective matched-pair study sheds some light on the development of 
anxiety and depression even though patients diagnosed with frank PTSD were 
excluded from the study. Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, et al (submitted for 
publication) compared 65 depressed and 65 non-depressed cancer patients 
(matched by age, sex, type of cancer, and size and spread of the disease) from a 
cancer outpatient department, on measures of intrusive memories of stressful 
life events, using the IES. The authors fail to specify the time since diagnosis 
and whether it was a first diagnosis. The depressed group (as defined by the 
HAD) were subdivided according to whether or not they met DSM-IV criteria for 
major depression (assessed by the SCID) into mildly depressed and severely 
depressed.
Prior to the analysis and in order to answer other research questions, six 
patients who met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD were excluded (5 severely 
depressed and 1 control patient). Of the remaining subjects, the researchers 
found that 11% of controls, 32% of mildly depressed and 43% of severely 
depressed reported at least one intrusive memory. Among the intrusive 
memories reported, 76% were clearly related to illness, injury and death (e.g. 
friends or relatives) and 44% were specifically related to cancer.
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In a subsequent study (Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, et al, in press) the same 
patients were re-interviewed six months later. Due to subject attrition (mainly 
death) only 28 of the 35 subjects, who at baseline reported at least one intrusive 
memory, were re-assessed as to their continued experience of intrusive 
memories. Continued intrusion of the same memory was highly predictive of 
depression at the second time point. Also, the presence of at least one intrusive 
memory at baseline was associated with greater anxiety at follow-up, with 
greater avoidance of the memories at baseline predicting more anxiety at follow- 
up. The authors speculated that intrusive memories (e.g. of deaths in the past) 
have salience for cancer patients who are anxiously concerned about future 
threat (e.g. recurrence and their own death) and that by the follow-up period the 
protection afforded by avoidance had broken down causing more anxiety.
In view of its more bleak implications, the diagnosis of recurrent disease is 
arguably a more ‘severe’ traumatic event than the first diagnosis and, indeed, 
data from two studies suggest that it results in more traumatic symptomatology. 
Kaasa, Malt, Hagen, et al, (1993), studied 247 patients (46% women) with 
mixed-site metastatic cancer undergoing palliative radiotherapy. Subjects were 
given the IES, GHQ-20, and a pain questionnaire before the start of their 
treatment. The amount of time since diagnosis was unreported in this study and, 
more importantly, the authors do not specify how many of the patients were 
coping with a first diagnosis of cancer and how many a diagnosis of recurrence. 
One third of the patients scored above the “high” threshold on either the 
intrusion or avoidance subscales of the IES, and 21% scored high on both 
scales. Interestingly, in view of the fact that many, if not all the patients were 
probably coping with a recurrence of their illness, 65% reported feelings of 
unreality, as if the cancer had not happened or was not real. The authors 
concluded that a “substantial number” of the patients in their study appeared to 
be suffering with a clinical syndrome conforming to PTSD though, without data 
on the duration of symptoms and a specific diagnostic assessment, this claim is 
impossible to substantiate from the data presented.
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An earlier study specifically considered disease recurrence. Celia, Mahon and 
Donovan (1990) recruited patients who had been disease-free for at least six 
months before their recurrence. 40 subjects (with mixed tumour types) were all 
undergoing cytotoxic chemotherapy, were considered by their physician to have 
at least six months to live and had been given their diagnosis of recurrence 
within the past 30 days. They were given the IES, the PAIS-self-report 
(Derogatis and Lopez, 1983), and a semi-structured interview which included a 
question relating to the degree to which the patient was surprised by their 
recurrence diagnosis.
Results indicated high levels of psychological distress, significantly higher than a 
demographically equivalent mixed-cancer first-diagnosis reference group. 43% 
scored above the cut-off (20) for intrusive symptoms while 80% scored above it 
for avoidant symptoms. 78% of the sample reported finding their recurrence 
diagnosis more upsetting than their initial diagnosis, while only 8% found their 
initial diagnosis more upsetting. As predicted, those patients who were 
“completely surprised” had significantly higher intrusion scores that those who 
“knew it could happen” (who did best) or who were “not at all surprised”.
Among those with their first recurrence (two thirds of the sample) avoidant 
responses were more common. Intrusive symptoms also tended to be more 
common in this group though this did not attain significance. All but one 
patient experienced a “collapse of hope” following recurrence and roughly half 
the sample were concerned that their physician might decide not to treat the 
recurrent disease. 18% believed their families would be less supportive than 
after their first diagnosis, and there was also a belief that health care staff were 
not as interested and were not providing as much support or information as 
they had when the patient was first diagnosed.
The authors observed that “one important component of any trauma that places 
a person at increased risk for later symptomatology is the extent to which the 
victim is surprised by the experience,” (p. 16) an observation for which there 
appears to be strong evidence in general trauma literature (Foa, Steketee and
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Rothbaum, 1989). They conjectured that a moderate level of fear therefore 
may be adaptive in terms of preparing patients for the emotional impact of 
recurrence. However, this study is weakened both by its cross-sectional and 
retrospective design; in particular, those currently coping with the emotional 
distress of recurrence may have distorted their recall of their earlier diagnosis.
Summary and Methodological Limitations
These empirical studies of cancer patients suggest that psychological distress 
and high levels of intrusion and avoidance are common in the weeks following 
diagnosis (Kaasa, Malt, Hagen, et al, 1993; Tjemsland, Soreide, and Malt, 
1996a; Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, et al, submitted for publication). These 
symptoms would likely be sufficient to meet DSM-IV criteria for PTSD were it 
not for their short duration and the fact that few papers have reported on 
physiological reactivity or arousal. However, they most likely reflect the normal 
processes of cognitive adjustment or, at worst, an acute stress disorder, rather 
than constituting the pathological symptoms of PTSD. Indeed, symptoms of 
PTSD may only differ from normal reactions in terms of their duration; the time 
at which assessments are made is therefore crucial (Passik, 1994).
Over the course of the ensuing weeks and months it appears that distress, 
intrusion and avoidance symptoms decline quite rapidly for the majority of 
patients (Tjemsland, Soreide, and Malt, 1996b), consistent with other types of 
trauma. However, although there is wide variation in the time of assessment 
among the studies reviewed, and while most of them are retrospective in design, 
there is a consensus indicating persistent PTSD-like symptoms among a 
minority of patients months or even years after diagnosis and the cessation of 
treatment (Baider and Kaplan De-Nour, 1997;Ostroff, Mashberg and 
Lesko,1989; Komblith , Anderson, Celia, et al, 1992a, 1992b; Kornblith, Herr, 
and Ofman, 1994; Celia and Tross, 1986; Alter et al, 1996). Furthermore, a 
few authors have concluded that a diagnosis of PTSD may sometimes be 
warranted (Alter et al, 1996; Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, et al, in press;
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Cordova et al, 1995; Kaasa, Malt, Hagen, et al, 1993; Tjemsland, Soreide, and 
Malt, 1996b).
More prospective studies are needed in order to chart the course of these 
symptoms and disentangle key predictive variables. However, a difficulty in this 
field is defining when the trauma threat has passed, in view of the very real 
ongoing threat of disease recurrence. Some authors have questioned the utility 
of relating the trauma of illness to a psychiatric diagnosis at all, arguing that 
understanding how aspects of illness and treatment remain traumatic stressors 
years later is the more interesting question (Kazak, Stuber, Barakat and Meeske, 
1996).
DSM-IV notes that severity, duration and proximity of an individual’s exposure 
to the traumatic event are the most important factors affecting the likelihood of 
developing PTSD. In this regard, the data available among cancer patients is 
equivocal. Severity of disease was generally assessed by its clinical staging alone 
rather than also through its appraisal by patients, the latter criterion being 
emphasised by DSM-IV. Celia and Tross, (1986) reported evidence that both 
severity of disease at diagnosis and short interval since cessation of treatment 
predicted increased PTSD symptoms and Kaasa et al (1993) found poor 
performance status (i.e. physical capability) also predicted PTSD, a finding 
supported by other studies (Komblith, Herr, and Ofman, 1994). However, 
other authors reported no such relationships (Cordova et al, 1995; Alter, et al, 
1996). More aggressive treatments were also not found to predict PTSD 
symptomatology (Cordova et al, 1995), lending further support for the view that 
the major trauma of cancer is not the treatment but, more likely, the diagnosis.
Intrusive memories and avoidance are not sufficient in differentiating adaptive 
trauma-related distress from the presence of PTSD; an assessment of 
physiological reactivity or arousal is also necessary (Ehlers and Steil, 1995) yet 
few authors have reported data on these symptoms. Although people with 
cancer may develop heightened arousal, anxiety, nausea and vomiting, in
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response to certain treatments (e.g. cytotoxic chemotherapy) (Redd, Dadds et al,
1993), it is doubtful that these conditioned responses are the result of trauma 
since the patient is expecting the treatment and it is rarely perceived as life- 
threatening.
Most of the studies reviewed above have used the IES alone to measure PTSD 
symptoms though this scale is not sufficient for the assessment of PTSD (Passik,
1994). Recent theoretical work (Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph, 1996) has 
questioned the use of this scale, suggesting that it fails to capture the distinction 
between verbally accessible knowledge (i.e., conscious memory of the trauma) 
and situationally accessible knowledge (nonconscious representations of the 
trauma). This work also suggests that studies may underestimate levels of PTSD 
owing to their failure to identify subjects who may have prematurely inhibited 
active emotional processing.
Theoretical Implications
Cognitive and psychodynamic models of posttraumatic stress indicate that 
avoidance is a normal temporary defence or coping response to an 
overwhelming and distressing event (the trauma) which the individual is 
struggling to integrate with their existing cognitive world views or schema 
(Horowitz, 1986). According to these models, it is the individual’s internal 
schema or assumptive world which enables them to predict and negotiate the 
social and material world. Intrusion and avoidance work at opposite ends of a 
control system that regulates the absorption of new information. In this sense, 
avoidance can be seen as an activity which impedes emotional processing while 
intrusive reexperiencing serves the process of integration (Ehlers and Steil,
1995). When regarded as a coping mechanism, avoidance titrates the 
absorption of traumatic information while denial may act as a more extreme 
form of avoidance, permitting no absorption.
However, as researchers in other areas of trauma have observed, the 
relationship between intrusion and avoidance is not straightforward and little is
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known about their roles in determining later affective and arousal symptoms 
(Joseph, Yule and Williams, 1995). Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, et al (1998, in 
press) found that later anxiety could be predicted by the extent to which cancer 
patients with intrusive memories attempted to avoid these memories. The 
significance of intrusive memories for cancer patients therefore may be more to 
do with ongoing threat than past loss, and it is the breakdown of avoidance 
mechanisms that provokes more anxiety. Ehlers and Steil (1995) have stated 
that, in other traumas, negative interpretations of intrusive thoughts may lead to 
a sense of ongoing threat. They argue that the patient interprets the fact that 
they are experiencing intrusive thoughts as further evidence of prior maladaptive 
beliefs (e.g. “I have a brain injury”). This is distinct, however, from the trauma 
of cancer in which intrusive thoughts about the diagnosis and illness simply elicit 
the patient’s belief that they now have cancer and may die from it; it is doubtful 
that patients appraise their intrusions per se as evidence of disease progression.
One survey of over 600 cancer patients in remission found that the most 
commonly identified cancer-related concern was fear or uncertainty about the 
future (Dunkel-Schetter, Feinstein, Taylor and Falke, 1992). Yet, surprisingly, 
the concept of future threat in cancer has not been widely examined. A 
paradoxical rise in anxiety has been noted at the end of treatment as the 
individual faces an uncertain future without frequent contact with medical 
services (Holland, Rowland, Lebovits and Rusalem, 1979). A cancer diagnosis 
poses a future threat that is shaped by the individual’s idiosyncratic belief system 
about the course of cancer (Celia and Tross, 1987), and accurate, timely and 
accessible information may go some way towards correcting misconceptions 
about this issue (Fallowfield, 1993). It may be that the individual’s perception of 
their prognosis (i.e. the future threat) would be a more accurate measure of the 
traumatic impact of the diagnosis, rather than prognoses made by doctors based 
on clinical staging of the disease. No study has yet specifically examined this 
issue. However, those with a diagnosis of recurrence are more likely to have 
negative beliefs about their prognosis and, indeed, as this review has shown, this
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group of patients do appear to have much higher intrusion and avoidance 
scores (Kaasa, Malt, Hagen et al, 1993; Celia, Mahon and Donovan; 1990).
An alternative formulation would be to regard intrusive and avoidance 
phenomena in cancer as a special form of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
since there are useful parallels (Ehlers and Steil, 1995). In OCD, patients’ 
intrusive thoughts often centre on catastrophes that have yet to happen yet over 
which they idiosyncratically believe they may have some control. It is the 
presence of these intrusive thoughts that leads to distress and subsequent 
avoidance of the thoughts through compulsive neutralising activities (Salkovskis, 
1985). However, while cancer patients often have intrusive catastrophic 
thoughts of the future (e.g. images of dying, grief-stricken relatives etc.) there is 
little evidence, with the exception perhaps of “bargaining” (Kubler-Ross, 1970), 
that they show elevated levels of neutralising activity.
Cancer itself is not a discrete stressor yet researchers have tended to use cross- 
sectional designs to ask cancer patients in remission to rate retrospectively the 
impact of their “cancer experience” as a global entity. Few studies have 
attempted to disentangle the various components of the disease that might be 
appraised as traumatic (e.g. diagnosis, hospitalisation, chemotherapy etc.) and 
most studies have failed to examine the particular trauma of the diagnosis to 
which DSM-IV specifically alludes. Thus, the existing literature leaves open the 
question as to whether the primary source of trauma in cancer is the diagnosis, 
the treatment which follows, or some other factor. While this question remains 
unanswered, there are grounds for believing that the process of diagnosis is 
critically important in mitigating the traumatic effects of the bad news. For 
example, in one study (Manuel, Roth, Keefe and Brantley, 1987) 35 patients 
with head and neck cancer were asked to complete the SCL-90 and IES three 
days after diagnosis, four to six weeks later (often coinciding with active 
treatment) and two to three months after initial diagnosis. Results indicated that 
diagnosis was associated with the highest levels of anxiety and avoidance of the
~  27 ~
three time points, and that active treatment was associated with relief from 
stress-related symptoms.
Breaking the News of Cancer
A recent review (Ptacek and Eberhardt, 1996) of 67 medical papers on the 
breaking of bad news, published since 1985, concluded that while there is much 
clinical opinion expressed in the literature there is rarely any theoretical 
justification or empirical validation. It is also almost exclusively written from the 
clinician’s perspective which may fail to recognise the factors which minimise or 
exacerbate the patient’s distress. Some authors have argued that the enormity 
of the news that doctors must deliver may dwarf the issue of the way in which it 
is conveyed (Persaud, 1993). However, when integrated with the fore­
mentioned studies on PTSD symptoms, published work in this field leaves room 
for optimism that certain factors may help to minimise the traumatic impact of 
bad news interviews. The behaviour of health care professionals during the 
process of the diagnosis helps to set the tone for subsequent coping (Frank- 
Stromberg et al, 1984)
a.) Provide a warning shot (Ptacek and Eberhardt, 1996; Buckman, 1998; 
Faulkner, Maguire, and Regnard, 1994). Breaking bad news should be seen 
as a process which occurs over time, rather than an event, and an early 
indication that difficult information is about to be conveyed may help 
prepare the individual (Buckman, 1998).
Most authors agree that a core component for the development of PTSD is 
the unexpectedness of the traumatic event (Ehlers and Steil, 1995). If an 
individual’s cognitive resources are entirely unprepared for bad news they 
are likely to be overwhelmed by it and avoidance and intrusion symptoms 
are more likely. Celia et al (1990) have shown that those who were 
“completely surprised” by their diagnosis of recurrence had significantly 
higher intrusion scores than those who “knew it could happen”.
Correspondingly, Tjemsland, Soreide, and Malt (1996b) have suggested that 
women with a close relative with breast cancer may be more emotionally 
prepared for the possibility of getting cancer themselves and may have 
learned that it is possible to survive the disease with a reasonable quality of 
life. Initial acceptance of the diagnosis has been associated in other studies 
with a family history of cancer (Frank-Stromberg, Wright, Segalla and 
Diekmann, 1984).
A further study which offers indirect support for giving patients time to 
prepare for their diagnosis found that at eight weeks follow-up, women with 
breast malignancies attending a ‘one-stop’ (same day) clinic had significantly 
higher levels of depression than women attending the traditional two-stop 
clinic in which patients must wait several days for their diagnosis (Harcourt 
Ambler, Rumsey and Cawthorn, 1997). The use of an ‘advocacy’ style of 
nurse counsellor intervention, in which the nurse prepares the patient for the 
diagnostic consultation with the physician, offers promise in this regard. 
Using this approach, the nurse helps patients develop a list of questions they 
would like to ask, whatever the diagnosis, thereby preparing the patients’ for 
possible bad news. However, so far support for this model is equivocal 
(Ambler, Rumsey, Harcourt et al, 1997).
b.) Allow patients to control the amount of information conveyed to them
over time, and provide as much information about the diagnosis and 
treatment as the patient requires. The diagnosis of cancer often elicits 
inaccurate, often catastrophic beliefs of impending death and a perceived 
sudden loss of control. Foa and colleagues have argued that what 
distinguishes PTSD from other anxiety disorders is that the trauma has 
violated basic concepts of safety; the world suddenly becomes less 
predictable and controllable (Foa, Steketee and Rothbaum, 1989). Effective 
emotional processing of a trauma requires the absorption of new 
information (Ehlers and Steil, 1995). Factual information may therefore 
mitigate the traumatic impact of the diagnosis by correcting misconceptions
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about the disease and its prognosis, increasing a sense of control, safety and 
predictability, thereby reducing its perceived threat (Ptacek and Eberhardt, 
1996). Perceived control is also thought to be essential to the maintenance 
of non-depressed mood (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Denial and avoidance 
are likely to work against this process.
However, the importance of providing adequate information at the point of 
diagnosis is complex. One study of breast cancer patients indicated that 
although patients who felt well-informed about their diagnosis and treatment 
experienced less anxiety and depression at one year follow-up than those 
who felt inadequately informed, most women acknowledged that they had 
been too shocked on hearing the word ‘cancer’ to absorb much of the rest of 
the interview (Fallowfield, Baum and Maguire, 1986).
The use of tape-recordings of medical consultations appears to improve 
patient retention of information and facilitates patients’ requests for 
clarification (Ford, Fallowfield, Hall and Lewis, 1995) but does not appear to 
reduce psychological morbidity (McHugh, Lewis, Ford et al, 1995). Over 
the course of their illness and its treatment, however, many patients report 
that their need for information changes (Blumberg, Kems and Lewis, 1983) 
and what may be important is that easy access to information enhances a 
patient’s sense of control and safety in their uncertain situation.
c.) Identify support network and encourage emotional processing. Many 
authors have commented on the importance of enhancing social support 
through (i) encouraging patients to invite someone supportive to their 
diagnostic interview, (ii) working with the patient to identify further sources 
of support, and (iii) encouraging patients to regard their physician as an 
additional support resource (Ptacek and Eberhardt, 1996). Lack of social 
support, especially partner support, was found to be a significant risk factor 
for the development of PTSD symptoms (Tjemsland, Soreide, and Malt, 
1996b), consistent with research on other sources of PTSD (Ehlers and Steil,
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1995; Jones and Barlow, 1990). Lack of social support is also a significant 
risk factor for the development of psychological disorders in cancer patients 
(Rowland, 1990). The availability of good social support is associated with 
complete and successful processing of trauma (Brewin, Dalgleish and 
Joseph, 1996) possibly because it allows victims to reappraise the cause of 
the event as external and not attributable to their own actions (Joseph, 
Brewin, Yule and Williams, 1991), or by correcting maladaptive 
interpretations of the trauma (Ehlers and Steil, 1995). Pennebaker (1993) 
has shown that even simply writing about the trauma may help people 
assimilate it into new more elaborate schemata. In view of the study by 
Celia et al (1990), described above, it is especially important to ensure that 
those facing a diagnosis of recurrence have adequate support from both 
family members and professionals.
d.) Retain a clear sense of hope, even when the prognosis is poor. Believing 
that one’s situation retains some element of hope appears to be essential for 
cognitive adaptation (Weisman and Worden, 1976; Carver, Pozo, Harris, et 
al, 1993). Celia et al (1990) noted that “the central organising theme with 
respect to the impact of recurrence seems to be the loss of hope” (p. 20).
All but one of the 40 patients in their study acknowledged that they felt less 
hope at recurrence than they had at first diagnosis. In one Scandanavian 
study (Boland, 1985), the highest incidence of suicide was found in cancer 
patients who had been offered no further treatment and no further contact 
with the health care system.
e.) Encourage active collaboration. Construing oneself as actively engaging 
in cancer prevention, such as continuing to take tamoxifen (Alter et al,
1996), appears to be a common and adaptive coping mechanism (Taylor, 
1983). Many patients want to participate in the fight against their cancer 
and often do so by turning to complementary therapists who offer a level of 
active collaboration that is absent in conventional medical settings (Sheard,
1994). Active coping among cancer patients has been positively associated
with optimism and acceptance of the disease (Carver, Pozo, Harris, et al,
1993) and the time of diagnosis could therefore be used as an opportunity to 
engage the patient in the use of such active coping mechanisms (e.g. health 
education advice on healthy eating, stress management, exercise etc.) 
Although studies have reported that not all patients want to be active 
collaborators in their treatment (Degner and Sloan, 1992), it remains likely 
that many patients wish to create a discontinuity with their pre-cancer 
lifestyles (Taylor, 1983).
Conclusions
Whether or not cancer patients commonly merit the full diagnosis of PTSD, 
there is growing evidence that a significant minority develop many of the key 
symptoms of the syndrome, particularly cognitive intrusion and avoidance, and 
psychological distress. What has not been adequately documented among 
cancer patients is the prolonged physiological arousal that is a necessary 
criterion for the diagnosis PTSD. Furthermore, with a few exceptions, the 
studies reviewed have largely failed to specify the cancer diagnosis as the 
primary traumatic event and have tended to measure responses to cancer as a 
global entity. More prospective longitudinal studies focusing on the traumatic 
effects of diagnosis are needed to disentangle the normal processes of cognitive 
adjustment from longer-term symptoms of PTSD. If the diagnosis of cancer can 
be reliably shown to be the source of post-traumatic symptomatology, an 
obvious further question will be whether PTSD treatments that have been found 
to be effective in general trauma are also efficacious in cancer. In the 
meantime, experimental and theoretical work to date offers a number of clues 
as to how the process of delivering bad news may be refined in order to mitigate 
its traumatic impact.
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CRITICAL REVIEW 2
ADJUSTMENT TO CANCER: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
OF THE CONCEPT
Introduction
Surveys of psychological disorders among cancer patients have found 
prevalence rates of between 30 and 50 per cent for anxiety and depression 
(Derogatis, Morrow, Fetting et al, 1983; Brennan and Leach, 1996). The term 
‘adjustment’ has come to be used in the cancer and health psychology literature 
to denote the absence of such psychological morbidity, and a return to pre- 
morbid functioning. It is therefore not surprising that ‘psychological adjustment’ 
is an important concept in research into chronic illness (Hatchett, Friend, 
Symister and Wadhwa, 1997).
As a result of this appropriate concern with psychological morbidity there has 
been a preoccupation in the field of psycho-oncology with the prediction and 
early detection of affective disorders (through screening measures and improved 
communication skills of health professionals), as well as with the efficacy of 
therapeutic interventions (Maguire, 1995). However, social psychiatry is only 
one approach to prevention in this area. Another is to develop an 
understanding of the psychological processes involved in coping with the 
implications of cancer, and then to test ways of mitigating their impact so as to 
prevent the psychological disorders with which cancer is so commonly 
associated. Yet within psychosocial oncology literature, theoretical models of 
adjustment have rarely been articulated from which testable predictions can be 
made about the development of psychological disorders, nor about steps that 
might be taken to prevent them.
Without adequate definition and theoretical underpinning, use of the term 
adjustment may be vague and misleading. The term ‘adjustment’ suggests the 
completion of change from one state to another, and research has often focused
~  41 ~
on adjustment as if it were merely the end-point of coping with the global threat 
of cancer; indeed, “poor adjustment” is sometimes used to denote psychological 
morbidity. The patient’s medical condition, especially the presence or absence 
of unpleasant symptoms like pain and the side-effects of treatment, such as 
fatigue, nausea and vomiting (Rodrigue, Behen and Tumlin, 1994), as well as 
more advanced illness (Bukberg et al, 1984), are highly associated with poor 
psychological functioning but it is questionable whether morbidity caused in this 
way should be equated with “poor adjustment”. Confusion is further 
compounded by use of the psychiatric diagnosis of adjustment disorder which 
describes “significant emotional or behavioral symptoms in response to an 
identifiable psychosocial stressor or stressors.” (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994.) Again, it is arguable whether psychological turmoil 
provoked by a life event should be regarded as morbid or part of the adaptive 
process.
Rather than viewing adjustment as an end-state, it may be more fruitful to ask: 
what are the components of a normal “adjustment” to cancer, what is it that is 
being ‘adjusted’, and what processes are involved? It is the purpose of this 
paper to review the concept of adjustment as a psychological/developmental 
process and to suggest theoretical links between this process and the 
development of psychological disorders in cancer, offering a number of 
hypotheses for preventing these disorders. Finally, the paper will consider the 
relationship between the concepts of adjustment and quality of life.
Problems of Definition
The concept of adjustment originates from the Darwinian notion of 
“adaptation” which posits that those species most fitted to adapt to the dangers 
of the physical world are most likely to survive (Moos, 1986). Watson and 
colleagues (Watson, Greer, Young, et al, 1988) have defined adjustment to 
cancer as “the cognitive and behavioural responses the patient makes to the 
diagnosis of cancer” (p.203). This narrow definition of the term fails to include 
other important aspects, including the social and spiritual dimensions of
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adaptation, responses to stressful events following diagnosis such as treatment 
and discharge, and any indication of what constitutes a healthy or successful 
adjustment. An earlier more encompassing and satisfactory definition suggests 
that “adjustment consists of the psychological processes by means of which the 
individual manages or copes with various demands or pressures” (Lazarus,
1969, p.18.)
The diagnosis of cancer and its aftermath undoubtedly leads to major life 
changes in a significant proportion of people, though these changes are not 
always negative and it is not clear that they are detected by the more commonly 
used outcome measures within psychosocial oncology (e.g. Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression (HAD) scale [Zigmond and Snaith, 1983], Profile of Mood States 
[Lorr and McNair, 1984], etc.). For example, in one survey of 200 cancer 
survivors, 30% had changed jobs and 23% had changed their living 
arrangements in the two years since their treatment (Stalker, Johnson and 
Cimma, 1990). While levels of anxiety and depression may return to premorbid 
levels, rarely does a cancer patient describe a sense of continuity with their lives 
before cancer — there is invariably a shift in the individual’s sense of themselves 
and the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Taylor, 1983).
Adjustment as a process of adaptation to change
Rather than viewing adjustment as the attainment of a normatively-derived 
emotional state (e.g. a particular threshold on the HAD), it might be clearer to 
reserve the term to describe the process of adaptation that people make to 
changed circumstances in their lives. This broader and more neutral definition 
emphasises a more psychological and developmental approach. The process 
has been conceptualised in a number of ways. Social-cognitive theorists have 
examined the nature of the adaptation from one state to another and the 
psychological tasks facing the individual. They have focused on adjustment as a 
goal or journey that individuals strive to negotiate. Coping theorists (e.g.
Lazarus and Folman, 1984; Nerenz and Leventhal, 1983), by contrast, have 
focused on the strategies or vehicles that people employ to negotiate the
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adjustment journey and mitigate the negative emotions generated by the change 
or threat. It will be argued that both these inter-related approaches offer the 
field of psycho-oncology useful models with which to understand the processes 
of adjustment and to prevent later psychological and social problems.
Coping
According to coping theory (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), coping is the process 
of managing internal and external demands which are appraised as taxing or 
exceeding the resources of the individual. It is an interaction between the 
individual and the environment in which each affects the other.
Coping research in cancer has largely examined relationships between coping 
responses and psychological outcomes (Parle, Jones and Maguire, 1996) though 
these studies have mostly used cross-sectional designs and employed self-report 
measures of coping responses to recent stresses. Lazarus (1993) has pointed 
out that, because of the diverse threats that people with cancer may be dealing 
with at any moment, research on the coping process must specify “the 
particular threats of immediate concern to the patient and to treat them 
separately rather than broadening the focus of attention to the overall illness” (p. 
236). He has made a distinction between research focusing on a person’s 
coping style, a general propensity to deal with stress in a particular way, and 
that focusing on elements of the coping process. Both approaches are 
important and both are evident in the psycho-oncology literature.
The diagnosis, treatment and aftermath of cancer involves a long process of 
adaptation to multiple threats and novel experiences. How an individual 
characteristically appraises and responds to these threats and experiences is 
known as their coping style. The implicit assumption of the coping style 
approach is that coping will reflect a relatively enduring attitudinal/behavioural 
style, similar to a personality trait.
- 4 4 -
Watson has used the term “mental adjustment” to denote the coping style of 
individuals in the face of a diagnosis of cancer (Watson, et al, 1988). Watson 
et al (1988) developed the Mental Adjustment to Cancer (MAC) scale which 
identifies five behavioural styles of coping: denial/avoidance, fighting spirit, 
fatalism, helplessness/hopelessness, and anxious preoccupation. They found 
that the last three coping styles were significantly associated with depression as 
measured by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale which was 
simultaneously administered. They also reported that the response of “fighting 
spirit” was significantly associated with less psychological distress (Watson, et al, 
1991) and found a similar positive association with the response of denial 
(Watson, Greer, Blake and Shrapnell, 1984), though this was not replicated in 
their later studies.
In a prospective study (Carver, Pozo, Harris, et al, 1993) of 59 early stage 
breast cancer patients, optimism was measured initially and coping (COPE) and 
distress (POMS) were assessed repeatedly around the time of surgery and again 
up to 12 months post-surgery. The results indicated that optimism was 
inversely related to distress at each assessment point, but positively related to 
active coping efforts, and acceptance of the reality of the disease. This suggests 
that optimism may be a personality trait which is associated with the use of 
certain coping behaviours. This study reported that denial correlated with 
higher distress, opposite to the early findings reported by Watson et al (1984). 
The authors speculated that acceptance of the situation is important for 
adjusting to it when the situation, like cancer, has to be endured. This view is 
consistent with bereavement literature which indicates that denial is a 
“temporary solution” which, if it persists, can lead to later maladaptive 
adjustment (Parkes, 1988).
The coping style approach has led to some fruitful clinical research (Moorey, 
Greer, Watson et al, 1994) in which patients’ underlying schemata have been 
altered (leading to the reduction of helplessness and an increase in fighting spirit) 
through the use of Adjuvant Psychological Therapy (APT) (Moorey and Greer,
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1989), a form of cognitive-behavioural therapy adapted for use with cancer 
patients. However, a recent study on testicular cancer patients has failed to 
support the efficacy of APT in this particular group (Moynihan, 1998).
The coping style approach is limited by the concept of coping leading to 
consistent behavioural responses by the individual rather than as a situation- 
specific variable which may change over time in the light of different stresses. 
There is some evidence (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen and De Longis, 1986) to 
support the idea that problem-focused coping is more responsive to the nature 
of the stressful context, while emotion-focused coping is more influenced by 
personal factors, but this work has not been conducted with respect to the 
specific stresses of cancer. In cancer, the appraisal of threat is likely to vary 
according to the stage of the disease and its treatment. For example, anxious 
preoccupation may not characterise an individual while undergoing their 
treatment, though it may be a significant feature of their behaviour prior to a 
hospital follow-up appointment.
Lazarus (1993) has emphasised the importance of appraisal variables though 
these have been rarely examined in the field of cancer. One exception to this 
was a study by Parle, Jones and Maguire (1996) which sought to assess the role 
that coping in the first few weeks after diagnosis had in the later development of 
affective disorders. They prospectively studied 673 newly diagnosed cancer 
patients to assess the effects of their appraisals, coping responses and resolution 
of 14 specific concerns to do with their cancer (as measured using a semi­
structured interview) on subsequent mental health (as measured by the 
Psychiatric Assessment Schedule). They found that neither the nature of the 
patients’ concerns, nor any specific coping response, predicted the development 
of an affective disorder. However, they did find that those who had high levels 
of generalised worry and multiple concerns were subsequently more likely to feel 
helpless and do nothing in response to these concerns.
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The finding that helplessness, which may be regarded as a negative secondary 
appraisal (i.e. a belief that one does not have the resources to cope with a 
particular threat), was predictive of affective disorders is consistent with Watson 
et al’s (1991) data though, because of the cross-sectional design of this earlier 
study, it was not apparent whether helplessness was a result of dysphoria or 
whether the reverse was true. The Parle, Jones and Maguire data suggest that 
“adaptive copers hold outcome expectancies and self-efficacy beliefs that are 
likely to facilitate their performance of coping responses” (p. 743).
A number of studies of cancer patients have reported cross-sectional data to 
support the idea that coping strategies characterised by avoidance or 
acceptance-resignation are associated with poor psychological adjustment 
(Dunkel-Schetter, Feinstein, Taylor and Falke, 1992) while active coping 
responses are associated with good outcome (Rodrigue, Behen and Tumlin,
1994). In one prospective study, Manuel, Roth, Keefe et al (1987) found that 
patients using high-approach strategies (e.g. spending a lot of time thinking 
about the implications of the illness) and those using high-avoidance strategies 
(e.g. distracting themselves by minimising the importance of the illness and 
getting on with other activities) reported less distress than those who were 
passive and made few attempts to actively cope with their disease.
The beneficial effects of active coping is reinforced by Dodds et al (1994) who 
proposed a model of adjustment in which two interrelated superordinate 
constructs are involved in the concept of the self. ‘Self as agent’ denotes a 
sense of personal control and a feeling that one is able to be successful at future 
tasks (self-efficacy), while ‘self-worth’ involves self-esteem and the absence of 
anxiety and depression. Using structural modelling techniques, this model was 
compared with other models based on data from the Nottingham Adjustment 
Scale which was given to 469 blind clients still adjusting to the loss of their sight 
at a rehabilitation centre. The authors found that acceptance and adjustment 
were strongly related to ‘self as agent’ but only weakly to ‘self-worth’. All these 
studies suggest that interventions that promote increased self-efficacy and enable
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people with cancer to take control of, and participate in their lives again, are 
likely to help restore their confidence and self-esteem.
Adjustment as Psychosocial Transition
Social-cognitive theorists are concerned with the nature of the change in 
individuals when they are confronted with a novel experience. Unlike coping 
theorists who focus on how people respond to a crisis, social-cognitive theorists 
are interested in what is required of an individual in such circumstances though, 
confusingly, coping theorists often subsume “cognitive adjustment” under the 
rubric “emotion-focused coping” (e.g. Broadstock and Borland, 1998). It could 
be argued that social-cognitive theorists attempt to define the context or agenda 
for coping efforts.
Parkes (1971) used the term “psychosocial transition” to describe the necessary 
change in a person’s “assumptive world” when confronted by a critical life event 
such as bereavement (Parkes, 1988). Such events may have emotional, 
material, psychological or existential implications for a person’s life space 
(Lewin, 1935), or that part of the environment with which the individual 
interacts. The “assumptive world” is the result of the total accumulation of an 
individual’s life experience. It allows people to classify and predict the world 
around them in order to safely negotiate it and satisfy their needs. The concept 
of the assumptive world is similar to that of cognitive schema (Neisser, 1967). 
Since a person’s life space is continuously changing from moment to moment, 
so too is their assumptive world being confirmed or disconfirmed, reinforced or 
altered in a continuous process of elaboration, refinement and adjustment.
Small unexpected changes in life space require only small modifications in the 
assumptive world. However, more profound changes, e.g. psychologically 
threatening events (such as a cancer diagnosis), are thought to overwhelm 
temporarily the capacity of the assumptive world to predict or react adaptively 
to prevailing circumstances. Such disorientation can be seen in the period
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immediately following a life-threatening diagnosis: information is hard to process 
and for hours, often days, the individual struggles to accept what he or she has 
been told. According to Horowitz (1986) there follows a psychological need to 
integrate the new information with existing schemata, termed the ‘completion 
tendency’ (manifested as re-experiencing the event or having intrusive memories 
of it), which is thwarted by a competing need to defend the mind from the full 
impact of the information (i.e. avoidance or denial).
This approach complements the foregoing discussion regarding active us. 
passive coping strategies: “In the early stages of a trauma, avoidance can reduce 
stress and anxiety while allowing for a gradual recognition of the threat; later, 
only approach [sic] will allow for the assimilation and resolution of threat and 
trauma into an integrated self-structure” (Manuel et al, 1987, p. 150).
Successful adjustment thus involves the individual adaptively assimilating 
(merging new information into existing assumptions) or accommodating change 
(modifying existing assumptions about the world to be able to incorporate the 
new information) (Piaget, 1952).
Inherent in this model, which has been elaborated by others (Moos, 1986; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1985, 1992), is the notion that every new experience, whether 
appraised as positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant, involves the certainty 
that people will either “creatively reformulate” (or reappraise) the experience or 
modify their assumptions about the world in order to accommodate it. In most 
situations both processes are operating. In the case of overwhelming life events, 
like receiving a cancer diagnosis, it is often the individual’s most fundamental 
assumptions that are at stake and require change. However, this process of 
accommodation involves huge amounts of cognitive processing, particularly 
since human information processing is biased towards cognitive conservatism 
and a tendency to maintain existing schema or deeply-held assumptions (Janoff- 
Bulman, 1992).
Both the life event itself and the subsequent intra-psychic changes in the 
individual will have consequences for members of the individual’s social network. 
These processes of intra-personal and inter-personal change are likely to 
produce emotions associated with stress, such as anxiety and dysphoria, and 
concomitant resistance to change such as denial and avoidance (Parkes, 1971; 
Janoff-Bulmann, 1992).
Changes to life space may lead to helpful and adaptive changes to, or 
confirmations of, the assumptive world in as far as these adjustments or 
confirmations allow people to interact more effectively in the social and material 
world. This is often experienced and described as “healthy personal growth”. 
On the other hand, events can also lead to maladaptive and unhelpful 
adjustments to the assumptive world (e.g. a sense of helplessness), or the 
confirmation of existing maladaptive assumptions (e.g. a sense of guilt), and this 
can lead to further distress and formal ‘disorders’.
This developmental view of adjustment has the advantage of being able to 
account for the otherwise paradoxical finding that many cancer patients describe 
their illness as having had a positive impact on their lives. A further advantage 
of this approach is that it can generate testable predictions about which 
assumptions are commonly undermined (or confirmed) by which specific threats 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and what factors are likely to facilitate or hinder their 
reconstruction. For example, assumptions that are held with extreme 
confidence and have not been challenged are more likely to be “shattered” with 
devastating results for the victim (Janoff-Bulmann, 1985). Moreover, one might 
hypothesise that changes in the assumptive world are made ever harder as the 
disease develops because of diminishing periods of time in which to effect a 
revision of one’s assumptive world. It is therefore little wonder that depression 
is more common in the terminally ill (Breitbart, Chochinov and Passik, 1998).
A number of authors have attempted to describe the task of adjustment in terms 
of the resolution of threats or incongruences with existing assumptions about
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the world. There is a degree of consensus among their conclusions. Cohn and 
Lazarus (1979) have postulated that illness entails a number of threats involving 
uncertainty to which the individual must respond. These include threats to (a) 
life; (b) bodily integrity and comfort; (c) self-concept and future plans; (d) 
emotional equilibrium as a result of the other threats; (e) social roles and 
activities; and (f) threats involving the need to adjust to new social or physical 
environments. Very similar constructs are described by Moos and Schaefer 
(1984).
Moorey and Greer (1989) conceptualised the stress of cancer along two 
dimensions: threat to survival (“our sense of mortality is shattered”) and threat to 
the self-image (mental and physical abilities, personal and social roles, and 
physical appearance). Janoff-Bulman (1992) takes a similar view when she 
writes that, at the core of the assumptive world, are abstract beliefs about self, 
the external world and the relationship between the two. “Extreme life events”, 
such as having cancer, shatter the assumptions that (a) the world is benevolent; 
(b) the world is meaningful; and (c) the self is worthy.
Taylor (1983) proposes a theory of cognitive adaptation which is essentially a 
similar conceptualisation of adjustment to the authors above. However, Taylor’s 
theory proposes certain emotion-focused coping strategies which function to 
restore schema which she postulates are illusions that are characteristic of 
positive mental health. She maintains that normal human thought involves 
overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery 
and unrealistic optimism (Taylor and Brown, 1988). The theory was derived on 
the basis of extensive interviews with 78 breast cancer patients who appeared to 
(a) search for a meaning for their predicament (finding a causal explanation for 
their cancer and restructuring the priorities of their lives as a result of their 
cancer); (b) gain a sense of mastery (believing that they could exert control over 
the course of their cancer; for example, believing that they had changed from 
the way they lived their lives before their diagnosis); and (c) enhance the self
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(through construing personal benefit from the illness or comparing themselves 
with others worse off).
While sound and plausible from a clinical and intuitive perspective, these 
conceptualisations largely fail to account for why people negotiating these 
changes appear to be vulnerable to the development of psychological disorders 
and other forms of distress. However, it is possible to synthesise three recurring 
themes from the work of social-cognitive theorists, each of which offer testable 
hypotheses for the prevention of psychosocial problems.
LOSS OF CONTROL
The diagnosis of cancer rapidly leads to fundamental changes in the relationship 
between the individual and their environment. Together with the perceived loss 
of control over the body (the prospect of having to accommodate changes to its 
appearance, capabilities and sensation), new cancer patients are suddenly faced 
with high levels of uncertainty (the possibility/probability of their death) and 
novelty (the complex medical environment) over which they perceive they can 
exert little control. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1979) predicts that in situations 
of novelty, ambiguity and fear people are likely to regress to more infantile ways 
of behaving. In particular, they are likely to welcome any benign figure of 
authority who provides safety by appearing to be in control of the situation. 
Thus, like denial, regression may serve to provide a temporary defence at times 
when the assumptive world is unable to negotiate and predict prevailing reality. 
Crisis theory (Moos, 1986) endorses the idea that people are especially 
receptive to outside influences at times of change and uncertainty.
Over the course of their illness, many people choose to collaborate more closely 
with their doctors and become better informed about their treatment and, as 
Taylor (1983) has observed, many people prefer to contribute actively to their 
treatment (e.g. 49% of her sample had changed their diet, believing that this 
would prevent recurrence). Furthermore, evidence from studies on coping, cited
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above, suggest that active coping and “self-as-agent” lead to self-efficacy and 
enhanced control.
Many theorists agree that a sense of personal control, whether illusory or not, is 
integral to the individual’s self-concept and self-esteem, as well as the 
maintenance of non-depressed mood (Taylor and Brown, 1988). The corollary 
of this is that measures to encourage cancer patients to resume as much control 
as they wish, over all aspects of their lives (including their treatment), is likely to 
have a beneficial effect on mood and may serve to prevent depression. On the 
one hand, people with cancer could be encouraged to assimilate or reappraise 
their perceived loss of control by the active coping response of reassuming 
control in some areas of their lives. At the same time, assumptions about 
control would gradually need to accommodate the fact that one may die sooner 
than expected, an event over which one has, indeed, limited control.
LOSS OF ENGAGEMENT
Much of a person’s sense of themselves, or their identity, is derived from a 
personal trajectory which offers goals and rewards in the future. Goals may be 
short-term and clear-cut (e.g. looking forward to meeting friends for lunch later 
this morning) to long-term and more abstract (e.g. one day writing a novel). In 
all aspects of life, goals and rewards provide structure and motivation. Without 
significant motivational structure in our lives we are in danger of feeling that life 
is pointless; apathy and a sense of helplessness can set in, and we are at risk of 
depression (Beck, 1967). Such a situation can occur, for example, in the 
context of long-term unemployment (Dew, Bromet and Penkower, 1992).
A life-threatening diagnosis, by definition, confronts the individual with his or 
her mortality. Almost regardless of the actual prognosis that has been given, 
many people begin to prepare for the possibility of their death (Weisman and 
Worden, 1976). Implicit long-standing life goals may suddenly become clear 
and distinct yet, at the same time, their eventual attainment may seem unlikely 
and unrealistic. Other goals may be dismissed as trivial and no longer
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important, while a number of people report that their illness helped them 
develop entirely new motivational priorities (Taylor, 1983).
Serious illnesses threaten the individual’s motivational framework which 
becomes in danger of breaking down. In cancer, the demands of months of 
radiotherapy and/or chemotherapy can lead the patient to feel dislocated, as 
they feel less and less engaged in their work and social lives. Life becomes 
dominated by treatment-related rituals (e.g. daily visits to the radiotherapy unit), 
and the side-effects of treatment (nausea, fatigue etc.) preclude the hope that 
one might fully enjoy an event or achieve something useful. Such events may 
lead to maladaptive assumptions about the world. Nerenz and Leventhal (1983) 
have described the contrast between individuals whose lives are entirely 
dominated by their disease and those who are able to “encapsulate” their 
disease, otherwise try to function normally, and regard it as only one 
component of the self. Some cancer patients appear to engage in what has 
been termed “defensive pessimism” (Norem and Cantor, 1986) by failing to 
make plans for the future lest they be disappointed (e.g. by a recurrence of their 
illness).
Beliefs in personal efficacy are associated with higher motivation, optimism and 
persistence which, in turn, may lead to a greater sense of personal control 
(Taylor and Brown, 1988; Dodds et al, 1994). Furthermore, having a “wished 
for” future is one component of hope (Nunn, 1996). The implication here is 
that interventions which encourage patients to maintain or enhance the 
motivational structure of their lives, and be future-oriented (i.e. develop plans 
and goals) are likely to prevent the development of depression and encourage 
the encapsulation of the disease. Again, this constitutes a strategy to prevent 
the development of maladaptive assumptions (e.g. “What’s the point in planning 
anything?”) by strengthening beliefs in personal efficacy. At the same time, pre­
existing assumptions about life goals must gradually accommodate any 
limitations imposed by the disease.
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LOSS OF SOCIAL SUPPORT
The diagnosis of cancer plunges people into a surreal world in which the 
individual can feel profoundly isolated and alone. Whatever the objective 
prognosis, it also confronts patients with the prospect of permanent separation 
from loved ones that will inevitably occur at the moment of their death. The 
examination of this stark reality is profoundly distressing, not only because of 
their fear of leaving the world alone, but also because people tend to anticipate 
the grief reaction of their survivors. Parents, in particular, commonly worry 
about the fate of their children after their death.
One of the paradoxical responses that people sometimes make as they 
contemplate future separation from loved ones, is premature withdrawal. 
Separation anxiety is not, of course, unique to the patient and may be acutely 
experienced by those most dependent on the person facing the illness; in these 
circumstances the patient may attempt to protect their dependants by not 
talking about their predicament, thus reinforcing their isolation. However, 
sometimes withdrawal is a caring but misguided desire to begin the process of 
separation early in order to prevent profound loss on the day of death.
Assumptions about relationships involve considerable assimilation and 
accommodation over the course of a cancer illness as both the patient and his 
or her significant others adjust to role changes brought on by the illness and its 
treatment. For example, anger is likely to be directed towards those who have 
‘disappointed the assumptive world’ by not having behaved as the individual 
might have wished, and this may even lead to enduring but stressful changes in 
these relationships, and possibly further social isolation.
However, although the social network may be a source of stress, social support 
is an important resource in coping with cancer (Dunkel-Schetter, 1984; 
Wortman, 1984; Neuling and Winefield, 1988) and is widely held to be an 
effective buffer against the effects of stress (Cohen and Wills, 1985). It is 
positively related to mental health and negatively related to physical illness and
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mortality (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Social support helps in the rebuilding of the 
shattered assumptive world by providing a safe context in which individuals can 
reassess the world, their role within it and their self-worth (Janoff-Bulman,
1992; Parkes, 1988). Thus, interventions which enhance the provision of 
social support are likely to prevent the affective disorders which are so common 
in cancer.
Adjustment and Quality of Life
Kenneth Caiman (1984) has defined quality of life as the gap between what 
people expect and what they actually experience: “Quality of life measures the 
difference, at a particular period of time, between the hopes and expectations of 
the individual and the individual’s present experience” (p. 125). Poor quality of 
life may be assumed to involve the loss of something formerly expected from 
life, even though the individual may have been previously unaware of their 
expectation. In short, quality of life is wholly subjective, not a score against a 
normative table of functional ability. It reflects a very personal view of the 
world, consisting of the individual’s perception of current reality which is 
compared with acquired assumptions that have been shaped by the individual’s 
goals and expectations coupled with (an almost spiritual) sense of justice in the 
universe.
From a social cognitive view these expectations are psychological constructs 
which can vary over time according to present and past experiences; they 
constitute one major domain of the assumptive world. Like the assumptive 
world, expectations are pre-conscious’; that is, available for scrutiny but rarely 
consciously examined (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). People are often not aware of 
what constitutes their quality of life and their assumptive world until they are 
“disappointed” by some important feature of them.
There are two immediate implications of this in terms of defining adjustment to 
illness as an end-point and as a process. First, adjustment as an end-point may 
be viewed as a return to pre-morbid levels of quality of life; either the negative
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effects of the illness have passed, or assumptions/expectations are recalibrated 
to accommodate or assimilate the implications of the illness. Second, 
adjustment as a process may be viewed as any steps that are taken to facilitate 
this recalibration of assumptions/expectations or the assimilation of the 
implications of the illness.
For example, a woman who has had a mastectomy has to cope with the 
incongruence between her assumptions and expectations about her body and 
the reality of her altered physical appearance, capability and sensation. These 
negative effects of her illness may be partially reversed through breast 
reconstruction surgery. On the other hand, her quality of life may return to 
near premorbid levels as she learns to “adjust” to her altered physical state: her 
expectations and assumptions about herself (both physically and psychologically) 
adapt to her new reality (accommodating it) while her appraisal of her body- 
image and general self-image may improve as she habituates to her body 
changes (assimilation). A sense of closer congruence between expectations and 
reality is thus re-established, along with something which may approximate 
premorbid quality of life.
Conclusion
It has been argued that adjustment is not simply the end-point of an individual’s 
cancer journey but, rather, an active psychosocial process which may include 
both positive and negative consequences for the individual and which may 
contain the seeds for the later development of psychological disorders and 
interpersonal problems. Both the coping and social-cognitive literatures offer a 
theoretical understanding from which useful hypotheses for the prevention of 
these problems may be derived.
Hospitals have been viewed as “communities whose purpose is to facilitate the 
process of psycho-social transition” (Parkes, 1971). In particular, Parkes (1988) 
has suggested that in facing a transition, such as the experience of cancer, 
individuals may be helped by trained volunteers. He and others (Brennan and
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Sheard, 1994) point out that those who have fully completed a similar transition 
themselves may be a valuable source of guidance and support to those starting 
their journey. In view of the high incidence of cancer and concomitant distress, 
the deployment of trained cancer survivors offers a cost-effective and practical 
way forward towards helping people adjust to this disease and restore some 
measure of quality to their lives.
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SELECTION, REFLECTION AND CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY
Abstract
Professional training in clinical psychology is currently one of the most sought- 
after post-graduate courses in the UK. The aim of clinical training is to provide 
trainee practitioners with sufficient instruction in the theory and intervention 
techniques of the discipline to be allowed to practise relatively autonomously at 
the end of its three years. Yet there still appears to be conceptual confusion as 
to how much the practice of clinical psychology is an academic science and how 
much it is an interpersonal encounter
It will be asserted that the personal qualities and skills of practitioners play an 
essential role in determining the nature of interactions with clients, not simply 
the techniques which they may be able to offer, or their academic knowledge or 
rigour. It will be argued that clinical understanding is based not only upon 
theoretical and empirical knowledge, but also upon the psychologist’s 
constructions of their client’s behaviour and that these constructions are shaped 
by the psychologist’s own assumptive world and personal qualities. Increased 
self-awareness is often one of the tangible benefits of psychological intervention 
for many clients but it is unclear how much ongoing self-awareness or reflexivity 
is expected of the clinical psychologist in their professional role.
It will be argued, on the basis of preliminary survey data, that with the growing 
emphasis on academic achievement in the selection of candidates for clinical 
training programmes, some of the most important variables in whether or not a 
person develops into an effective and safe practitioner (e.g. empathy, the 
capacity for reflection etc.) are not being consistently assessed. This paper will 
ask whether the profession should be selecting trainees on the basis of personal 
qualities, and whether, in fact, training courses are doing so.
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Finally, as an exercise in personal/professional reflection itself, this paper points 
to the need for training courses, and the profession as a whole, to reflect 
carefully on the interface between personal and professional life throughout the 
career of the practitioner.
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SELECTION, REFLECTION AND CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY
"Which other profession is better placed to have insights into the 
phenomenology, wishes, uncertainties and irrational discrepancies in 
the mind o f the client? Which other profession is better placed to 
reflect on itself, on its own defence mechanisms, its false attributions, 
and its fear and on the coping strategies available to increase its 
effectiveness?" (Gale, 1997, p. 13)
“The core implementation skills arise from the use o f psychological 
knowledge and include: problems-solving skills, inter-personal skills, 
listening skills, communication skills... interpretative skills, 
consultative skills, and skills needed to apply psychological 
therapeutic theories(M anpow er Advisory Service Report on Clinical 
Psychology, 1989, p. 44)
“A  common attribute o f experienced clinical psychologists is that they 
have built their own ‘modeY -  usually an amalgam o f other 
theoretical perspectives -  which informs their own work ” (Manpower 
Advisory Service Report on Clinical Psychology, 1989, p. 41)
Introduction
The experience of preparing this thesis, of being a student again, has provided a 
welcome opportunity to reflect on my development as a clinical psychologist in 
light of the training I received, and to ask questions about the relationship 
between training and some of the core issues in my clinical practice. It will be 
my contention that personal and professional reflexivity are essential to 
professional development but that this aspect of clinical psychology has been 
historically neglected due to its scientifically challenging nature. The writing of 
this paper has therefore been an iterative reflective process in itself, though this
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quite personal dimension is difficult to convey without it appearing arrogant or 
self-indulgent. The paper makes no claims on originality or “truth” per se but, 
like clinical work itself, presents a combination of evidence, conceptual models 
and personal reflection. It is thus, in some ways, an embodiment of the subject 
under discussion.
After reflecting on the nature of psychological knowledge, and the role of the 
construction of meaning in clinical work with adult clients, the paper will present 
pilot survey data on the particular issue of ‘gate-keeping’ within the profession. 
These will include the perceptions of both trainees and trainers as to what are 
the important criteria for selecting prospective candidates for training in clinical 
psychology. These data assume no pretensions regarding their scientific rigour 
or objectivity. In fact, like clinical work itself, the “case-study” of this paper, the 
problems to be discussed are variably defined and difficult to operationalise.
The conclusions drawn are, undoubtedly, a matter of “clinical opinion.”
Psychological Knowledge and the Construction of Meaning
“There is no doubt that theory has a place in psychotherapy. We do 
need a framework with which to think, but it may be that the 
relationship with the other should take priority” (Crellin, 1997)
Helping to reduce distress through personal self-awareness is obviously a central 
tenet of a great deal of clinical or applied psychology with adult patients. The 
British Psychological Society’s (BPS) Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) has 
stated that the “central focus” of clinical psychology is “the value it places on the 
experience of individuals and their attempts to understand that experience”
(BPS, Undated, p2.). However, it has been argued that, from its origins at the 
Maudsley Hospital, UK clinical psychology has “sought legitimacy via British 
‘aggressive scientism’ rather than through the practices rooted in the continental 
traditions of phenomenology” (Pilgrim and Bames, 1989). This suggests that 
clinical psychology in Britain may contain conceptual and philosophical 
contradictions at its core; to what extent can clinical practice be scientific and 
objective and how much is it necessarily (interpersonal and subjective?
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Scientific experiment can undoubtedly lead to more refined models of the world 
and is a necessary and vital component for the development of many aspects of 
knowledge, including that of human self-awareness. As is well known, George 
Kelly (1955) took this view of human conceptual development. However, 
although its polar opposite may be blind faith, science is not the only medium 
for the acquisition of psychological knowledge. Furthermore, the practice of 
clinical psychology requires more than the application of factual knowledge 
(Mollon, 1989); it requires the capacity to blend a number of interpersonal and 
listening skills with a knowledge of theoretical models of human behaviour, in 
order to help the client achieve a new level of self-awareness (which may, in 
turn, lead to behaviour change). In other words, clinical psychology is not 
simply the practice of good science or academic ability; it is also the application 
of some essential personal skills, some of which will be explored below.
Clinical psychology purportedly offers more depth of understanding than non- 
interpretive therapeutic approaches (e.g. client-centred therapy) and therefore, 
as such, is more subject to “top-down” or conceptually-driven processes 
(Norman, 1976). In other words, psychologists are able to apply quite 
sophisticated models of behaviour to the raw information conveyed to them by 
their clients. Models, however, simply provide a structure (or construction) 
through which behaviour may be better understood; they do not provide ‘truth’ 
or ‘meaning’. Modem social constructivists point to this distinction between 
observation and meaning:
"It is the context that interacts with the objects o f observation to 
produce the elements we endow with meaning. Nothing means 
anything on its own. Meaning comes not from seeing or even 
observation alone, for there is no ‘alone' o f this sort. Neither is 
meaning lying around in nature waiting to be scooped up by the 
senses; rather it is constructed. Constructed in this context, means 
produced in acts o f interpretation."
(Steedman, 1991)
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Kelly’s adoption of the philosophical notion of constructive alternativism, speaks 
to this same idea:
“There are always some alternative constructions available to choose 
among in dealing with the world...no one needs to be the victim o f 
his b io g r a p h y (Kelly, 1955, p. 15)
Unlike the medical model with its emphasis on achieving a diagnosis, clinical 
psychologists (of any theoretical persuasion) attempt to contextualise ‘problems’ 
by placing them within a matrix of influencing variables (whether historical or 
current). This capacity to collate and accurately synthesise the many, often 
‘woolly’ variables that influence a client’s presenting problem into a plausible 
‘current working hypothesis’ (i.e. construction or formulation) may be enhanced 
by training (which provides theoretical models) and clinical experience, but 
‘experience’ is a commodity which is not confined to what has been learned in 
the consulting room. Psychologists bring their own personal sensitivities, 
strengths and fears to their encounters with clients.
Paradoxically though, without some personal involvement in our clients’ stories, 
we are unlikely to get anywhere near the truth of their experiences. The 
objective facts of the story alone are rarely sufficient; we are forced to immerse 
ourselves temporarily in that experience in order to make sense of it. Thus, if 
“perceiving is a constructive process”, a fact which has been widely accepted by 
cognitive psychologists for three decades (Neisser, 1967, p .95), then the work 
of psychologists cannot simply involve the objective application of discrete 
theories and therapeutic techniques. Their understanding and behaviour are a 
function of the constructions that they uniquely and subjectively place on what 
is observed. In short, as the Manpower Advisory Service (MAS) report 
accurately stated, clinical psychologists build, and are informed by, “their own ” 
models (Manpower Advisory Service Report on Clinical Psychology, 1989 
Report, 1989).
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What personal qualities are needed among clinical 
psychologists?
To summarise, clinical psychologists have theoretical models to help them 
contextualise and intervene in human problems: models of development and 
learning, models of appropriate therapist behaviour, and models of therapeutic 
intervention. These various models (some of which have been empirically 
validated) help psychologists shape a working hypothesis of their client’s 
presenting problem so that they can begin to understand how it developed and 
how it is maintained. But, as has been argued, clinical psychology also involves 
sophisticated inter- and intra-personal skills which reside differentially within 
people and which are commonly acknowledged as helpful in the therapeutic 
process. A few of these will now be examined.
EMPATHY
Empathy is a highly valued hallmark of data-driven, therapeutic models such as 
client-centred therapy. It is perhaps less highly valued by the more theory- 
driven therapies, such as behavioural and cognitive-behavioural therapy, which 
are so widely taught in clinical psychology training courses. This is ironic in 
view of its potentially more important role in these more ‘interventionist’ 
models. Interestingly, highly top-down interpretive therapies, such as 
psychodynamic psychotherapy for example, do appear to place greater 
emphasis on the value of empathy.
The capacity to empathise with another person is presumably derived from a 
person’s personal history and psychological development (it appears to have 
close parallels, for example, with the child’s development of a theory of mind, a 
concept which has been termed “reflective function” [Fonagy and Target, 
1997]). It is interesting to note in this context that the word “sensitivity” has 
two meanings: (1) easily affected emotionally by events and other people, and 
(2) acutely perceptive and aware of others’ emotions. The former suggests a 
tone of personal vulnerability while the latter suggests someone empathic. It
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may be no accident that the word has two meanings for it seems likely that a 
person’s capacity for empathy is largely drawn from their own personal 
vulnerability. (If so, this also raises the interesting question as to whether 
psychological practitioners do their best work in areas where they feel most 
vulnerable or whether these therapeutic fields are chosen by practitioners in 
order to confront their fears.)
INTUITION
Claxton (1998) has recently reviewed the concept of intuition and recent 
scientific work which is beginning to shed light on this neglected and unpopular 
notion. It appears that intuition is non-conscious, non-intellectual learning and 
that it is superior to conscious intellectual learning in tasks which involve, over 
time, complex patterns of contingency (e.g. several variables simultaneously 
and/or sequentially influencing one another). Claxton indicates that such 
implicit learning or intuition “requires tolerance of a temporary state of 
confusion, and that complex, counter-intuitive predicaments are better mastered 
if this state of confusion -  having given up the attempt to generate and hang on 
to conscious hypotheses -  has been induced” (p.218). Indeed, intuition may 
rely on information which is both inarticulate and of a faint or fleeting quality.
These findings may have a significant bearing on the capacity of psychological 
therapists to mesh the many variables being described by the client into a 
perceptive and meaningful whole (i.e. a formulation). Far from relying only on 
an intellectual or academic understanding of the client’s problems, this suggests 
that therapists would do well to learn to ‘tune in’ to non-conscious, non­
intellectual, empathically-derived information in order to arrive at insights, 
interpretations and formulations. It is interesting that Claxton’s description of a 
state of non-intellectual receptiveness corresponds very closely with what Freud 
called the importance of the analyst’s “free-floating” attention, and what later 
psychoanalysts referred to as a receptiveness to information derived from 
thoughts and feelings generated in the counter-transference (Sandler, Dare and 
Holder, 1973).
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Certainly, my own clinical work has given me examples of reaching an insight 
about the client, what the Gestalt Therapists have aptly called an “Ah-ha!” 
experience, only to have to spend the next minute working out in my 
(intellectual) mind how I arrived at this sudden thought (a mental equivalent to 
‘reverse engineering’). Although perhaps scientifically unreliable due to their 
post-hoc retrospective nature, the validity of these moments of “inner sight” or 
insight are often confirmed by the fact that the client has reacted with a strong 
identification with my subsequent interpretation or observation.
REFLEXIVITY (AND CLINICAL SUPERVISION)
Clearly, all the aforementioned clinical components -  sensitive empathic insight, 
intellectual and emotional reflection and self-awareness by the therapist, and the 
capacity for effective synthesis and integration -  are all essential for the progress 
of good therapy. In addition, the most essential skill of any therapist is their 
capacity to draw upon these components in order to make a therapeutic 
‘response’ of some sort (to enable the client’s therapy to progress.) This 
response can be anything from a nod of encouragement, to a key therapeutic 
interpretation. The basis of this crucial skill is probably largely taught in the 
context of trainee placements and the medium for its teaching is generally 
clinical supervision.
In effective clinical supervision, the trainee is encouraged to reflect on their own 
behaviour, that of their client, and the various sources of information for the 
responses that they may or could have made. In other words, supervision helps 
to contextualise the trainee’s own behaviour by providing “alternative 
constructions” in order to derive further understanding and self-awareness, in 
much the same way as psychologists work with clients. In this way, the trainee’s 
reflexivity is encouraged and their clinical skills are refined.
It could be argued that this capacity for reflection and subsequent adaptive 
recalibration defines all successful systems and organisms, including those of
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relationships and individuals; without it, learning and skill development are 
impossible. Psychologists work within a personal, social and ethical context and 
all have a bearing on the psychologist’s constructions. Reflexivity enables some 
of these pre-conscious influences to become conscious. Scientific method is one 
form of such reflexivity but there are a number of other ways in which such 
reflexivity can be mediated. For example, writing can be a self-reflective process 
and can lead to a clearer understanding of what it is one feels and believes; e.g. 
writing an accurate clinical formulation involves both a measure of reflection and 
discovery. Clinical supervision, however, is a more deliberate and focused 
method of encouraging clinicians to consider the perceptions and constructions 
that they bring to their work. In short, the capacity to be self-critical and 
reflective is a personal quality which is essential to personal and professional 
development. The provision of adequate supervision opportunities, on the 
other hand, is essential to the maintenance of standards within the profession.
Gate-keeping the profession
If one accepts the premise that clinical effectiveness is, at least in part, a 
function of the practitioner’s personal qualities, the corollary must be that some 
individuals are more suited to the work of therapeutic clinical psychology than 
others. Few psychologists would be arrogant enough to deny the existence of 
individuals who have no formal training in either psychological therapies or 
science but who, nonetheless, possess a “natural gift” for psychologically 
helping others.
This leads to the idea that the profession should be ‘gate-keeping’ itself by 
selecting and vetting candidates, at least in part, on the basis of their personal 
qualities, even if the culture of clinical psychology is the very antithesis of being 
judgmental about people. (Clinical placements, for example, are never likely to 
be an effective method for “weeding out” unsuitable trainees; ironically, it may 
be the very fact that most clinical psychologists aspire to be fair-minded, flexible 
and, above all, non-judgemental that gate-keeping the profession is such a 
problematic area).
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Assuming that such desirable and undesirable qualities do exist, it would be 
ironic if the profession of clinical psychology, with its origins in psychological 
testing, has yet to reach an explicit consensus on what these qualities are or, 
indeed, what methods would enable them to be assessed. To what extent then 
do training courses vet and select candidates in terms of personal qualities? In 
order to begin to answer this question I conducted two small, informal pilot 
surveys. These surveys do not pretend to be scientifically rigorous but are 
merely exploratory and descriptive in nature.
Trainee Survey 
METHOD
First I asked twenty clinical psychology trainees (all in their third years but from 
three different training courses) to complete a short informal survey 
questionnaire (Appendix 1), of unknown reliability but reasonable face validity, 
concerning the selection procedure which they had undergone. Twenty subjects 
were clearly not necessarily representative of the annual intake of three hundred 
clinical trainee across the UK at that time (Gardner, 1997); they were trainees I 
met in the context of teaching (they were otherwise unselected), but all were 
asked to return their questionnaires anonymously by post and all did so.
RESULTS
The following summary of this small survey indicates little emphasis on personal 
qualities in the selection process. (The numbers in brackets refer to the number 
of respondents answering thus)
1. What questions were you asked at the Personal Interview when you 
applied to the course?
* How do you handle stress? (14; 70%)
* Why do you want to be a clinical psychologist? (9; 45%)
* What do you like to do in your spare time/hobbies? (5; 25%)
* There was no personal interview (4; 20%)
~  80 ~
What makes you laugh (4; 20%), upset (1; 5%), angry (2; 10%)? 
What are your strengths and weaknesses? (2; 10%)
What has been the most traumatic issue you have experienced 
in you work so far? (1; 5%)
My impression was that the panel was assessing whether they 
would want to share a cup o f tea with me  (1; 5%)
2. Do you feel that this process accurately assessed your suitability for 
being a clinical psychologist?
Yes (3; 15%)
Yes but you can fake it (1; 5%)
No (10; 50%)
(e.g. “J had rehearsed some answers and others were what I 
thought they wanted to hear; very light-hearted but not very 
searching”)
Yes and No (6; 30%)
(e.g. “The questions were so predictable; Motivation yes, 
suitability no; People need to be asked what they get out o f 
being a therapist”)
3. When you applied for the course do you believe that you were aware 
of your personal motivations for becoming a clinical psychologist?
Yes (14; 70%)
No (6; 30%)
4. Do you feel that the past three years have made you clearer about 
your motivations for becoming a clinical psychologist?
Yes (17; 85%)
No (3; 15%)
5. If so, what have been the main factors which have helped clarify 
these issues? (9 people responded to this item)
Supervision (4; 44%)
Personal reflection (4; 44%)
Discussion with peers (2; 22%)
Personal therapy (3; 33%)
Exposure to different settings and approaches (1; 11%)
6. What do you feel are some of the factors that would make some 
people unsuitable to become clinical psychologists? (10 people 
responded to this item)
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Lack of self-awareness/insight about how our own vulnerabilities or 
unresolved personal issues impact on clinical work, or how clinical 
work impacts on us (8)
Poor social/communication skills (4)
Rigidity of approach/Lack of ability to take account of several 
perspectives (3)
Lack of empathy/ability to listen (3)
Psychotic or personality disorders (2)
Limited life experiences (1); Lack of: sense of humour (1), creativity 
and imagination (1), academic ability (1), assertiveness (1)
7. How important do you feel being in some form of personal therapy is 
as part of clinical psychology training?
* Extremely important (6; 30%)
* Fairly important (4; 20%)
* It depends on the individual (8; 40%)
* No answer (2; 10%)
8 . Are there any other comments you would like to make about “gate- 
keeping” in clinical psychology?
* Too much emphasis on the scientist-practitioner model. This has led
to the over-focusing during selection procedures on academic 
performance aspects of individuals profiles.
* The system is too tunnel-visioned for getting onto courses. Is there a
way of encouraging a more open-minded approach in trainees, to 
avoid clinical psychology evangelism which seems to be 
perpetuated by the current system? Perhaps we need to open the 
gates more.
* With the introduction of doctorates, it feels as if courses are beginning
to focus more on academic credentials. Perhaps a more formal 
structure for assistant psychologists, both with regard to career 
progress and assessment of ability, would be more relevant in 
assessing individuals suitability.
* Academic skills are very important, but they may carry too much
weight at interviews. Academics on clinical courses are not typical 
clinicians. If anything, they are a bit short on social skills 
themselves.
* I think it would be helpful if people had personal therapy before
training but I certainly think it should be part of training for 
anyone wanting to be a therapist in terms of understanding
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yourself but also in being able to empathise more fully with how 
clients feel in coming to see a psychologist.
* It would be better to have a more apprentice style training entered at
a Assistant level and moving through specialties, with a BPS input, 
away from universities. Interpersonal problems between existing 
trainees and course teams shapes the recruitment of following 
cohorts. In this way a dialectic swing occurs from one cohort to 
the next (i.e. existing cohorts are the antithesis of past cohorts).
* Either enhance the status of Assistant Psychologists (e.g. work counts
towards qualification) or scrap the role. Beware of training courses 
becoming too academic-centred.
* The process of assessment of personal suitability to practice should be
ongoing, i.e. there should be some form of monitoring of mental 
state and current life problems. Everyone has times of crisis and 
this should be addressed through an ongoing mentoring or 
supervision system.
SUMMARY
This small survey produced surprisingly consistent responses in view of fact that 
the trainees were drawn from three different courses. Apart from asking how 
trainees cope with stress and why they wanted to be a psychologist, there was 
little consistency in the “personal questions” they were asked, and little 
sophistication in the questions themselves. Half the sample did not feel that the 
selection process adequately assessed their suitability to become clinical 
psychologists.
It is reassuring that 17 of the 20 respondents felt that their motivations for 
working in the field had become clearer to them and four of the nine people 
who commented on this cited supervision as having helped. There was a 
strong theme of personal reflection with respect to what had been helpful in 
clarifying motivations for becoming a psychologist (question 5) though this 
“monitoring of process”, as one respondent referred to it, appeared to be 
largely secondary to clinical experience and supervision or, indeed, personal 
therapy, rather than being one of the key foci of the course. Three of the nine 
people who responded to this item had found personal therapy to be helpful in 
clarifying their motivations, while exactly half of the respondents viewed being in 
therapy as either extremely or fairly important as part of clinical training.
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Trainees appeared to have quite clear and consistent views about the qualities 
that would be unsuitable in clinical psychologists, and a number of them 
expressed concern that clinical courses over-emphasise academic skills.
It could be argued that the trainees’ awareness of these issues is ample 
demonstration that the selection process had worked in their case. But equally, 
it could be argued that, rather than being enhanced by the courses, the clinical 
and personal reflexivity of the trainees has been maintained despite the more 
academic emphasis of the courses.
Course Directors Survey 
METHOD
In order to find out how courses are addressing the problems of selection, I sent 
another confidential questionnaire (Appendix 2) to all 24 UK clinical psychology 
training courses, of which nine (37%) responded. In view of this low response 
rate, the results should be viewed with caution since they may not be 
representative, nor reflect best practice, and are, in any event, rooted in the 
time in which the survey was conducted (early 1998). The questionnaires and 
cover letters were addressed to course directors though there is no guarantee 
that it was they who completed them. Two of the respondents took issue with 
structure or ‘purity’ of the questions themselves rather than attempting to 
answer them, while all the others appeared to have no difficulty understanding 
what was intended by the questions.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM COURSE DIRECTORS’ SURVEY
Because it is difficult to summarise objectively the results from the course 
directors’ survey, their largely verbatim responses can be seen in Appendix 3 
(page 96).
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The academic bias referred to by the trainees was evident though not as 
pronounced as might have been expected. The selection process appeared to 
favour academic achievement (weighted across the courses as 34%) over past 
experiences (19%) and performance at interview (17%), but there was 
considerable variability in the importance placed on personal qualities as 
opposed to academic abilities. In fact, one or two respondents appeared to 
have a rather limited understanding of what was meant by ‘personal qualities’ 
when they were asked (in question 4) what personal qualities they sought in a 
candidate (e.g. “practical... interest in current affairs”, “motivation to 
succeed, interest in people, organisation o f work”).
Personal qualities were assessed primarily in the context of selection interviews 
though only two of the courses conducted specifically personal interviews; most 
assessed personal qualities as one dimension of the clinical interview. It was 
interesting to note that one course had conducted research into their selection 
procedure and found that openness was “the key personal quality” they were 
selecting for, though it would have been useful to have had an operational 
definition of this term. Only this course and three others referred to the 
importance of reflexivity or self-awareness, and only two courses mentioned 
empathy. Other sought-after qualities tended to emphasise motivation, social 
and interpersonal skills (such as warmth which may be similar to openness), and 
the ability to cope with stress.
Of those who made explicit the personal criteria they were selecting for, one 
course sent a copy of the personal interview panel rating form. This included 
numbered scales from 1 (Unsatisfactory) to 7 (Excellent) relating to four items: 
interpersonal skills, ability for listening/sensitivity and self-reflection, 
affect/warmth and openness, and personal insight/ability to cope. This is 
clearly a more sophisticated approach to selection than having no explicit 
criteria at all as was the case among three of the nine courses.
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Negative qualities tended to be similar to those suggested by trainees: 
personality disorders or deficits (e.g. self-centredness), poor interpersonal skills 
and relationships, insensitivity and lack of self-awareness. However, only four of 
the nine courses made these potential criteria for rejection explicit among the 
selection panel.
All respondents believe that their interview process to be moderately valid, 
reliable or fair, though again there was some variability. Interestingly, 7 of the 9 
respondents believed that at least one trainee in the past five years had been 
unsuitable to become clinical psychologists for reasons of personal qualities, 
constituting 12 trainees in total. However, it is unclear how many of these 
people became qualified and if one assumes, very conservatively, that courses 
trained over five years the maximum number within the range marked on 
question 1, this would correspond to only 1.6% of all trainees being later 
deemed unsuitable. Indeed, responses to the last question suggest that most 
courses are content with their selection system and do their best within the 
limited resources at their disposal.
Other approaches to selection
I also contacted both the American Psychological Association (APA) and twelve 
doctoral clinical psychology training courses in the United States, of which three 
responded. The APA sent me a copy of the Guidelines and Principles for 
Accreditation of Programs in Professional Psychology, with a note explaining 
that selection is left up to the graduate programmes. While specifying that each 
training course must “adhere to and make available to all interested parties 
formal written policies and procedures that govern intern selection...” (p. 11), 
the 37 page document makes no reference to what personal qualities courses 
might wish to seek or avoid in prospective interns.
One respondent from a US graduate school stated that his course uses the 
interview to “deselect people who clearly have inappropriate personalities”
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though admitted that they do not use explicit criteria for doing this: “True 
comment made at an interview: ‘my doctor thinks I should be able to go off 
antidepressants in the very near future.’” The same respondent said that the 
University of Minnesota use their Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI) and that a few other US universities also use psychometric tests. As for 
himself, he said he would favour using a personality test to measure the 
candidate’s “social orientation and views of themselves”, though he said that a 
better, albeit expensive, way would be to have the applicant interview a 
disturbed person and “find out what their level of comfort and empathy is.”
A second respondent noted that their selection process aims to find a match 
between the aspirations of the candidates and those of the programme though 
added “We do, on occasion, notice behaviors or attitudes expressed during the 
applicant’s interviews which seem incompatible with professional clinical work.”
The last US respondent sent a copy of the form sent to referees by their 
university. This constitutes a list of eleven qualities which the referee is required 
to rate according to a scale ranging from “very low” to “truly outstanding”. The 
eleven qualities are: academic ability; creative, innovate thinking; capacity for 
objective evaluation of self (sic); energy level at work; empathic capacity; 
maturity of judgement; conscientiousness; ability to work closely with others; 
ability to work independently; capacity to handle stress; open-mindedness, 
tolerance for deviance. Among other questions, are a further ten which require 
the referee to rate the candidate according to “personality characteristics which 
would interfere with his/her functioning in the clinical role”. These include: 
anxious, fearful; dependent; low self-esteem, unusual need for approval; hostile, 
angry; pushy, aggressive; manipulative etc.
Unfortunately, the form makes it clear that federal law permits the candidate 
access to the document, thus probably diluting its ultimate validity. However, 
compared with the confidential guidelines for referees issued by the UK Clearing 
House for Postgraduate Courses in Clinical Psychology, the form is impressively
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detailed. The UK guidelines simply ask the referee to comment on the 
candidate’s “overall suitability for training as a clinical psychologist, interaction 
with others..., and identification of strengths, needs and weaknesses.”
The United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP) (personal 
communication) also assesses psychotherapy trainees through interview, but 
then insists that successful candidates be in personal therapy themselves 
throughout the duration of their training. There is not, as yet, a UKCP policy 
on how the requirement of personal therapy is assessed but the issue of 
personal suitability is largely conducted through the trainee’s Personal 
Development Profile and Personal Learning Journal. The former is based on 
information written in the latter, as well as self-assessment and peer-assessment. 
It aims, among other things, to assess the student’s ability to reflect on the 
relationship between personal development and professional practice, and 
requires a “commitment to personal growth and development.” The clinical 
supervisor is also required to indicate whether the student “shows some ability to 
integrate personal awareness, knowledge and skill with clinical practice.”
Within psychoanalysis, a training analyst is expected to pronounce on the 
success of the trainee/analysand’s therapy before the latter is permitted to 
proceed to becoming an analyst themselves. While some have viewed this as a 
rather radical, even paranoid, form of gate-keeping with inherent contradictions 
(Young, 1996), it nonetheless represents one end of a continuum, with the 
other end being no attempt to examine who passes through the door into the 
profession.
Regardless of how one views the methods of gate-keeping within psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy, these disciplines believe that it is essential to examine the 
motivations and conflicts of their practitioners. The choices people make, 
including their choice of profession, can and should be subject to scrutiny in 
order to protect the public from practitioners who may harbour dubious ethics, 
potentially damaging personal motivations of which they may be only partially
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aware, or even inappropriate interpersonal behaviour. Although such scrutiny 
currently appears to be inconsistent at the point of entry into clinical 
psychology, some courses do encourage trainees to maintain “reflective 
journals” which at least go some way to acknowledging the potential impact that 
training may have on the individual.
Conclusions
There appears to be tacit agreement among trainees, UK and US clinical 
psychology training courses, as well as UK psychotherapy courses, that the 
personal qualities of practitioners are an important source of variance in their 
effectiveness as practitioners. However, in this small survey of UK clinical 
psychology training courses, even where these issues were addressed, personal 
and interpersonal qualities were rarely made explicit in the selection procedure, 
there was little overall consistency among training courses in the way that they 
selected and vetted prospective trainees for these qualities, and there was not 
even much clarity about quite what these qualities are. Furthermore, it would 
appear, on the evidence from both surveys, that the clinical psychologist’s 
personal skills, as well as their growth and development, were tending to be 
overshadowed by academic requirements. Again, it must be conceded that the 
evidence presented is of an exploratory, descriptive nature, since the 
questionnaires were not scientifically constructed and are of unknown reliability 
and validity. Thus, the questionnaires may have biased the results.
In its pursuance of scientific and academic rigour, clinical psychology may be in 
danger of failing to nourish the equally valuable contributions of empathy, 
sensitivity, reflexivity, intuition and insight, qualities which presumably reside 
differentially within individuals yet are scientifically challenging to operationalise 
and measure. This is not to say that these qualities cannot be enhanced where 
they are poorly developed. Trainees find reflective clinical supervision and 
personal therapy helpful in this regard, but the former is often dependent on the 
willingness and competence of clinical supervisors while the latter is rarely 
encouraged and never required.
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If, as the quotation from the MAS report at the beginning of this paper 
suggests, experienced clinical psychologists develop interpretative skills based 
upon their own particular models’, this indicates a need for practitioners 
continually to articulate and reflect on these internal models and assumptions. 
This sort of reflexivity or personal self-awareness is the very thing that 
practitioners are able to offer the public, yet only relatively recently has there 
been an insistence on clinical supervision within the profession (Green, 1995). 
Rather than viewing the issues as mutually exclusive, Professional Practice 
Guidelines for clinical psychologists recognise that “personal and professional 
development often go hand in hand, the one facilitating the other or restricting 
it” (BPS-DCP, 1995, p.38).
The advent of clinical governance within the NHS provides an opportunity for 
the profession to acknowledge the awesome degree of trust that clinical 
psychologists, and others working in any field of behaviour change, are given by 
the public at large. It is time that the profession reached a consensus on 
whether or not clinical psychologists’ personal skills and qualities should, or even 
could be the target of vetting and monitoring. Such an approach would not be 
without dangers or practical difficulties. Charges of protectionism and elitism 
would be voiced by those fearful that tighter gate-keeping would lead to 
unwelcome homogeneity, and selection procedures would have to be devised 
that would demonstrably uphold the principles of equal opportunity. Indeed, 
such a review might even conclude that there is little special about clinical 
psychologists and that all desirable therapeutic skills can ultimately be taught. 
However, no matter the outcome, by reflecting on whether or not we would 
wish to select trainees on the basis of personal qualities as well as academic 
ones, we might, in the process, leam something about our beliefs and 
assumptions.
In concluding this critique of some of clinical psychology’s apparent 
contradictions, it is readily conceded that this particular construction of these
issues is only one of many. It may even be some distance from the “truth” 
within current clinical psychology selection and training, as construed by others. 
The writing of it, however, has provided the author with an opportunity to 
reflect on some of the assumptions and beliefs that influence his own 
constructions and, in doing so, to clarify some of them. It has been argued that 
such attempts at reflection, preferably in the context of a dialogue with a clinical 
supervisor, provide the fuel for both personal and professional development and 
should be enhanced within the profession of clinical psychology.
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Appendix 1: Trainee Survey (1)Appendix 1: Trainee Survey
B e c o m in g  a  C linical  P sychologist
What questions you were asked a t the Personal Interview when you applied to 
the course? (List any you remember)
Do you feel that this process accurately assessed your motivation and suitability YES [ 1
for being a  clinical psychologist?
Comments NO f~~|
When you applied for the course, do you feel that you were aware of your YES | |
personal motivations for becoming a  clinical psychologist? _
NO Q
Do you feel that the past three years have m ade you clearer about your ygj [“ I
motivations for becoming a  clinical psychologist?
n o Q
If so, what have been the main factors which have helped clarify these issues?
What do you feel are some of the factors that would make some people 
unsuitable to becom e clinical psychologists?
Appendix 1: Trainee Survey (2)
What would be a  fair and practical way to assess these factors?
How important do you feel being in some form of personal therapy is as part of 
clinical psychology training?
Extremely important Q  
Fairly important Q  
No opinion Q  
Fairly unimportant Q  
Totally unimportant Q
Any other comments you would like to make about “gate-keeping” and clinical psychology?
Thanks for jour help!
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Appendix 2: Course Directors* Survey (1)
Appendix 2:
Clinical Psychology Trainee Selection Questionnaire
This questionnaire is anonymous; results will be grouped and any identifying information about 
particular courses will be removed. Honesty, however, is essential if this exercise is to have any value
<5 □
1. On average, how many trainees does your course take per year? 5-10  f l
(Do not include top-up/conversion course candidates) 10-15 Q
>15 □
2. What weight (please use percentages) would you give to the following components in selecting a 
new trainee?
Academic achievements 
Performance at interview 
Quality of application form 
References
Past experiences (e.g. assistant psychology jobs)
Career interests
3. In selecting a clinical psychological trainee, what relative weight would you give to academic 
achievement and personal qualities? Mark the line with an X. (The mid-point which is marked 
represents equal weight to both dimensions)
Academic i ■ 1 Personal
Achievement > ' * qualities
4. What personal qualities in a candidate are you looking for?
5. Are these personal qualities made explicit 
(e.g. written down) among the admissions panel? YES □ NOD
6. What personal qualities in a candidate do you regard as unsuitable in someone who is a poten­
tial clinical psychologist?
7. Are these personal qualities made explicit 
(e.g. written down) among the admissions panel? YES □ NOD
(Please ensure 
thatyour 
weightings add 
up to 100%)
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Appendix 2: Course Directors’ Survey (2)
8. Personal suitability
What methods (e.g. application form, references, interview, practical exercises, etc.) do you use 
to select candidates on the basis of their personal qualities?
(Please try to rank each component in order of its importance; 1 -  most important)
9. The Interview .---- .
How many people interview each candidate? I
10. On average, how long is the interview?
11. What are you trying to find out from the interview?
12. Do interviewers use explicit (written) criteria h - j  _  ,—,
to assess candidates in the interview? '—' ^  ‘
(If YES, please attach a copy if  available, first removing any obvious identifying marks)
13. Please rate, with regard to personal qualities, the extent to which you believe your interview to 
be(0=Not at all; 10 = Completely)
a valid procedure (it accurately assesses what it purports to assess)? 
a reliable procedure (it consistently assesses what it purports to assess)? 
a fair procedure (it is equally valid for all candidates)?
14. In the past five years, how many trainees have you accepted onto your 
course who you later believed to be unsuitable to become clinical 
psychologists, for reasons of personal qualities?
15. If you had a free hand to set up a new selection procedure, what would it involve?
□□□
□
Thank you very much for your help with this. Please enclose any written criteria used in interviews. Any 
additional thoughts, comments, documentation and information would be most welcome.
Please return to: James Brennan, Bristol Oncology Centre, Horfield Road, Bristol BS2 8ED
~ 96 ~
Appendix 3: Course Directors' Responses
The following is a summary of the results from the Course Directors’ Survey. 
(The number in brackets following the question refers to the number of 
responses to it).
Question 2: What weights (percentages) would you give to the following 
components in selecting a new trainee? (6)
Mean % Range
Academic achievement 34.44 16.661-50
Performance at interview 16.94 10-20
Quality of application form 11.94 5-20
References 7.77 5-16.66
Past experiences (i.e. jobs) 19.44 10-30
Career interests 10.55 0-16.66
Question 3: What relative weight would you give to academic
achievement and personal qualities (e.g. interpersonal skills and 
behaviour)? (6)
Respondents were asked to mark a visual analogue scale. Taking the mid-point 
between academic and personal qualities as zero with a range of 5 in either 
direction, the mean response was 0.6 in favour of academic achievement 
though three of the six courses who responded placed more emphasis on 
personal qualities than on academic achievements. The actual marks have been 
re-plotted onto the following line:
Academic . Personal
v A / V / n /  —I
I
5
yV
0
yV
5
X
Question 4: What personal qualities in a candidate are you looking for?
(9) (Responses are presented verbatim.)
* Enthusiasm; warmth; likeability; ability to use conceptual and social
language
* Openness (last year research was done on our selection procedure
which included standardised personality measures. Openness was
1 One respondent chose to apportion equal weight to each of the six categories; i.e. 16.66%
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confirmed as the key personal quality.) Self-awareness, ability to 
reflect on strengths and weaknesses, ability to co­
operate/negotiate, ability to take initiative, non-verbal social skills, 
motivation for a career in clinical psychology.
* Good interpersonal skills, an awareness of how to apply psychological
principles when discussing a case, ability to describe research 
work
* Reflexivity about self and others, ability, history of good constructive
working relationships, resilience and good coping skills/strategies
* We have developed a person specification which is available if
required: warmth, good listening skills, empathy, good time 
management skills
* First, academic achievement. However, in terms of personal qualities,
practical, awareness of limitations, realistic about professional 
role, interest in current affairs.
* Sensitivity and empathy, good interpersonal skills, ability to get on
well with clients and colleagues, reflexiveness/self awareness, 
open-minded but critical, resilience, ability to cope and prioritise 
demands of job, maturity
* Motivation to succeed, interest in people, organisation of work
* Motivation for clinical training, ability to handle stress, ability to
establish relationships, broad-minded, tolerance, breadth of 
interest, realistic expectations, empathy without over involvement, 
warmth.
Question 5: Are these personal qualities made explicit (e.g. written 
down) among the admissions panel? (9)
Yes -  5
Yes, generally - 1  
N o - 3
Question 6: What personal qualities in a candidate would you regard as 
unsuitable in someone who is a potential clinical psychologist, 
and grounds for ‘rejection’? (8)
* Arrogance, self-centredness, inarticulateness
* Lack of openness, self awareness; inability to reflect on strengths and
weaknesses, inability to co-operate/negotiate, inability to take the 
initiative, poor non-verbal social skills, poor motivation for a 
career in clinical psychology
* Someone with obvious personality problems, occasionally noted in
references, but generally not. Someone who might not be able to 
manage the demands of clinical training
* History of destructive interpersonal relationships which could be for a
variety of ‘personal quality’ reasons
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* Lack of awareness of limitations, over-confidence, under-confidence.
Unable to think clearly about potential difficulties. Attracted to 
profession through personal difficulties.
* Non-self-reflective, close minded, wedded to a single
approach/model, poor interpersonal skills, lacks personal 
warmth/empathy, evidence of (illegible)
* Ego-centricity, manipulation of people, absence of: motivation to
succeed, interest in people, organisation of work
* Psychopathy, insensitivity, narrow-mindedness, unsuitable for working
with others in an organisation
Question 7: Are these personal qualities made explicit (e.g. written 
down) among the admissions panel? (9)
Yes -  4 
N o - 4
No, we tend to focus on positives, rather than negatives- 1
Question 8: What methods do you use to select candidates on the basis 
of their personal qualities?
Most courses specified the interview as the primary assessment method. Two of 
the courses reported having personal interviews in addition to clinical and 
academic ones. Others specified the clinical interview as the forum in which 
personal qualities are assessed. One innovatively ranked a group task as the 
most important method of assessing the personal qualities of candidates though 
unfortunately no details were provided about this. All but one of the nine 
courses used explicit written criteria for assessing candidates in interviews, 
though there was wide variation in the total number of people candidates are 
interviewed by (3 -  13). Most candidates were interviewed for a total of 
between half an hour and an hour.
Question 13: Please rate, with regard to personal qualities, the extent to 
which you believe your interview to be (0 = Not at all; 10 = 
Completely):
A valid procedure (it accurately assesses what it purports to assess)?
Mean = 6.8 Range: 5-8
A reliable procedure (it consistently assesses what it purports to assess)?
Mean = 7.33 Range: 5-8
A fair procedure (it is equally valid for all candidates)?
Mean = 7.66 Range: 5-10
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Question 14: In the past five years, how many trainees have you 
accepted onto your course who you later believed to be unsuitable to 
become clinical psychologists, for reasons of personal qualities?
Mean = 1 .3 3  Range: 0-5 Total = 12
Question 15: If you had a free hand to set up a new selection procedure, 
what would it involve? (6 courses responded to this item)
* I would certainly keep the interview format
* Inclusion of a group task. Selection takes up significant time and
resources at the moment. Undoubtedly improvements could be 
made but the issue is one of cost-effectiveness.
* Have considered this several times over the last few years and if given
free hand I would perhaps acknowledge that there is limited 
purpose other than trying to eliminate "unsuitables" and might 
therefore be less focused on academic issues at interview, or some 
personality assessment. However strong suspicion many could 
fake positive.
* The procedure evolves and a fresh look is possible and carried out
each year. Seems to be a ‘good enough’ system. We have 
contemplated using psychometric assessments from time to time 
but so far they received little support for supervisors.
* I like our system. At interview we have two of our course staff with a
regional representative. Our preference is to take students with a 
strong academic background.
* In true psychological fashion, we have three assessment panels for
selection and require agreement from all selectors, so answering 
questions about "the interview" is inaccurate. Given time 
constraints etc I think it is reasonable procedure and our annual 
feedback suggests candidates find it fair
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RESEARCH STUDY
P r o m o tin g  C o u p le  S u p p o r t  in Ca n c e r
Abstract
The diagnosis and treatment of cancer is a highly stressful event and frequently 
leads to high levels of psychopathology among both patients and their partners. 
Social support, especially partner support, has been shown to act as a powerful 
buffer against the effects of stress including the stress of cancer. Theoretical 
and empirical work supports the contention that where the stressor, like cancer, 
is outside the individual’s control, emotional empathic support is the optimal 
form of social support. However, a number of studies have suggested that while 
partner support can be an important source of social support, partners can 
sometimes be an additional source of stress to the patient, particularly among 
female patients. To date, almost all research examining partner support in 
cancer has examined female breast cancer patients and there have been no 
reported interventions designed to enhance couple support.
This study therefore examined gender differences in the ability of partners to 
communicate emotional and confiding support, and to evaluate in a randomised 
controlled trial the effectiveness of a video intervention designed to enhance 
couple support. 80 couples, in which one partner was suffering with a first 
diagnosis of colorectal cancer, were invited to participate of whom 46 couples 
consented. After both partners had independently completed questionnaires 
measuring demographic, communication, relationship and psychological 
variables, the couple was randomly assigned to the video intervention group or 
the standard care (no video) control group. Both groups were assigned equal 
numbers of male and female patient couples. Couples assigned to the video 
group were instructed to watch the video and discuss its contents together. 
Three months after randomisation all couples were reassessed on the same 
measures.
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Results indicated that men perceived their partners to be significantly more 
empathic and supportive than women perceived their partners, while there were 
no significant differences in perceived criticism and withdrawal. The video 
appeared to have very limited effects on the couples who saw it though the 
sample size may have been too low to detect differences. The results are 
discussed with reference to their theoretical implications and the methodological 
shortcomings of the research.
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PROMOTING COUPLE SUPPORT IN CANCER 
1. INTRODUCTION
One in three people in the UK develop cancer in their lifetime and one in four 
people will die from it (Cancer Research Campaign, 1989). In addition to being 
a very common disease, cancer is associated with a high incidence of 
psychological distress and disorder (Massie and Holland, 1990) which poses a 
profound challenge to the small but growing field of psychosocial oncology 
(Maguire, 1995). It would be unrealistic to assume that there will ever be 
sufficient clinical resources within the National Health Service to meet this level 
of need. What is urgently required is a better understanding of the psychological 
processes which lead to these clinical disorders, and some empirically validated 
ways of preventing them from developing.
The diagnosis of cancer, for almost everyone, is a traumatically stressful event 
that precedes the rapid onset of a bewilderingly complex medical treatment 
involving a combination of surgery, radiotherapy, chemotherapy and/or 
hormone treatments. For many, it is the start of a personal ‘cancer journey’ 
that often takes several months to complete, during which time the individual 
may have to make dramatic changes in their lifestyles and role relationships. In 
view of the stress of these many changes, and the uncertainties surrounding this 
life-threatening illness, it might seem intuitively unsurprising that so many 
people develop high levels of anxiety and depression warranting psychological 
intervention. Although a considerable body of work over the past twenty years 
supports the conclusion that psychological treatment interventions can be 
effective in reducing psychological distress and improving quality of life (Sheard 
and Maguire, in press) as yet there has been less emphasis on the more pressing 
issue of preventing psychological suffering.
Between 15 and 20% of cancer patients will develop moderate to severe 
psychological disorders requiring mental health intervention. A further 30% will 
have an adjustment disorder involving symptoms of anxiety or depression 
(Massie and Holland, 1990). In addition, there is growing evidence that the 
families and carers of cancer patients face considerable psychological distress 
(Kissane, Bloch, Bums et al, 1994; Glasdam, Jensen, Madsen and Rose, 1996) 
and that both patients and spouses experience an erosion of social support in 
the months following diagnosis (Northouse, Templin, Mood and Oberst, 1998). 
This is important in view of the fact that perceived lack of support from family 
members (Neuling and Winefield, 1988), and from partners in particular 
(Weisman and Worden, 1976; Pistrang and Barker, 1995), has been positively 
related to anxiety and depression in cancer patients.
The following review will show that social support and, in particular, partner 
support, is highly relevant to the prevention of psychological distress among 
cancer patients. It will attempt to locate the specific issue of spousal support in 
cancer within the broad fields of social support, interpersonal relationships and 
care. It will also try to draw out some of the conflicts and complexities of the 
couple relationship when one member has become defined as the patient and 
the other the carer.
1.1 Social Support and Stress
John Cassel was one of the first scientists to empirically demonstrate a 
relationship between interpersonal ties and health. He hypothesised that social 
support might act as a buffer against the effects of stress (Cassel, 1974) . 
Building on Cassel’s work, Caplan (1974) conceptualised social support as a 
protection against pathology and characterised it as consisting of
“significant others who help people mobilise their psychological 
resources in order to deal with emotional problems... in order to help 
them deal with the particular stressful situation to which they are 
exposed. ”
(Brownell and Shumaker, 1984, p .2)
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In the 25 years since Caplan’s definition, the social support literature within 
social and health science has burgeoned, and his definition has required 
elaboration. More modern definitions stress that social support is an interaction 
that may be both enacted and/or perceived. For example, it has been defined 
as “social interactions that provide individuals with actual assistance and embed  
them  into a web of social relationships perceived to be loving, caring and 
readily available in times of need” (Kaniasty and Norris, 1997; p .595)
From a sociological perspective, social support has been viewed in terms of the 
degree of one’s social integration and the size and structure of one’s social 
network (e.g. Buunk and Hoorens, 1992). This is commonly known as the 
Main Effect hypothesis (Cohen and Wills, 1985); main-effect processes are 
thought to operate regardless of stress levels.
Cohen and Wills (1985) have suggested that, as a buffer against the effects of 
stress, social support serves four basic functions:
Esteem  support: assures people that they are competent and accepted, 
despite their shortcomings, with the effect of bolstering their self-esteem.
Informational support: provides people with information or advice in order 
better to understand and cope with what is happening.
Social companionship (or network support): involves spending time with 
people in leisure activities, thereby reducing stress by fulfilling a need for 
affiliation
Instrumental support (or tangible aid): provides concrete assistance in the 
form of financial aid, needed services and other material resources.
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Cutrona and Russell (1990) have added a fifth function which is closely related 
to esteem support: Emotional support provides comfort and security in times 
of stress, leading the recipient to feel cared for by others.
Social support has important parallels with the field of coping. In fact it has 
been argued that any (material, psychological or social) resources deployed to 
deal with life stress are always either support or coping. If the resources are 
governed by the person under stress they are part of the coping process; if they 
are governed by someone else, they are part of social support (Leatham and 
Duck, 1990). Indeed, Thoits (1986) has argued that social support is a form of 
coping assistance.
THE MATCHING HYPOTHESIS
Cohen and Wills (1985) have pointed out that, in order for the buffering effect 
to be observed, there must be a reasonable match between the type of support 
provided and the coping requirements of the stressor. This has since been 
variously termed the ‘matching hypothesis’ or the ‘specificity model’ (Trickett 
and Buchanan, 1997).
Although epidemiological research has led to some important findings, e.g. that 
people with social ties live longer and have better physical and mental health 
than those without such ties (Dunkel-Schetter, 1984), this approach has largely 
failed to further scientific understanding of optimal matches between types of 
stress and types of support. Furthermore, there has been conceptual confusion 
in the literature over how social support should be defined and operationalised, 
and too often it has been viewed along a single dimension. Furthermore, 
conclusions about social support have been largely based on correlational data 
collected at a single point in time (Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter, 1987).
Since the early 1980’s, however, there has been greater interest in regarding 
social support as a transactional process involving the stressor, the distress
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caused, the environmental conditions, the personal characteristics of the 
recipient and the provider, and the effect that these variables have on one 
another over time (Shinn, Lehmann and Wong, 1984); the implication is that 
social support may only be effective where there is an appropriate match 
between these variables. In particular, social support is seen as involving a 
complex interaction between the person receiving the support and the person 
giving it (Buunk and Hoorens, 1992) yet, until recently, there has been little 
dialogue between the fields of social support and personal relationships (Duck, 
1990). Thus, more modem definitions of social support reflect its multi­
dimensional and dynamic nature; for example, social support is seen as “an 
exchange o f resources between at least two individuals perceived by the 
provider or the recipient to be intended to enhance the well-being o f  the 
recipient” (Shumaker and Brownell, 1984, p. 13).
Using a cognitive appraisal model of stress, Cutrona and Russell (1990) have 
described a taxonomy of stressful events. These dimensions have implications 
for the type of support that is most beneficial in a given situation. For example, 
the controllability of an event predicts whether the individual will use emotion- 
focused or problem-focused coping. Controllable events are met with coping 
attempts to alter the distressing situation (e.g. advice, information, actual 
assistance, etc.), while uncontrollable events (such as cancer) will require social 
support components that serve to diminish the intensity of the emotions 
produced by the event (e.g. opportunities to ventilate emotions, re-evaluate the 
severity of one’s loss and “experience positive emotions that derive from 
sources not lost because of the stress (e.g., reminders that one is loved)” 
(Cutrona and Russell, 1990; p. 329)
1.2 Social Support and Adaptation to Cancer
Reviews of the literature on social support and adaptation to physical illnesses 
(Wortman and Conway, 1985) and cancer (Wortman, 1984; Wortman and 
Dunkel-Schetter, 1987), make similar methodological criticisms to those 
mentioned above. Although there has been broad acceptance of the fact that
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social support positively influences health outcomes, including physical health 
(Wallston, Alagna, DeVellis and DeVellis, 1983) and even, more contentiously, 
survival in cancer (e.g. Maunsell, Brisson and Deschenes, 1995), most early 
studies used cross-sectional, retrospective or case-control designs, often using 
vague definitions of social support. Wortman and Conway conclude that what is 
needed is more longitudinal research examining distinct aspects of social 
support as predictors of subsequent health status, while controlling for other 
variables which are likely to have an impact on health.
While acknowledging that debilitating medical illness such as cancer can 
adversely affect all aspects of an individual’s life (and so necessitate multiple 
forms of social support), Cutrona and Russell (1990) have categorised this type 
of stress as a negative, uncontrollable event that involves the loss of or threat to 
physical assets (including a threat to life). Thus, according to their model, 
emotional support and emotion-focused coping should be essential.
Drawing on interviews with 79 breast and colon patients (86% women; 62% 
married; mean age 56) 7 to 20 months after diagnosis of primary cancer, 
Dunkel-Schetter (1984) offers support for the idea that the uncontrollability of 
cancer engenders a need for emotional support above all other forms of social 
support. She found that 81% of her sample mentioned emotional support as 
one of the most helpful form of support, 41% mentioned informational support 
(if provided by health care staff) and only 6% mentioned instrumental assistance. 
She also found that the quantity, strength and satisfaction with support was 
significantly correlated with positive affect and self-esteem, though this 
association was only found among those with good prognoses.
Interestingly, some of the most unhelpful behaviours concerned family or friends 
giving the patient information and advice. Subjects were asked about nine 
statements presumed to be unhelpful. Of these the most frequently endorsed 
were “minimising problems or feelings about the cancer ’ and “being told not 
to worry because things would work out all right”, each endorsed by 37% of
- 1 0 8 -
the sample. 87% of the sample indicated that they had coped by sometimes 
keeping their thoughts and feelings to themselves, largely because of their 
expectations of others’ reactions. Furthermore, 28% of the sample felt that 
their spouses or significant others did not really understand their feelings about 
the cancer.
In her review of the literature, Rowland (1990) concluded, like Dunkel-Schetter, 
that positive social support is an effective buffer against the psychological 
distress of cancer, but that the loss of a significant other, who withdraws during 
the patient’s illness, may become a more powerful stressor than the illness itself. 
These two overlapping issues will be addressed separately. However, as will 
become evident, most of the published studies on social support and cancer 
have involved breast cancer patients.
In one of the earliest published studies on this issue, Bloom, Ross and Burnell 
(1978) provided 21 women who had had mastectomies with a support 
intervention that included information, opportunities for emotional expression 
and support from medical and mental health professionals. Two months after 
their mastectomies the women who received this intervention had higher self­
esteem and self-efficacy scores than women who did not. Although being of 
potential interest, being virtually the only published account of a social support 
intervention in cancer, this study demonstrated the efficacy of support by 
professionals but not the patients’ own social network.
The effect of family support, however, was demonstrated in a study of 
psychological adjustment of 54 women with metastatic breast cancer (Speigel, 
Bloom and Gottheil, 1983). Patients who reported at baseline that their 
families were high in expressiveness and low in conflict tended to show less 
mood disturbance over the course of the year following their diagnosis. The 
authors speculated that families high in expressiveness may provide an 
opportunity for the sharing of fear and frustration, thereby making it a mutual 
concern rather than one that the patient must endure alone.
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Neuling and Winefield (1988) reported a longitudinal study of recovery after 
surgery for breast cancer, in which 59 patients (35 of whom had had a 
mastectomy) reported the frequency of, and satisfaction with various supportive 
behaviours by specified family members (39 of the 43 married patients 
nominated their husbands) and friends. These behaviours were those first 
explored in the Dunkel-Schetter (1984) study described above. The women 
were interviewed 2-7 days after their breast surgery and were followed up one 
and three months post-surgery in their homes or by postal questionnaire. The 
results confirmed Dunkel-Schetter’s finding that cancer patients require and 
obtain significant amounts of empathic support from family members yet do not 
look for information or advice from this quarter. Emotional support appeared 
to be abundantly available, compared with other types of support from family 
members, around the time of the operation, decreasing in a linear fashion over 
the next three month. However, in spite of this, empathic support was most 
widely criticised as being insufficient. Satisfaction with family support was highly 
related to low scores on anxiety and depression in the early stages following 
surgery but this relationship appeared to decline at the one-month post­
operation time point.
Other studies confirm the importance of social support to overall emotional 
adjustment following diagnosis. Generally those with more social support and 
greater satisfaction with this support demonstrate less anxiety and depression 
over time (Northouse, 1988; Rodrigue, Behen and Tumlin, 1994). A number 
of authors have pointed to the importance of spousal support to the well-being 
of married or cohabiting patients (Neuling and Winefield, 1988; Rose, 1990). 
This issue will now be explored.
1.3 Partner Support
Among social relationships, marital status has been the most studied and most 
consistently related to health, though the benefits are almost always greater for 
men than for women (House and Kahn, 1985). One of the most important
positive health effects of being married appears to be through its transaction of 
social support, usually by involving people in a greater number of family ties and 
social networks, and by preventing social isolation (Baider, Kaufman, Peretz, et 
al, 1996). Studies have shown that when people have an emotional concern 
they are most likely to turn to their spouse or partner for support (Barker, 
Pistrang, Barker and Shaw, 1990), and, indeed, the lack of a confiding 
relationship increases the risk of depression. Among the partner/carers of 
people with cancer, one study has shown that 76% of male and 56% of female 
partners viewed their spouses (i.e. the patient) as their predominant source of 
support (Keller, Henrich, Sellschopp, and Beutel, 1996).
Unfortunately, however, neither the Main Effect model nor the Stress-buffering 
model clearly accounts for how interpersonal relationships either help or hinder 
adaptation within the system of spousal support (Baider, Koch, Esacson, and 
Kaplan De-Nour, 1998). One of the methodological challenges in examining 
the relationship between partner support and health is its interactional nature, 
with both variables affecting the other (Burman and Margolin, 1992). 
Furthermore, studying the relationship between psychological morbidity and 
partner support is unlikely to be fruitful unless the quality of the interactions 
between patient and partner are considered in detail. For example, as has been 
demonstrated in several of the studies discussed below, problems in a 
relationship may be a more powerful influence on emotional well-being than the 
positive aspects of the relationship. Prevalence of depression among single, 
separated or divorced people is three times higher than in those who are 
happily married; however, those reporting marital dissatisfaction are 25 times 
more likely to be depressed than single people (Schulz, Schulz, Schulz and von 
Kerekjarto, 1996).
There have been a number of cross-sectional studies to indicate that being in a 
close relationship predicts better psychological adjustment to cancer (Shag, 
Ganz, Polinsky, et al, 1993; Northouse, 1988). Significant others are thought 
to be an especially rich source of emotional support at times of stress and may
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be more sensitive than others to the plight of the patient and their particular 
needs (Bolger, Foster, Vinokur and Ng, 1996). However, like patients, partners 
demonstrate high levels of distress following the diagnosis of their partner’s 
cancer (Kissane, Bloch, Bums et al, 1994) and in one study of prostate cancer 
patients, the partners’ demonstrated significantly higher levels of distress than 
the patients (Komblith, Herr, Ofman et al, 1994).
A Danish study of 102 mixed-site cancer patients’ spouses (65% female) 
reported that 18% had scores on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale 
that were indicative of a clinical disorder while a further 32% were borderline 
(Glasdam, Jensen, Madsen and Rose, 1996). Interestingly, although spouses 
reported that their contact with family and friends had been maintained or even 
intensified, only a third reported feeling any support from these sources. This is 
a potentially important finding since it is likely that people who are well 
supported are better able to give support. The fact that spouses may be as 
distressed as patients has led some authors to question their ability to provide 
support (Baider et al, 1996). However, the critical question is whether the 
partner’s attempts at support are perceived as supportive by the patient, a 
question which has rarely been examined in the literature, and whether anything 
can be done to mitigate partners’ distress. In one study of 121 husbands of 
breast cancer patients, self-reported close confiding relations with their wives 
was associated with better emotional adaptation, as was the opportunity to 
share closeness and discuss feelings with other adults (Hoskins, Baker, Budin, et 
al, 1996). The implication of this may be that partners should be encouraged to 
diversify their sources of support.
Two investigations have attempted to track the psychological congruity of 
patients and their spouses, and both have noted a high correspondence between 
partners over time. Northouse studied 58 couples where the woman received a 
diagnosis of breast cancer and 73 couples where the woman had a diagnosis of 
benign disease (Northouse et al, 1998). Couples were assessed “a few days 
after their diagnosis”, and 60 days and 1 year post-diagnosis. Not surprisingly,
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couples in the malignant group reported significantly more emotional distress 
than those in the benign group. Women in the malignant group perceived a 
linear but slow decline in the support they received over the course of the study 
while the men in this group experienced a dramatic drop in support at the 60 
days point, perhaps, as the authors suggest, because they had been perceived 
by others as care providers rather than people in need of support themselves.
The other prospective study (Omne-Ponten, Holmberg, Sjoden and Bergstrom,
1995) interviewed 56 breast cancer patients and their partners separately at 
four and thirteen months after surgery. This study sought to examine whether 
the husband was able to perceive accurately his wife’s needs and provide the 
support required, and whether this was predictive of her later psychological 
adjustment. Over 90% of the couples had been married for more than 10 
years. The authors found that both patients’ and husbands’ assessments (in 
semi-structured interviews) of the marital relationship at four months were 
significantly related to the patient’s later psychological outcome. However, the 
authors noted that despite assertions of having a ‘good’ marital relationship, 
some spouses (both men and women) reported avoiding talking about their 
concerns in order to protect their spouse from further anxiety, and some of the 
women were convinced that “on/y another woman ” could give them the kind 
of empathy and support that they needed.
1.4 Impact of Chronic Illness on Partner Relationships
Although the psychological benefits of a supportive partner relationship are 
apparent, a number of authors have alluded to problems that may develop in 
the relationship between the recipient and provider of care and support. For 
example, studies of informal helping and support among healthy subjects have 
shown that partner-helpers are more inclined to use advice-giving, interpretation 
and self-disclosure than stranger-helpers (someone unfamiliar to the recipient) 
(Barker and Lemle, 1987). Spouses were more inclined to try to change their 
partner’s behaviour rather than explore their feelings, and thus were rated as 
showing less empathy than strangers in the same position.
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Several researchers within the field of personal relationships have called for a 
greater collaboration between their field and that of social support, arguing that 
it is within the domain of personal relationships that social support is delivered 
(Coyne and Smith, 1991; Leatham and Duck, 1990; Hatchett, Friend, Symister 
and Wadhwa, 1997). As has been observed, relationships are not the product 
or sum of two pre-formed minds but also a reflection of the evolving relationship 
and its social context (Duck, West and Acitelli, 1997).
Leatham and Duck (1990) have described several ways in which a relationship 
may be strained by the giving and receiving of social support. For example, 
unrelenting painful disclosures and depressed or needy communication can have 
a wearing effect on the recipient. If previous attempts at support have had 
negative consequences, the recipient may devalue and criticise the present 
support attempt. In addition, the provision of social support can do as much to 
destabilise a relationship, as the relationship can do to stabilise a person under 
stress (e.g. changes in role relationships). The authors argue that both fields 
need to pay closer attention to the mundane “daily dynamics of relating and also 
to the talk through which relationships -  the basis for support -  occur” (p.22). 
The following studies demonstrate some of these points.
At its simplest level, cancer appears to have negative long-term consequences 
for some marriages: marital tensions and strains are reported to occur in 10 to 
20% of couples affected by cancer (Keller, Henrich, Sellschopp, and Beutel, 
1996). For example, 403 survivors of Hodgkin’s disease were surveyed about 
various health and psychosocial variables on average nine years after their last 
treatment (Fobair, Hoppe, Bloom, Cox, Varghese and Speigel, 1986). 129 
(32%) of the total sample were divorced and, of these, 69 had been married at 
the time of their diagnosis. 34 (49%) of these 69 attributed their divorce to 
their Hodgkin’s disease. Although unreliable due to its retrospective nature, this 
is a striking finding.
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In addition to the stigma and avoidance of others, cancer patients may 
experience diminishing support with time. In an examination of 100 breast 
cancer patients and 100 male and female disease-free individuals, Peters-Golden 
(1982) reported that healthy individuals showed high levels of stigma and 
avoidance towards cancer patients yet imagined that they themselves would 
have an extensive network of support to draw upon if they developed the 
disease. Importantly, 38% of those with recurrent disease (55 out of the 100 
patients) reported that the support they received from others was inadequate, 
yet this was the case among only 11% of those with no recurrent disease. This 
suggests an erosion of support from first to recurrent diagnosis, though it is 
likely that recurrent disease also engenders a greater need for emotional 
support.
The damaging effect of problematic relationships on psychosocial adjustment 
was examined in a prospective survey of 68 end-stage renal disease patients 
(Hatchett, Friend, Symister and Wadhwa, 1997). Results confirmed that 
patients’ perceived inability to meet others’ expectations about coping with their 
illness were predictive of more psychological distress. In fact, the authors 
concluded that abating interpersonal conflict may be a more productive strategy 
in preventing distress than simply mobilising social support.
As well as patients having to cope with the perceived expectations of others, 
there is evidence that chronic illness may lead spouses to be critical of the 
patient. Manne and Zautra (1989) interviewed the husbands of 103 women 
with rheumatoid arthritis who also completed questionnaires on the burden of 
caring for their wives. The women separately completed a coping scale and a 
questionnaire concerning the perceived supportiveness of their spouses. 
Although cross-sectional in design, the results of this study indicated that 
positive support from husbands led patients to engage in more adaptive coping 
behaviours, such as cognitive restructuring and information-seeking efforts, 
while critical remarks from husbands appeared to lead to ineffective or harmful 
coping strategies such as wishful thinking (e.g. about a cure) with negative
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effects on self-esteem. As mentioned above, one purported causal mechanism 
underlying the effectiveness of social support is that it may influence coping 
indirectly by enhancing the recipient’s self-esteem (Wortman and Dunkel- 
Schetter, 1987). Reasons for the critical behaviour of husbands were not clear 
though there was some evidence that they resented the fact that their wives’ 
illness imposed limitations on their social, recreational and sexual activities.
Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter (1987) have succinctly summarised some of the 
main communication problems for cancer patients:
“Although their feelings about the patient's illness are largely 
negative, others appear to believe that they should remain optimistic 
and cheerful in their interactions with the patient. This con flic t... 
may result in physical avoidance, avoidance o f open communication, 
and strained interaction. The person with cancer often interprets 
these behaviors as evidence o f rejection at the very time when support 
from others is especially important. ” (p. 67)
There is ample evidence that many people with cancer value opportunities to 
express their fears and anxieties about recurrence and death (e.g. Lichtman, 
Taylor and Wood, 1988), though other data suggests that people tend to turn 
away from people under stress (Buunk and Hoorens, 1992). Indeed, they may 
disparage the distressed person as a way of dealing with their own perceived 
incompetence at support or sense of personal failure (Berrenberg, 1989), 
though they may be more inclined to help if they believe that such help will be 
productive and lead to real improvement in the lot of the recipient (Silver, 
Wortman and Crofton, 1990). Some authors have suggested that support may 
even decrease patients’ morale and sense of control if it leads to a 
reinforcement of their perception of incapacity (Bolger, Foster, Vinokur and Ng,
1996), while others have argued for the importance of open communication in 
relationships which fosters cohesion, increased marital satisfaction and 
psychological adaptation (Keller, Henrich, Sellschopp, and Beutel, 1996).
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Some evidence for the erosion of social support over time has already been 
presented (Dunkel-Schetter, 1984; Neuling and Winefield, 1988; Northouse et 
al, 1998; Peters-Golden, 1982). Bolger et al (1996) reported data which 
specifically focused on how significant others withdraw support in response to 
patients’ emotional distress. They studied 102 newly diagnosed breast cancer 
patients and their significant others four months and 8-10 months after 
diagnosis. The spouses of the patients who were married (73%) were also 
interviewed as well as the remaining significant others who comprised daughters 
(17%), friends (7%) and siblings (2%). Results indicated that over the six month 
period of the study patients’ physical impairment had the effect of mobilising the 
support of the significant other, but the patients’ distress also had the effect of 
eroding this support. Furthermore, the support that was delivered appeared to 
be ineffective in reducing distress or promoting physical recovery.
The authors speculated that a “contagion of distress” from the person under 
stress to the supporter may have led to an erosion of support. Although they 
had little data to support their claim, they argued that one explanation might be 
that significant others regard physical impairment as beyond the patient’s 
control, thereby meriting their support, whereas they regarded the patient’s 
emotional distress as controllable and thus less worthy of support. They 
concluded that both parties need to develop an awareness of the difficulties 
faced by the other, a position central to the current research described below.
Focussing on the communication behaviour of support providers, Pistrang and 
Barker (1992) studied 77 women with recently diagnosed breast cancer, to 
discover who they turned to for emotional support. They found that 51% of 
those who had a partner (61% of the sample) regarded their partner as their 
‘most important helper’. However, 38% of those who had nominated their 
partner as their preferred helper prior to breast cancer no longer regarded him 
as their preferred helper. The authors noted that women reported more 
problematic communication with partners than with friends and relatives. In
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particular, they withheld talking to their partners but would like to have talked 
more. They also felt less understood by partners and found talking to them less 
helpful than friends or relatives. Pistrang and Barker concluded that their data 
suggest that “the communication problems with partners were more to do with 
men’s difficulties in dealing with feelings, rather than an inability to understand 
the women’s concerns.” (p. 190)
Pistrang and Barker (1995) subsequently reported cross-sectional data on a 
larger sample (N=l 13; 60% married), which included that of their former study. 
Using subscales from the Symptom Check List (SCL-90R) and the Profile of 
Mood States (POMS-BI), they found that satisfaction with the partner helping 
relationship was associated with psychological well-being. Good communication 
with the partner was characterised by high empathy and low withdrawal, though 
women with partners were generally more distressed than women without 
partners. These authors also found that support from relationships outside the 
partner relationship did not compensate for the lack of a confiding relationship 
with the partner. They concluded that a poor partner relationship appears to 
be a risk factor in women’s psychological responses to breast cancer. The 
value of confiding emotional support to positive adaptation to illness has been 
further confirmed in another cross-s.ectional correlational study of breast and 
prostate cancer patients undergoing radiotherapy (Gotcher, 1992).
Finally, one study, which again showed negative partner behaviour having a 
significantly deleterious effect on psychological outcome, was unique in 
measuring the relationship between both positive and negative partner 
behaviours (Manne, Taylor, Dougherty, and Kemeny, 1997). In this cross- 
sectional study, it was hypothesised that negative spouse responses (withdrawal, 
avoidance and critical remarks) would be a more potent predictor of 
psychological outcomes than positive responses. It was also predicted that 
spouses who were critical and avoidant would also engage in fewer positive 
responses. 158 married individuals (88 male, 70 female) with cancer (colorectal: 
101; breast: 27; other sites: 30) were studied while receiving treatment (68%
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had metastatic disease). Measures, administered two months after the start of 
treatment, included perceived supportive spouse behaviours, perceived negative 
spouse behaviour, a mental health inventory and a measure of functional 
disability.
Results indicated a gender difference with respect to withdrawal behaviours, with 
female patients perceiving significantly more withdrawal/avoidant responses 
from their husbands. They also reported more psychological distress than the 
male patients. Of particular interest was the finding that for male patients, 
perceived supportive and perceived negative behaviours of their partners were 
independent. However, for female patients, the greater the social support 
provided by their husbands, the less likely they were to be perceived as critical 
or avoidant. For male patients, perceived supportive behaviours were not 
significantly associated with psychological outcome but, for female patients, 
perceived support was associated with higher scores of well-being.
The authors conceded that their measures of support may not have tapped into 
the most relevant aspects of social support such as empathy or understanding, 
and that “future studies need to further examine gender differences in spouses’ 
responses to illness” (p. 118), but they concluded that, on the basis of their data, 
it appeared that negative behaviour within close relationships has a stronger 
association with mental health than positive behaviour.
1.5 Gender and the Burden of Care
Most caring in Western society is performed by women. For example, Orbell 
(1996) has reviewed the literature on the caring of elderly people and has 
reported that in most epidemiological studies about 70% of carers are women. 
One explanation for this has been that, because of the more restricted 
employment opportunities for women, there is less “opportunity cost” of giving 
up work to look after an elderly relative. Another is to do with filial obligation, 
though this does not explain why it is women as opposed to men who so often 
provide the bulk of care in a family. However, an alternative view is that caring
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is ‘women’s work’ and that this gender role is socially reinforced. Orbell 
presents some evidence that, as a result of socialisation, nurturant and 
relationship skills are central to girls’ and women’s self-concept, a view shared 
by others (e.g. Gilligan, 1982). Thus, failure to engage in care may be more 
threatening to a woman’s self-concept and result in more feelings of guilt than 
they would in a man.
A recent review of the impact of caring for cancer patients on the care-giver has 
concluded that little is known about changing patterns of care-giving in relation 
to the course of the illness (Nijboer, Templaar, Sanderman et al, 1998) yet this 
is clearly a central question in a disease which is increasingly becoming defined 
as chronic. This review notes that the type of help provided may be a more 
important predictor of burden on the care-giver than the total number of tasks 
or time taken in care-giving. Personal tasks (such as feeding and washing the 
patient) are considered more burdensome, particularly if they restrict the 
freedom of the care-giver (see Manne and Zautra, 1989, above) than non­
personal tasks (such as doing the shopping) while emotional support is 
considered one of the most stressful aspects of the role. As has already been 
noted, the emotional distress of the patient may erode the provision of social 
support.
The relationship between gender and the distress of patients and spouses is not 
yet clear though there is considerable evidence that females, whether patients or 
care-givers, face greater burden and psychological distress than men (Baider, 
Koch, Esacson and Kaplan De-Nour, 1998; Burman and Margolin, 1992; 
Nijboer, Templaar, Sanderman et al, 1998). For example, in a study of care- 
giving in advanced cancer, Stetz (1987) reported that women expressed a 
greater need to stand by their ill husbands and reported more care-giving 
demands than did men in the equivalent role. As has been mentioned above, a 
study of prostate cancer patients found that their wives demonstrated 
significantly higher levels of distress than the patients themselves (Kornblith, 
Herr, Ofman et al, 1994).
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In one of the few prospective studies comparing men and women as both 
patients and spouses coping with gender-neutral cancers (colon, stomach, 
melanoma and lymphoma), Baider et al (1998; Baider et al, 1996) examined 
67 couples (28 female patients) at four time points over a 2 year period 
following initial diagnosis. All participants were interviewed in their homes and 
given questionnaires measuring family cohesion and adaptability to role 
changes, and psychological distress. Results (reported only for time points 1 
and 4) indicated that both patients and spouses were moderately distressed at 
both time points, with women reporting higher distress scores at T1 than their 
partners whether they were the patient or the partner (though this effect only 
reached statistical significance when the women were the partners). The 
psychological distress of women, whether sick or healthy, was significantly 
influenced by the distress of their husbands, while the psychological distress of 
men was only slightly influenced by the distress of their wives.
It is likely that men and women have different coping strategies in the face of 
stress, whether they or their partners are the primary victim of the stress. For 
example, Billings and Moos (1981) conducted a survey of 200 families in the 
San Francisco area and assessed their coping with a life event or personal crisis 
occurring in the previous year. Although husbands and wives used more 
problem-focused coping methods than emotion-focused methods, women 
reported using significantly more emotion-focused coping than men. Consistent 
with the matching hypothesis, discussed above, subjects used less problem- 
focused coping when the stress involved a death in the family (an uncontrollable 
stressor) than when confronted with other sources of stress.
More direct evidence for the difference between men and women in the way 
they cope with the role of being a carer comes from a study of spouses of 
mastectomy patients (Sabo, Brown, and Smith, 1986). In this study men were 
found to be emotionally engaged with their wives’ distress but were hiding it, 
preferring to play a more ‘positive’, protective, reassuring and minimising role.
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However, their wives interpreted this as insensitive and rejecting. This is similar 
to Pistrang and Barker’s (1992) results discussed above. Another investigation 
compared women’s and their husband’s distress prior to the woman’s biopsy for 
possible breast cancer (Northouse, Jeffs, Cracchiolo-Caraway, et al, 1995). 
Typically, the husbands reported considerably less distress than the women and 
did not discuss the biopsy with friends or co-workers but limited their discussion 
to wives and family members. Again, these responses were thought likely to 
reflect gender role differences in society at large, in that men may be more likely 
than women to confide solely in their partners.
Gender roles were examined in research on recently married healthy couples 
which measured marital satisfaction and depressive symptoms at two time 
points, eighteen months apart (Fincham, Beach, Harold and Osborne, 1997). 
Results were analysed using structural equation modelling. As in previous 
research, marital satisfaction was inversely related to depressive symptoms. 
However, the more interesting finding was that there were different causal 
pathways for men and women. The causal path from marital satisfaction to 
depression was significant for women and the causal path from depression to 
marital satisfaction was significant for men. The authors indicate that the results 
are consistent with previous research suggesting that “men may respond to their 
own depression by denigrating their relationships or by withdrawing from 
relationships to a greater extent than is true for women” (p. 356). Women, 
meanwhile, may be more vulnerable to marital stressors than men because they 
feel, or are required to assume, more responsibility for the resolution of 
relationship difficulties (Gilligan, 1982). If true, this finding has implications for 
the caring role among men and women: for example, if men experience a 
sudden reduction of emotional support (from its primary source -  their wives) 
when they are forced to care for their wives, they may respond with criticism or 
withdrawal.
Gender differences in supportive care are also evident in a study examining the 
changes in household responsibilities in 27 Canadian families over the course of
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the mother’s treatment for breast cancer (Green, 1986). Unusually, data was 
collected in family interviews which may have had the result of family members 
understating the effects reported. The family was asked to comment on each of 
the questions put to them and generate a number along a given scale that best 
reflected their consensus. Two interviews were conducted, six weeks post­
diagnosis and 6 to 12 months later. The first interview also collected 
retrospective data on household activities prior to the diagnosis. Of the 27 
families, 9 mothers were ‘non-partnered’ but all families contained children. 
Among the partnered families, most of the responsibility for most household 
activities was carried by the woman before, during and after her cancer. For 
five activities (shopping, housework, co-ordination of children’s activities, 
childcare and clothing upkeep), in which the woman had carried in excess of 
50% of the responsibility prior to her diagnosis, her responsibility dropped by 
15-35% while she was in treatment. However, at the second interview, only a 
few months after her diagnosis, responsibility distributions had returned to, or in 
most cases exceeded pre-diagnosis levels. In both partnered and non-partnered 
groups, women maintained considerably more responsibility than they 
relinquished for household responsibility including caring for the material needs 
of others in the family. Other studies have found that wives shoulder a greater 
housework burden that men and a disproportionate share of responsibility for 
maintenance of the family organisation and the provision of nurturing regardless 
of whether they are patients or spouse care-givers (Baider, 1995; Baider et al, 
1998).
Finally, conversation analysis research has examined the helping process that 
occurred between 26 women with breast cancer and two different types of 
helper: the woman’s male partner and a fellow breast cancer patient (who had 
completed her treatment for breast cancer) (Pistrang and Barker, in press). 
Building on Barker and Lemle’s (1987) work on partner vs. stranger helping 
behaviour, mentioned above, this study used trained observers to rate the 
communications between the woman and her helper. Results found that the ex­
patient helpers were rated as more helpful, empathic and supportive, less critical
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and as using more self-disclosure than the partners, with no differences in 
problem-solving or exploration. From the observer’s point of view, the 
helpfulness of the partner was negatively associated with criticism and the 
helpfulness of the ex-patient was negatively associated with self-disclosure. 
However, interestingly, the women did not differentiate between the two 
helpers, regarding both as helpful. The authors refer to work suggesting that 
women may be more skilful in supportive interactions while men are more 
inclined to take a problem-solving approach, consistent with the data from 
Billings and Moos (1981) referred to above.
1.6 Summary and Conclusions
The diagnosis and treatment of cancer is a highly stressful experience both for 
the ill person and their partner, and frequently leads to high levels of 
psychological morbidity. Social support, and particularly partner support, can 
act as a powerful buffer against the effects of stress and this finding appears to 
hold true in the context of cancer where it has been shown to be an important 
factor in patients’ psychological adjustment. However, social support is multi­
dimensional and theoretical work points to the need to match the type of 
support provided with the type of stress being confronted. Since serious 
illnesses like cancer are experienced as out of the individual’s direct control, 
theory predicts that emotional/empathic support should be the most effective in 
reducing distress. Empirical work appears to support this assumption.
People under stress are more likely to turn to their partner or spouse for 
support rather than others. However, social support and care can lead to 
strains and problems within the relationship between patient and carer which 
may, in turn, bring about an erosion of this valuable source of support and the 
development of subsequent psychosocial problems for either party. Partners 
often lack social support from friends and family and this may contribute both to 
their own psychological vulnerability and to their capacity to support the patient. 
Finally, there appear to be gender differences in the level of distress experienced
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by men and women, both as patients and as carers, as well as differences in 
men and women’s ability to demonstrate empathic care.
To date, almost all studies looking at partner support in cancer have examined 
breast cancer patients (Manne, Taylor, Dougherty, and Kemeny, 1997), all of 
whom have been women, rather than comparing the sexes in equivalent roles as 
patients and partners. Furthermore, most of these investigations have used 
cross-sectional rather than prospective designs. What remains unclear from the 
literature is whether there are differences over time in men and women’s 
behaviour and psychological functioning when they are either in the role of 
patient or partner/carer. To answer this question would require all patients to 
be suffering with a gender-neutral disease such as colorectal cancer, leukaemia 
or lymphoma.
Furthermore, while there have been numerous reported interventions for cancer 
patients, no published study to date has evaluated a preventative clinical 
intervention with the specific purpose of promoting and enhancing partner 
support when one member of the couple has been diagnosed with cancer.
7.7 Research Aims
The present study has two aims.
1. To examine the differences between men and women in their abilities 
to communicate emotional and confiding support to their partners when 
one of them has cancer; to measure this perceived support and to 
measure the effect of this support on the psychological adjustment of 
both patients and spouses.
2. To devise and evaluate a preventive intervention designed to enhance 
the mutual provision of social support between patients and their 
partners.
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1.8 Implications for an Intervention
The preceding review indicates that certain elements should be present in such
an intervention:
1. In view of the high incidence of cancer in society and the scarcity of 
professional psychosocial support resources, the intervention must be cost- 
effective to deliver.
2. The intervention should emphasise the use of empathic/emotional support 
over more instrumental or informational types of support.
3. The intervention should aim to prevent some of the interpersonal 
communication difficulties that have been referred to in the literature (e.g. 
critical remarks, avoidance and withdrawal, partners minimising the patient’s 
distress or being overly positive about the disease, unreasonable 
expectations, etc.) and which may be an aspect of support erosion.
4. It should also aim to promote those interpersonal behaviours which have 
been reported as helpful: emotional ventilation, expressions of affection, 
mutual empathic sharing of concerns, etc. In short, it should encourage 
both partners to develop an awareness of the difficulties faced by the other, 
not assume that the other person should know what they are feeling, an 
observation noted by clinicians in the field (Moorey and Greer, 1989).
5. Partners of patients should be encouraged to seek out additional support for 
themselves in view of the fact that they may have temporarily lost the 
support of the patient (who is likely to have become preoccupied with their 
own predicament). In addition, there is evidence that partners do not 
receive adequate support from friends or relatives, possibly because they, 
and others, perceive partners as care-providers rather than in need of
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support themselves. Without adequate support themselves, it may be 
difficult for partners to provide support to the patient (Baider, 1995).
1.9 The use of video technology to promote behaviour 
change
The medium of video was chosen for its obvious potential cost-effectiveness in 
such a prevalent disease as cancer. In 1996, 82% of British households 
possessed a video player, a proportion which appears to be rising in a linear 
fashion by about 2-3% per year (Thomas, Walker, Wilmot, and Bennett, 1998). 
Eiser and Eiser (1996) have reviewed studies evaluating the use of videos as 
health education interventions. However, they report no published studies in 
which the aim of the video was to enhance social support. Most were 
concerned with health education messages or preparation for medical 
treatments. They point out that in spite of their enormous potential value, both 
in terms of information delivery as well as skill transmission, few formal 
evaluations have been undertaken of the many videos that have been produced. 
Their review concludes that most of the studies demonstrated little or no positive 
evidence for the effectiveness of video as a health education intervention. 
However, this was largely because of particular problems that were common to 
many studies:
1. Authors appeared to lack any clear notion of what effects to expect from 
their video and thus what variables to measure.
2. There was often a failure to develop the intervention with any 
involvement of the target group so as to match the content of the 
programme with the real concerns of that group.
3. Many videos lacked any underlying theoretical basis for behaviour change
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However, videos appeared to have demonstrable advantages when used to 
present: (a) models of specific behaviour to be imitated and rehearsed; (b) 
information in an appealing way; and (c) information about the damaging 
consequences of behaviour. In fact, they reported that fear can be a powerful 
motivator for behaviour change, a view consistent with the Health Belief Model 
(Becker and Rosenstock, 1984) which was adopted as the theoretical backbone 
for the video intervention described below.
1.10 Hypotheses
1. That cancer patients, receiving an intervention designed to
enhance partner support, will have lower levels of psychological 
distress than those who receive standard care alone.
2. That the partners of cancer patients, receiving an intervention
designed to enhance partner support, will have lower levels of 
psychological distress than those who receive standard care 
alone.
3. That the intervention will improve the patient’s perception of
the effectiveness, helpfulness and supportiveness of their 
communication with their spouse, and will lead to higher 
satisfaction with the relationship relative to the control group.
4. That patients’ perception of support and empathy from their
partners will be associated with good psychological adjustment.
5. That males are more likely than females to perceive their 
spouses as their primary source of support in equivalent roles of 
patient or partner, and
6. That the intervention will lead more females to regard their
spouses as their primary support.
7. That female patients will perceive their spouses to
communicate lower empathy and supportiveness, and higher 
criticism and withdrawal than male patients.
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2. METHOD
2.7 Design
This study was a randomised controlled trial, evaluating the impact of a video 
intervention on the psychological, communication and relationship functioning 
of couples in which one partner was being treated for cancer. See Figure A  — 
Study Design.
Participating patients and partners were sent separate self-report questionnaires 
by post and instructed to complete them independently of one another before 
returning them to the experimenter. The couples were then randomised to one 
of two groups. The intervention group received a video, an accompanying 
leaflet and a short questionnaire (for both participants) concerning the video. 
The control group received routine care (i.e. no video). All participants were 
reassessed three months after randomisation. The sample size was not 
predetermined using a power calculation since an audit study had revealed that 
323 married patients were newly diagnosed with colorectal cancer in 1996, 
suggesting that achieving a large sample size of at least 50 couples in both 
groups would not pose difficulties.
FIGURE A: Study Design
TIME - 1
co
TIME- 2
Consent
ASSESSMENT ONE
Recruitment
ASSESSMENT TWO
CONTROL GROUP 
N = 23
VIDEO GROUP 
N = 23
Female-Patient Couples 
N = 11
Male-Patient Couples 
N = 11
Male-Patient Couples 
N = 12
Female-Patient Couples 
N = 12
Randomisation 
Blind Sequential Allocation
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2.2 Participants
Participants were drawn from patients attending oncology out-patient clinics at 
the Bristol Oncology Centre, Musgrove Park Hospital (Taunton, Somerset), the 
Royal United Hospital (Bath, Wiltshire) and Yeovil Hospital (Somerset). All 
patients were heterosexual, married or co-habiting, and were newly diagnosed 
with their first occurrence (i.e. no recurrences) of colorectal cancer. Eligibility 
for the study required that neither the patient nor their partner had had any 
previous cancer illness, that the patient was under 80 years old, and that the 
couple had access to a video player. Finally, the patient’s expected survival, as 
judged by his or her oncologist, had to be at least one year.
COLORECTAL CANCER
Colorectal (bowel) cancer is the second most common cause of cancer in the 
UK, and was responsible for over 15,000 deaths in 1996 (c.f. NHS Centre for 
Reviews and Dissemination, 1997). The incidence rate of the disease (45 per
100,000 of the population) rises sharply with age and fewer than half of all 
patients survive more than 5 years. Of those afflicted 59% are men. Surgery is 
the first-line treatment and is given to over 80% of patients, while pre- and post­
operative radiotherapy and chemotherapy do offer some survival benefit. All 
the patients in the current study were receiving either radiotherapy and/or 
chemotherapy.
2.3 The Intervention Video
In view of the lack of intervention studies targeting couples affected by cancer 
and the reported high incidence of psychological problems within the couple 
relationship, a video intervention was chosen because of its potential cost- 
effectiveness. The conception of the video was to weave both the personal 
testimonies and stories of patients with the advice of an “expert” (the author). 
The Health Belief Model (HBM) guided the making of the video in as far as the
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author attempted to include the following four elements of the model and to 
make the desired behaviours as explicit as possible:
1. perceived susceptibility (the belief that one may be vulnerable to a 
particular threat, problem or disease)
2. perceived seriousness (the belief that the consequences of the threat, 
problem or disease are severe and noxious)
3. perceived benefits of preventive action (the belief that by engaging in the 
behaviour promoted by the intervention one will prevent the threat from 
occurring)
4. perceived barriers (the belief that barriers to preventive action can be 
overcome; i.e. self-efficacy)
The focus of the intervention was to promote empathic emotional support 
between both partners, to reduce unhelpful behaviours (such as withdrawal, 
being critical or being overly ‘positive’) and to avoid the erosion of support by 
encouraging the carer-partner to acquire further support for themselves. 
However, in accordance with the HBM, the video begins with several allusions 
to the threat of anxiety and depression if the subsequent advice is not followed. 
The video also emphasises that cancer affects both partners in a relationship, 
not just the patient, and that it is a stressful time for both of them. Thus, from 
the beginning, there is an attempt to validate the experience of the partner as 
well as the patient. Following the patients’ and expert’s anecdotal accounts, the 
video ends with clear prescriptive advice which summarises the behaviours that 
have been advocated in the video.
MAKING THE INTERVENTION VIDEO
The highly iterative process of making the video intervention will now be 
described because this process was intrinsic to the film that emerged. The video 
was made over a six month period with the assistance of a professional video 
maker who provided technical advice and did most of the filming using a hired
- 131 -
digital video camera.2 All directorial and editing decisions were made by the 
author in light of the many sources of feedback that emerged during the process 
described below.
Five former female patients of the author (all of whom had completed their 
treatment for cancer at least six months before) were invited by letter to 
participate in the making of the video. Subsequently, a male ex-patient was 
invited to take part in the video and, in accordance with his wishes, he was 
filmed separately on hospital premises. All participants provided their written 
consent (a) before being filmed and (b) several months later, after they had read 
the transcript of what the author was proposing to use in the film.
All the women were invited to spend a day making the film at the author’s 
house. The women were strangers to one another except for two who knew 
each other through a church organisation. A three hour discussion took place 
in the morning between all the women and the author concerning some of the 
issues that the author wished to draw out in the video. Although the author had 
chosen women who had had either positive or negative experiences of support 
from their partners, he was careful to make no allusion in the focus-group 
meeting to any information that had been acquired in his clinical work with the 
women. Thus, issues were raised in general abstract terms and it was left up to 
the women to elaborate on them as they wished, often resulting in very personal 
self-disclosures. It is regrettable that this meeting was not recorded in light of 
the powerful feelings it aroused and the processes of mutual identification and 
bonding that developed between several of the women. The camera crew 
joined the women and the author for lunch, after which filming began. While 
the first women were being filmed, others continued their discussions and 
further considered the points they wished to make on the video.
2 Note that a parallel film, designed to be used as a control intervention, was made 
simultaneously. This film, called Finding the Calm, was a twelve minute stress 
reduction intervention. Due to recruitment difficulties, this arm of the trial was 
dropped.
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Following transcription of the raw footage of the patient testimonies, followed 
by rudimentary editing, the author was filmed (fulfilling the role of “expert 
professional”) in order to draw out further points and to ensure that the video 
would not lead partners to feel excessively guilty over omissions of support on 
their part. It was felt important to emphasise that cancer affects both members 
of the couple and that the roles of patient and partner are both stressful.
There followed a more rigorous editing of the complete transcripts, and the 
writing of ‘voice-overs’ in order to ensure continuity and shape to the 
programme. ‘Cut-away scenes’ (visual analogues of the spoken material) were 
then filmed and the voice-overs recorded. The original footage, the cut-aways 
and the voice-overs were then taken to an off-line video-editing suite where they 
were compiled into an ‘off-line’ (i.e. semi-finished) version of the programme.
The off-line version of the video was then shown to two ex-patient cancer 
support volunteers, an independent video-editor, as well as numerous others for 
their feedback. After taking this feedback into account, the final edit list of the 
video (Appendix A) was sent to all ex-patients who appeared on the video in 
order to obtain their final consent. The final edit list was then taken to an ‘on­
line’ video editing suite where, with music and titles, it was rendered onto a 
Betacam master. Multiple copies of the finished videos were subsequently made 
from this master over a number of days. The completed video is 15 minutes 
and 34 seconds long.
The prescriptive advice with which the video ends summarises the main themes 
discussed. These are:
1. “Anxiety and depression are less likely to develop if the couple are able to 
face the stress of cancer together
2. Try to be clear with each other about what you are feeling, but don’t assume 
you know what your partner is feeling or thinking
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3. Do your best not to interrupt your partner when they are speaking; try to listen 
more than talk
4. Avoid being critical of your partner; remember that it is a stressful time for both 
of you and that both of you need support
5. Words may not always be as important as giving or receiving a hug from your 
partner
6. Remember that being overly positive, giving advice, or finding a solution is not 
always what’s needed; try to find out instead whatever your partner would find 
it helpful to talk about.
7. Don’t worry about saying the wrong thing — the important thing is to try to stay 
involved
8. Find someone else you can talk to, and get support from, on a regular basis”
2.4 Measures
A number of the measures were identical to those reported by Pistrang and 
Barker (1992, 1995) in their study of the perceptions of partner support among 
women with breast cancer, and are used with their permission. This was in 
order to replicate their study and to expand it in order to examine both men and 
women suffering with the same illness. Table A presents a summary of the 
main variables examined.
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TABLE A: Summary of key measures (Patient
Questionnaire)
Type of 
Variable
Section
number
Question
numbers Description
Time of 
administration
TIME 1 TIME 2
1 1 -1 6 Demographic information
1 17-18 Personal history of stress ✓
Demographic 1 19 Most important source of support s
1 20 Time since diagnosis + recent treatment (e.g. surgery, etc.) s
co
2 1 - 9
Expression of concerns & 
feelings, helpfulness of 
disclosure, effectiveness, s ✓
<0 holding backo
c
3s=
2 10 Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory (empathy scale) s
E 2 11 Qualitative view of partner s ✓oo
2 12, 14 - 16
Perception of partner: stress 
level, supportiveness, 
criticalness, withdrawal
V
2 13 Relationship change s s
Relationship 2 17 Relationship happiness s s
Satisfaction 2 18 .Dyadic Adjustment scale s s
4 1 - 4 Significant Others Scale s s
Psychological
distress
3 1 -2 9
Symptom Check List -  90 
(SCL-90) (Anxiety, 
Depression, Hostility 
subscales)
s s
5 1 -10 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale V s
6 - Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAD) s s
2.4.1 PATIENT QUESTIONNAIRE
The patient questionnaire (Appendix D1, page 227) was divided into six 
sections. It was estimated that the whole questionnaire (nearly 100 questions) 
could be completed within 40 minutes.
Section 1 included standard demographic questions (questions 1-16), a number 
of questions assessing personal history variables (questionl7), and a question 
about concurrent stresses (question 18). The only items in the first 
questionnaire (Time-1) omitted from the second (Time-2) were these basic 
demographic and distant personal history questions (see Table A). Question 19
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assessed the patient’s most important source of support since they learned they 
had cancer and, finally, question 20 assessed time since diagnosis and recent 
treatment.
Section 2 was largely drawn from Pistrang and Barker’s research protocol 
(personal communication). Questions assessing the extent of subjects’ concerns 
and worries preceded questions which assessed the extent to which the subject 
had talked about these concerns or particular feelings to their partner (1-4). 
Questions 5 and 6 assessed how helpful the subject had found talking to their 
partner about these concerns or feelings along six-point scales. Question 7 
assessed the adequacy of the extent of communication between subject and 
partner though items (a) and (c) were subsequently excluded because their 
implications for communication were ambiguous. Questions 8 and 9 were 
concerned with whether and why people may have held back from talking about 
their concerns or feelings. Question 10 measured empathy and was a ten-item 
subset from the revised Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory (Barrett- 
Lennard, 1978) with a reported coefficient alpha (i.e. internal consistency) of 
0.83. The rest of Section 1 assessed the quality of the patient-partner 
relationship, both since the diagnosis of the cancer (questions 11 to 16: 
perceptions of how supportive, critical and withdrawn the partner had been) and 
more generally as measured by six items from the Dyadic Adjustment Scale 
(Spanier, 1976) (questions 18).
Section 3 (Problems and Complaints) included three subscales from the 
Symptom Check List (SCL-90) Derogatis, 1977). The subscales were Anxiety 
(10 items), Depression (13 items) and Hostility (6 items). Subjects responded 
according to a 5-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “extremely”.
Section 4 (Your Relationship) was taken from the Significant Others Scale 
(SOS) (Power, Champion and Aris, 1988) which measures different functional 
aspects of perceived social support. This scale (which was not used by Pistrang 
and Barker) measures actual vs. ideal levels of support along four dimensions.
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The scale was simplified to measure only perceived support from the subject’s 
partner.
Section 5 (Views about Yourself) was the widely-used ten-item Rosenberg Self- 
Esteem Scale (RSES) (Rosenberg, 1965). Finally, Section 6 comprised the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) 
which has been widely used with cancer patients and contains 7-item subscales 
for both anxiety and depression.
2.4.2 PARTNER QUESTIONNAIRE
The partner questionnaire (Appendix D2, page 228) comprised a subset of 
questions from the patient questionnaire, and was estimated to take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were 
virtually identical and excluded only items pertaining to the patient’s treatment. 
Section 2 was shortened to include only questions about the subject’s 
relationship with his or her partner.
2.4.3 THE INITIAL VIDEO FEEDBACK QUESTIONNAIRE
The initial video feedback questionnaire (Appendix D3, page 249) was 
primarily designed to help subjects personalise, internalise and remember the 
information they had seen on the video, as well as to consider possible barriers 
to following its advice (along the lines of the Health Belief Model), in the hope 
that this would enhance the effect of the intervention. Questions concerned the 
video’s importance, relevance and potential helpfulness as well as potential 
obstacles or barriers to enacting the advice in the video.
2.4.4 THE FOLLOW-UP VIDEO QUESTIONNAIRE
The follow-up video questionnaire (Appendix D4, page 249) was designed to 
obtain quantitative and qualitative information about the video at the end of the 
study. It was thus a retrospective self-report measure of unknown reliability, 
which asked subjects to consider to what extent the video had changed their 
behaviour and that of their partner.
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2.5 Procedure
2.5.1 ETHICS
Ethical approval for the study was sought and obtained from four hospital 
Research Ethics Committees (Appendix B, page 207): United Bristol 
Healthcare NHS Trust, East Somerset NHS Trust, West Somerset (Taunton and 
Somerset Hospital), and Royal United Hospital Bath NHS Trust. The main 
ethical questions, peculiar to this research project, which were likely examined 
by the Ethics Committees were whether or not the questionnaires or 
intervention video were potentially damaging to participants, and whether those 
taking part in the video were compromised in any way in spite of their informed 
consent. For the purposes of obscuring the central purpose of the study from 
subjects, the research project was preliminarily entitled “An Evaluation of Two 
Psychosocial Videos”.
2.5.2 IMPLEMENTATION
Eligible patients were approached about the study while attending their first 
outpatient appointment with their oncologist to discuss their impending 
treatment (chemotherapy or radiotherapy). Their oncologist was instructed to 
ask the patient whether they felt that they and their partner might be prepared 
to receive more information about a study looking at “how couples cope when 
one of them has cancer”. Although no further information was given, it was 
explained that the couple might be asked to watch a video and the couple’s 
access to a video player was thus established. The name, sex and date or birth 
of all eligible patients approached was then passed onto the author by clinic staff 
with an indication whether or not the patient had agreed to receive further 
information.
Patients who had agreed to be contacted were then sent a letter (Appendix C, 
page 216), addressed to the patient and their partner, inviting them to
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participate in the study. Enclosed with the letter was a detailed Consent Form 
(Appendix C, page 218) and a stamped addressed envelope for its return to the 
author.
Both members of consenting couples were then sent different questionnaires 
according to whether they were the patient or the partner (Appendix D1 & D2). 
These were contained in separate but unsealed stamped addressed envelopes, 
clearly marked with either the word ‘Patient’ or ‘Partner’ on the outside. A 
cover letter (Appendix C, page 249) gave instructions that the partners should 
complete the questionnaires separately, without consulting one another, before 
returning them to the author.
Once both questionnaires had been received, couples were consecutively 
assigned to the video or control group. This method of consecutive allocation 
was considered an adequate randomisation strategy in that it could not 
conceivably lead to any selection bias. There were four groups into which the 
couple could be assigned: female-patient intervention group, female-patient 
control group, male-patient intervention group, and male-patient control group.
Following randomisation, couples in the control group were sent a letter 
(Appendix C, page 223) explaining that they had been randomly assigned to 
the no-video (control) group, but reiterating that their continued participation 
was still vital to the research project. Couples in the intervention group were 
sent a copy of the video intervention, two copies of a short Initial Video 
Questionnaire (Facing it Together - Appendix D3, page  249) which, again, 
were concealed in separate clearly marked stamped addressed envelopes, two 
copies of a leaflet also entitled “Facing it Together” (Appendix E, page 250), 
and a cover letter asking the couple to watch the video together but without 
others present (Appendix C, page 222). The leaflet was designed to reiterate 
the prescriptive advice on the video and to act as an accessible prompt should 
the subject wish to refresh his or her memory.
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Finally, three months after receipt of the first questionnaires, all couples were 
sent Time-2 questionnaires which were almost identical to those they had 
completed before. Again, these were concealed in marked stamped addressed 
envelopes, along with a cover letter (Appendix C, page 224) of instruction. 
Couples in the intervention group were also sent the Follow-up Video 
Questionnaire (Appendix D4, page 249) along with their main questionnaires. 
As soon as all these last questionnaires were received, the couple were sent a 
letter thanking them for their participation (Appendix C, page 225).
2.6 Statistical Analysis
There are essentially four explanatory perspectives from which the dataset can 
be viewed: patient/partner X male/female X intervention/control X Time- 
l/T im e-2. This represents sixteen potential groupings of the data. In view of 
this complexity and the number of variables involved, the chances of a false 
positive result (Type 1 error) will be high if each variable is analysed from the 
perspective of all these various groupings. Clearly, a multivariate parametric 
approach is the preferred option when considering multiple outcome variables 
and explanatory factors.
However, all the variables in the current study (with the obvious exception of 
age) are binary, ordinal or categorical rather than continuous. Such data only 
allow subjects to be ranked in relation to one another; no assumptions can be 
made about the magnitude of the difference between any two scale points.
Thus, particularly in view of the relatively small sample size, these kind of data 
require non-parametric statistical methods (Powell, 1996) which do not assume 
a normal distribution. Although non-parametric statistics are less powerful, their 
very conservativeness has advantages when so many variables are to be 
examined.
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Hypotheses pertaining to gender differences were predominantly tested by 
cross-sectional examination of participants at Time-1. Hypotheses relating to 
the effect of the video intervention were tested by first calculating change scores 
for each participant from Time-1 to Time-2, and then comparing change scores 
between the two groups.
Data were manipulated and analysed using SPSS Windows (version 8), Excel 
and Access computer programs. Note that with respect to the Mann-Whitney U 
Test, SPSS for Windows does not calculate a significance level for the U test but 
instead gives the related Z statistic and its significance level. The Z statistic 
corrects for scores receiving the same rank. This means that if Z is not 
significant, nor will U. Hence, for the following analyses, using the Mann- 
Whitney test, the value of Z and not U will be reported.
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3. RESULTS
The results will be presented in seven sections:
3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF THE SAMPLE
3.2 COMPARISON OF THE VIDEO AND CONTROL GROUPS AT TIME-1
3.3 COMPARISON OF CHANGE SCORES BETWEEN THE VIDEO AND 
CONTROL GROUPS FROM TIME-1 TO TIME-2
3.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNICATION AND 
RELATIONSHIP VARIABLES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS
3.5 GENDER DIFFERENCES
3.6 INITIAL VIDEO FEEDBACK QUESTIONNAIRE
3.7 FOLLOW-UP VIDEO FEEDBACK QUESTIONNAIRE
3.1 Demographic Features of the Sample
3.1.1 PARTICIPANTS, REFUSALS AND DROP-OUTS
In total, 80 eligible couples (of which 41 contained male patients) were 
approached over a ten month period. Of these, 9 male-patient couples and 5 
female patient couples refused to receive further information about the study. A 
further 6 male-patient and 5 female-patient couples declined to participate after 
obtaining consent information about the study and of those who consented to 
the study, 3 male-patient and 6 female-patient couples subsequently failed to 
return their pre-test questionnaires. This left an initial sample of 46 couples 
(70% of those receiving the consent information) who were randomly allocated 
to the Video (n=23) intervention and Control (n=23) groups. Patients who 
either refused or dropped out of the study were not significantly different in 
either age or sex from patients who participated.
At Time-2, 3 months after randomisation, four couples (3 female-patient and 1 
male-patient) failed to respond to the questionnaires and the reminders sent to 
them. Of these, three were in the control group and one was in the video
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group. There were no differences between these couples and the rest of the 
sample in age or on any psychological variable except SCL-90 Depression on 
which they scored significantly lower (Mann-Whitney, z=2.10, p=0.036).
3.1.2 DEMOGRAPHIC AND PERSONAL HISTORY VARIABLES
The mean age of the patients and partners (n=92) was 58.4 years with a 
preponderance of patient subjects in their sixties (see Figure 1)
FIGURE 1: Age Distribution of patients in the video and
control groups
Group
m H | Control 
| - } Video
30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79
Ages in 10 year bands
There were no statistically significant differences between the video and control 
groups on demographic variables (see Table 1), with two exceptions: 
significantly more control group partners than video group partners reported 
that they had previously coped with a family member with cancer; and control 
group subjects left school significantly later than video group subjects.
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TABLE 1: Demographic Characteristics of Video and
Control Groups
Variable Video(n=23)
Control
(n=23)
Test
statistic
P-
value
Gender of patient
Male (n) 12 11 Chi2=0.087 0.770
Female (n) 11 12
Patients’ age mean (sd) 58.91 (11.35) 58.04 (11.73) t=0.255 0.800
Partners’ age mean (sd) 60.52 (10.94) 56.04 (12.72) t=1.28 0.207
Length of relationship
mean (sd) 33.24 (14.30) 29.09 (16.26) t=1.28 0.201
Number of children mean (sd) 2.04 (0.98) 1.95 (0.94) t=0.443 0.659
Age of youngest child mean (sd) 28.55 (11.81) 27.20 (10.87) t=0.548 0.585
Patients’ school leaving age mean 
(sd) 15.48 (1.62) 17.54 (3.74) t=2.43 0.020
Partners’ school leaving age mean 
(sd) 15.40 (1.63) 18.04 (4.73) t=2.37 0.020
Weeks since diagnosis mean (sd) 11.35 (5.48) 11.32 (8.67) t=0.014 0.989
Surgery over past 2 months n (%) 8(35) 14(61) Chi2=3.13 0.077
Chemotherapy over past 2 months
n (%) 16(70) 10(43) Chi2=3.18 0.074
Radiotherapy over past 2 months n
(%)
5(22) 6(26) Chi2=0.12 0.730
Patients’ family history of cancer
n (%) 7(30) 10(43) Chi2=1.08
0.299
Partners’ family history of cancer n
(%)
2(9) 9(39) Chi2=5.85 0.016
No direct measure of cancer symptomatology or functional performance was 
made. One recruitment criterion was an assessment by the patient’s doctor that 
the patient would survive at least one year. No patients died during the course 
of the study. Time-2 measures of cancer treatment over the prior three months 
(i.e. the course of the study) indicated no difference between the groups on 
surgery (Chi-square=3.55, p=0.059), radiotherapy (Chi-square=2.47, 
p=0.116), or chemotherapy (Chi-square=2.444, p=0.118).
3.2 Comparison of the Video and Controi Groups at Time-1
3.2.1 COMPARISON OF PATIENTS IN THE VIDEO AND CONTROL 
GROUPS AT TIME-1
Patients in the video and control groups were compared as to their sources of 
support, communication, relationship, and psychological variables at Time-1 to 
investigate whether randomisation had been effective. Table 2 indicates that
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although the two groups did not differ in the source of the main support, 
patients in the control group rated their partners as significantly more empathic 
than video group patients (p=0.047). They also reported a tendency to find 
talking to their partners as more effective (p=0.058) than those in the video 
group. Whilst there were no differences between the groups in terms of 
relationship satisfaction, there were differences on psychological variables. 
Video group patients had higher scores on SCL-Depression (p=0.040), SCL- 
Hostility (p=0.016) and HAD-Depression (p=0.018), representing a failure of 
randomisation.
TABLE 2: Comparison of Patient Subjects in the Video and
Control Groups on Key Outcome Variables at Time-1
Variable Video (n=23) Control(n=23)
Chi-
square
P-
value
O -c
0 o
O Q.
Partner as the most important 
source of support n (%) 18(78) 19(83) 1.20 0.548
= §• o «
CO
Male as most important source of 
support n (%) 6(26) 10(43) 1.06 0.303
Video 
mean (sd)
Control 
mean (sd)
Mann- 
Whitney z=
P-
value
(3) Talked about concerns 2.11 (1.04) 2.16(1.16) 0.212 0.832
(4) Talked about feelings 2.06 (1.18) 2.55 (1.26) 1.467 0.142
c:o (5) Helpfulness of talking 2.05 (1.80) 2.48 (1.17) 0.784 0.433
13o (6) Effectiveness of talking 11.55 (5.05) 14.41 (5.42) 1.896 0.058
JZ3 (8) Holding back 0.82 (0.91) 0.64 (0.73) -0.561 0.575
E
E (10) Empathy of partner 11.23 (10.78) 16.64 (10.60) 1.989 0.047
O (14) Supportiveness of partner 4.61 (5.61) 3.82 (0.50) 1.275 0.202
(15) Partner criticism 0.50 (0.86) 0.41 (0.67) -0.129 0.898
(16) Partner withdrawal 0.18(0.85) 0.18 (0.39) 1.322 0.186
Q. (13) Relationship change 3.65 (0.88) 3.45 (0.74) -0.695 0.487
<n
c (17) Happiness of relationship 0.76 (1.04) 1.30 (1.22) 1.574 0.116
(18) Dyadic Adjustment Scale 0.67 (1.91) 0.68 (3.08) 0.568 0.570
a: Significant Others Scale -2.1 (3.24) -1.1 (2.39) -1.260 0.208
Self-Esteem 8.14 (4.49) 9.14 (5.29) 0.796 0.426
Too SCL-Anxiety 6.55 (4.86) 5.23 (5.84) -1.390 0.164
o>o SCL-Depression 10.95 (6.13) 7.50 (6.12) -2.059 0.040
oszo SCL-Hostility 2.05(2.19) 0.82 (1.44) -2.407 0.016
COQ. HAD-Anxiety 5.91 (4.13) 4.00 (2.99) -1.370 0.171
HAD-Depression 4.00 (3.01) 1.95 (1.73) -2.37 0.018
-1 4 5  ~
3.2.2 COMPARISON OF PARTNERS IN THE VIDEO AND CONTROL 
GROUPS AT TIME-1
As can be seen from Table 3, partners in the control group were significantly 
more likely to have chosen a man as their main source of support since the 
diagnosis of their partner’s cancer (p=0.011). The two groups were otherwise 
similar except for higher levels of partner criticism in the video group (p=0.033) 
and a non-significant tendency for control group partners to have higher self­
esteem scores (p=0.058).
TABLE 3: Comparison of Partner Subjects in the Video and
Control Groups on Key Outcome Variables at Time-1
Variable Video(n=23)
Control . 
(n=23)
Chi-
square
P-
value
<4-
O t  0 oO Q.
Partner as the most important 
source of support n (%) 9(39) 12 (52) 1.629 0.443
= 3 O w 
CO
Male as most important source of 
support n (%) 2(9) 10(43) 6.453 0.011
Video 
mean (sd)
Control 
mean (sd)
Mann-
Whitney
z=
P-
value
o
’c (14) Supportiveness of partner 3.17(0.72) 2.91 (1.11) -0.514 0.607
£ ~C. (15) Partner criticism 0.74 (0.86) 0.30 (0.70) -2.132 0.033 TOo
o (16) Partner withdrawal 0.35 (0.71) 0.61 0.84) -1.282 0.200
Q. (13) Relationship change 3.43 (0.73) 3.47 (0.85) 0.143 0.886
in
c (17) Happiness of relationship 1.05 (1.36) 1.00 (1.13) -0.199 0.842
(18) Dyadic Adjustment Scale 0.78 (2.76) 0.35 (1.99) -1.601 0.109
C£ Significant Others Scale -1.18(2.59) -1.96 (2.60) -0.935 0.350
Self-Esteem 5.32 (4.64) 7.95 (4.76) 1.897 0.058
15
o SCL-Anxiety 6.96 (7.07) 5.61 (4.03) -0.099 0.921
O)_o SCL-Depression 12.17(9.12) 11.30 (6.99) -0.121 0.904
JZ
o SCL-Hostility 2.0 (2.32) 1.57 (1.56) -0.158 0.874
10 
Q. HAD-Anxiety 6.74 (3.63) 6.17(3.38) -0.497 0.619
HAD-Depression 3.61 (2.89) 3.30 (1.87) -0.022 0.982
3.2.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATIENTS AND PARTNERS ON KEY 
VARIABLES
There were only two significant differences at Time-1 between patients and 
partners. Patients’ assessments of their partners’ supportiveness were 
significantly higher than partners’ assessments of the patients’ supportiveness 
(Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, z = 3.51 , p < 0  .001) which is perhaps not 
surprising given their relative situations. More interesting was the finding that 
partners perceived their spouses to have withdrawn (question 16) significantly 
more than patients perceived their partners to have withdrawn (Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test, z = 2 .5 6 ,p  = 0.010) though there was no difference in 
perceived criticism between patients and partners at Time-1 (Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks test, z=0.420, p=0.674).
3.3 Comparison of Change Scores in the Video and Control 
Groups
Change Scores
The means and standard deviations of the experimental variables at Time-1 for 
both the video and control group have been presented in Tables 2 & 3.
Change scores were calculated for each subject for each variable by subtracting 
the Time-2 score from the Time-1 score. The video and control groups were 
then compared according to the resulting change scores (Note: Tables 4  & 7 
exclude data from the four couples who had dropped out of the study by Time- 
2).
The raw means and standard deviations for both patients and partners in the 
two groups are presented in Tables 5,6, 8 and 9, which include within-group 
comparisons from Time-1 to Time-2 for all subjects.
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3.3.1 EFFECT OF THE VIDEO ON PATIENT SUBJECTS
The video appeared to have had limited impact on patients’ perception of their 
most important source of support (Table 4) with one more subject in the video 
group and two less subjects in the control group designating their partner as 
their most important source of support. Among the outcome variables only 
three change scores were significantly different between the groups. The 
perception of the partner’s supportiveness fell in the control group while it 
remained the same in the video group (p=0.029). The perceived happiness of 
the relationship (question 17) improved for subjects in the video group while it 
declined in the control group (p=0.022).
There were no significant differences between the groups in change scores on 
any measure of psychopathology except for the depression scale of the HAD on 
which patient control subjects became more depressed while video subjects 
became less depressed, a significant group difference (p=0.009). However, it 
must be borne in mind that at Time-1 the video group had significantly higher 
scores on both HAD-Depression and SCL-Depression and thus it is unclear 
whether this difference in the change scores between the groups reflects 
regression towards the mean or a genuine effect of the video. The change in 
HAD-Depression was not supported by similar changes in SCL-Depression.
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TABLE 4: Comparison of Change Scores among Video and
Control Patient Subjects
Variable Video T2-T1 (n=22)
Control T2-T1 
(n=20)
Chi-square
(d.f.=2)
P“
value
So
urc
e 
of
 
su
pp
or
t
Partner as the most 
important source of 
support
+1 -2 2.270 0.321
Male as most 
important source of 
support
+3 -2 4.943 0.084
Variable
Video Group (
mean (sd
n=22) Control Group
mean (sd
n=20)
)
Change 
Mann- 
Whitney 
z =
Change
p-value
T1 T2 Change T1 T2 Change
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
(3) Talked about 
concerns
2.13
(1.04)
1.88
(0.77)
-0.25
(0.86)
2.10
(1.17)
2.15
(1.16)
0.05
(1.07) 0.683 0.495
(4) Talked about 
feelings
2.05
(1.18)
2.23
(0.96)
0.25
(1.10)
2.42
(1.35)
2.29
(1.15)
-0.129
(0.81) -1.408 0.159
(5) Helpfulness of 
talking
1.95
(1.78)
0.95
(2.57)
-1.00
(2.29)
2.35
(1.22)
2.00
(1.58)
-0.35
(1.81) 0.621 0.535
(6) Effectiveness 
of talking
10.68
(5.87)
12.00
(6.38)
1.32
(6.59)
13.05
(6.21)
13.90
(5.90)
0.85
(4.06) 0.127 0.899
(8) Holding back 0.68
(0.84)
0.59
(0.80)
-0.09
(0.53)
0.80
(0.77)
0.90
(0.64)
0.10
(0.45) 1.251 0.211
(10) Empathy of 
partner
11.55
(10.53)
13.55
(9.46)
2.00
(5.07)
15.30
(11.60)
15.35
(10.56)
0.05
(5.37) -1.213 0.225
(14)
Supportiveness of 
partner
3.50
(0.91)
3.59
(0.73)
0.09
(0.61)
3.70
(0.66)
3.35
(0.88)
-0.35
(0.59) -2.189 0.029
(15) Partner 
criticism
0.50
(0.86)
0.36
(0.73)
-0.14
(0.56)
0.45
(0.69)
0.20
(0.52)
-0.25
(0.79) -0.241 0.809
(16) Partner 
withdrawal
0.18
(0.85)
0.45
(0.86)
0.27
(0.93)
0.20
(0.41)
0.20
(0.62)
0.00
(0.46) -1.249 0.212
o
(13) Relationship 
change
3.68
(0.89)
3.59
(0.73)
-0.09
(0.97)
3.50
(0.76)
3.35
(0.75)
-0.15
(.37) -0.377 0.706
Re
la
tio
ns
hi
|
(17) Happiness of 
relationship
0.73
(1.03)
0.95
(1.17)
0.23
(0.68)
1.05
(1.28)
0.65
(1.09)
-0.40
(-94) -2.286 0.022
(18) Dyadic 
Adjustment Scale
0.68
(1.86)
0.41
(2.40)
-0.27
(2.00)
0.50
(3.24)
0.50
(3.32)
0.00
(1.62 0.079 0.937
Significant Others 
Scale
-1.73
(2.80)
-1.86
(3.23)
-0.14
(1.46)
-1.35
(2.46)
-1.90
(4.02)
-0.55
(2.42) -0.581 0.561
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l
Self-Esteem 8.00
(4.44)
8.09
(4.56)
0.09
(2.96)
8.47
(6.12)
8.11
(4.56)
-0.37
(3.35) -0.710 0.478
SCL-Anxiety 6.45
(4.91)
5.50
(4.13)
-0.95
(4.13)
5.00
(5.82)
4.80
(6.77)
-0.20
(6.24) 0.038 0.970
SCL-Depression 10.55
(6.22)
13.09
(8.22)
2.55
(6.86)
7.50
(6.39)
10.60
(9.55)
3.10
(7.39) 0.088 0.930
SCL-Hostility 2.05
(2.19)
2.14
(2.29)
0.09
(2.35)
0.90
(1.48)
1.65
(2.08)
0.75
(1.65) 0.917 0.359
HAD-Anxiety 5.82
(4.20)
5.00
(3.02)
-0.82
(3.49)
4.05
(2.93
4.15
(3.95
0.10
(2.29) 0.943 0.346
HAD-Depression 4.00
(3.01)
3.64
(3.14)
-0.36
(3.54)
2.00
(1.75)
3.50
(3.87)
1.50
(3.22) 2.597 0.009
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Tables 5 and 6 indicate that while there were no significant differences in any of 
the variables from Time-1 to Time-2 among video group patients, there was a 
significant decline in the perception of partner supportiveness among control 
group patients (Wilcoxon z=2.33, p=0.020) and a significant increase in both 
SCL-Hostility (Wilcoxon z=2.33, p=0.020) and HAD-Depression (Wilcoxon 
z=2.520, p=0.012). This suggests that the between group changes in 
supportiveness and HAD-depression were more the result of a decline among 
control patients on these variables from Time-1 to Time-2, rather than an 
improvement among video group patients.
TABLE 5: Comparison of Video Patients at Time-1 and Time-2
Variable TIME-1(n=23)
TIME-2
(n=22) McNemar
P-
value
o t<D O O Q_
Partner as the most important 
source of support n (%) 18(78) 19(86) —  - 1.000
= 1 Male as most important source of 
support n (%) 6(26) 9(41) — 0.250
TIME-1 TIME-2 Wilcoxon P-
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. z= value
(3) Talked about concerns 2.11 1.04 1.88 0.77 1.129 0.259
(4) Talked about feelings 2.06 1.18 2.21 0.92 1.304 0.192
Co (5) Helpfulness of talking 2.05 1.80 0.86 2.59 1.799 0.072*->
OSo (6) Effectiveness of talking 11.55 5.05 12.00 6.68 1.044 0.297
c
3 (8) Holding back 0.82 0.91 0.76 0.70 0.816 0.414
E
E (10) Empathy of partner 11.23 10.78 13.55 9.46 1.666 0.096o
o (14) Supportiveness of partner 4.61 5.61 3.59 0.73 0.707 0.480
(15) Partner criticism 0.50 0.86 0.36 0.73 1.134 0.257
(16) Partner withdrawal 0.18 0.85 0.45 0.86 1.276 0.202
'Q. (13) Relationship change 3.65 0.88 3.59 0.73 0.465 0.642
(/>C (17) Happiness of relationship 0.76 1.04 0.95 1.17 1.508 0.132o3
(0 (18) Dyadic Adjustment Scale 0.67 1.91 0.41 2.40 0.514 0.608
V£ Significant Others Scale -2.1 3.24 -1.95 3.28 0.604 0.546
Self-Esteem 8.14 4.49 8.09 4.55 0.263 0.793
(0o SCL-Anxiety 6.55 4.86 5.50 4.13 0.963 0.336
U)o SCL-Depression 10.95 6.13 13.09 8.22 1.684 0.092
oszo SCL-Hostility 2.05 2.19 2.14 2.29 0.029 0.977>»
(0
Q. HAD-Anxiety 5.91 4.13 5.00 3.02 1.383 0.167
HAD-Depression 4.00 3.01 3.64 3.14 0.909 0.363
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TABLE 6: Comparison of Control Patients at Time-1 and Time-
2
Variable TIME-1 (n=23) TIME-2(n=20) McNemar p-value
O -c
0) oO Q.
Partner as the most important 
source of support n (%) 19(83) 17(85) — 0.500
= 3o «
CO
Male as most important source of 
support n (%) 10 (43) 8(40) — 0.500
TIME-1 TIME-2 Wilcoxon p-value
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. z=
(3) Talked about concerns 2.16 1.16 2.15 1.16 0.228 0.820
(4) Talked about feelings 2.55 1.26 2.39 1.08 0.709 0.478
co (5) Helpfulness of talking 2.48 1.17 2.00 1.59 0.689 0.491
COo (6) Effectiveness of talking 14.41 5.42 13.90 5.90 0.997 0.319
crs (8) Holding back 0.64 0.73 0.70 0.73 1.000 0.317
E
E (10) Empathy of partner 16.64 10.60 15.00 10.73 0.390 0.697
o (14) Supportiveness of partner 3.82 0.50 3.35 0.88 2.333 0.020
(15) Partner criticism 0.41 0.67 0.20 0.52 1.406 0.160
(16) Partner withdrawal 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.62 0.000 1.000
Q. (13) Relationship change 3.45 0.74 3.35 0.74 1.732 0.083
(/)c (17) Happiness of relationship 1.30 1.22 0.65 1.09 1.809 0.070
to (18) Dyadic Adjustment Scale 0.68 3.08 0.50 3.32 0.454 0.650
Q)QC Significant Others Scale -1.1 2.39 -1.90 4.02 1.026 0.305
Self-Esteem 9.14 5.29 8.10 4.56 0.570 0.568
too SCL-Anxiety 5.23 5.84 4.80 6.77 0.313 0.754
CDO SCL-Depression 7.50 6.12 10.60 9.55 1.696 0.090
oszo SCL-Hostility 0.82 1.44 1.65 2.08 2.326 0.020
</>
CL HAD-Anxiety 4.00 2.99 4.15 3.95 0.032 0.975
HAD-Depression 1.95 1.73 3.50 3.87 2.520 0.012
3.3.2 EFFECT OF THE VIDEO ON PARTNER SUBJECTS
There were no statistically significant differences between the video and control 
groups in terms of the partners’ change scores from Time-1 to Time2 (Table 7) 
though four subjects in the video group changed their choice of their most 
important source of support to their partners (i.e. the patient). However, 
paradoxically, there was also a significant decline in perceived partner (i.e. 
patient) supportiveness from Time-1 to Time-2 (Wilcoxon z=2.33, p=0.020;
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Table 8) among the video group partners. In addition, among the control group 
partners there was a reduction in HAD-Anxiety from Time-1 to Time-2 
(Wilcoxon z=2.012, p=0.044; Table 9).
TABLE 7: Comparison of Change Scores among Video and
Control Partner Subjects
Variable
Video
T 2 -T 1
n=22)
Control
T 2 -T 1
(n=20)
Chi-
square
(d.f.=2)
P-
value
So
ur
ce
 
of
 
su
pp
or
t Partner as the most important 
source of support +4 0 2.806 0.246
Male as most important source 
of support +5 0 3.608 0.165
Variable
Video Group (n=22)
mean (sd)
Control Group
mean (sc
(n=20)
i)
Change
Mann-
Whitney
z=
Change
p-value
T1 T2 Change T1 12 Change
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
(14)
Supportiveness 
of partner
3.23
(0.69)
2.91
(0.75)
-0.32
(0.57)
2.85
(1.14)
2.95
(0.83)
0.10
(0.97) 1.377 0.169
(15) Partner 
criticism
0.73
(0.88)
0.86
(0.99)
0.14
(0.77)
0.35
(0.75)
0.55
(0.83)
0.20
(0.70) 0.086 0.931
(16) Partner 
withdrawal
0.36
(0.73)
0.50
(0.67)
0.136
(0.94)
0.65
(0.88)
0.55
(0.60)
0.10
(0.72) -1.241 0.215
Re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
(13) Relationship 
change
3.45
(0.74)
3.59
(0.80)
0.136
(0.56)
3.55
(0.89)
3.40
(0.82)
-0.150
(0.67) -1.853 0.064
(17) Happiness 
of relationship
1.05
(1.36)
0.86
(1.04)
-0.182
(1.00)
1.15
(1.14)
0.90
(0.85)
-0.250
(1.02) 0 1.00
(18) Dyadic 
Adjustment 
Scale
0.77
(2.83)
1.00
(2.47)
0.23
(1.19)
0.30
(2.03)
0.60
(2.64)
0.30
(2.13) 0.182 0.856
Significant 
Others Scale
-1.10
(2.62)
-1.62
(2.40)
-0.52
(2.16)
-2.10
(2.71)
-1.90
(2.90)
0.20
(1.51) -0.878 0.380
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l
Self-Esteem 5.14(4.57)
5.95
(4.66)
0.82
(2.52)
7.10
(4.69)
8.05
(4.57)
0.95
(2.76) 0.038 0.970
SCL-Anxiety 7.09(7.20)
6.27
(6.47)
-0.82
(5.09)
6.05
(4.08)
5.20
(4.29)
-0.85
(4.20) -0.393 0.695
SCL-Depression 12.64(9.05)
11.41
(9.44)
-1.23
(6.67)
12.45
(6.77)
9.15
(8.31)
-3.30
(7.78) -0.972 0.331
SCL-Hostility 2.05(2.36)
2.32
(2.50)
0.27
(2.47)
1.70
(1.63)
1.90
(2.86)
0.20
(2.93) -0.633 0.527
HAD-Anxiety 6.86(3.67)
6.82
(4.54)
-0.04
(3.15)
6.50
(3.27)
5.05
(2.91)
-1.45
(2.95 -1.448 0.148
HAD-Depression 3.73(2.90)
3.91
(3.79)
0.18
(2.50
3.50
(1.91)
3.15
(2.62)
-0.35
(2.80) -1.017 0.309
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TABLE 8: Comparison of Video Partners at Time-1 and Time-2
Variable TIME-1(n=23)
TIME-2
(n=22) McNemar p-value
O -c
0 o
U Q.
Partner as the most important 
source of support n (%) 9(39) 13(59) — 0.250
= % O w 
C0
Male as most important source of 
support n (%) 2(9) 7(32) — 0.063
TIME-1 TIME-2 Wilcoxon p-value
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. z=
COo
"c
(14) Supportiveness of partner 3.17 0.72 2.91 0.75 2.333 0.020
3  CE.2 (15) Partner criticism 0.74 0.86 0.86 0.99 0.832 0.405
Eoo (16) Partner withdrawal 0.35 0.71 0.50 0.67 0.952 0.341
Q. (13) Relationship change 3.43 0.73 3.59 0.79 1.134 0.257
CO
c (17) Happiness of relationship 1.05 1.36 0.86 1.04 0.842 0.400
CO
0
CH
(18) Dyadic Adjustment Scale 0.78 2.76 1.00 2.47 0.852 0.394
Significant Others Scale -1.18 2.59 -1.50 2.33 1.046 0.296
Self-Esteem 5.32 4.64 5.95 4.66 1.430 0.153
loo SCL-Anxiety 6.96 7.07 6.27 6.47 0.594 0.552
O)o SCL-Depression 12.17 9.12 11.41 9.44 1.189 0.235
o
.co SCL-Hostility 2.0 2.32 2.32 2.50 0.416 0.677
CO
Q. HAD-Anxiety 6.74 3.63 6.82 4.54 0.000 1.000
HAD-Depression 3.61 2.89 3.91 3.79 0.242 0.809
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TABLE 9: Comparison of Control Partners at Time-1 and Time-
2
Variable TIME-1(n=23)
TIME-2
(n=20) McNemar p-value
o -e 
0 o
O Q.
Partner as the most important 
source of support n (%) 12(52) 12(60) — 1.000
= % o wCO
Male as most important source of 
support n (%) 10 (43) 10(50) — 1.000
TIME-1 TIME-2 Wilcoxon p-value
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. z=
O
‘c (14) Supportiveness of partner 2.91 1.11 2.95 0.83 0.504 0.6143 c. 
£ % (15) Partner criticism 0.30 0.70 0.58 0.84 1.265 0.206c  roO
O (16) Partner withdrawal 0.61 0.84 0.55 0.60 0.632 0.527
Q. (13) Relationship change 3.47 0.85 3.40 0.82 1.000 0.317£1(/>
C (17) Happiness of relationship 1.00 1.13 0.90 0.85 1.155 0.248
U—*ro (18) Dyadic Adjustment Scale 0.35 1.99 0.60 2.64 0.566 0.571
0
a: Significant Others Scale -1.96 2.60 -1.89 2.99 0.595 0.552
Self-Esteem 7.95 4.76 8.05 4.57 1.429 0.153
roo SCL-Anxiety 5.61 4.03 5.20 4.29 1.213 0.225
roo SCL-Depression 11.30 6.99 9.15 8.31 1.683 0.092
o£1O SCL-Hostility 1.57 1.56 1.90 2.86 0.360 0.719
(/)Q. HAD-Anxiety 6.17 3.38 5.05 2.91 2.012 0.044
HAD-Depression 3.30 1.87 3.15 2.62 0.888 0.375
3.4 Relationship between Communication Variables and 
Psychological distress
A central question of this research was whether the quality of partner support 
experienced by people coping with the stress of cancer influences the 
development of psychological distress. While this cannot be conclusively 
answered using correlational analysis (which only indicate mutual associations 
between variables), the concurrent relationships at Time-1 and Time-2, and the 
predictive relationships from Time-1 to Time-2, between communication 
variables and psychological distress will be presented. In view of the fact that 
there were relatively few differences between the video and control groups, their
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data will be combined in these analyses. Considering the large number of 
correlations which follow, caution should be exercised in their interpretation.
3.4.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATIENT-ASSESSED
COMMUNICATION VARIABLES AND PATIENT DISTRESS 
Time-1
Table 10 presents correlations between communication variables and patient 
distress at Time-1. It can be seen that there were no statistically significant 
associations between communication and psychological variables at Time-1. The 
one exception was that self-esteem was positively associated with perceived 
partner empathy (p=0.009).
TABLE 10: Correlation Matrix between Patient-assessed
Communication and Psychological Variables at Time-1 (N=42)
Self-
Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
r(3) Talked about concerns p
-.126
.432
.201
.202
.315
.042
-.059
.709
.100
.527
.176 
... .264
r
(4) Talked about feelings .135.399
-.071
.653
.017
.915
.080
.614
-.274
.079
-.082 ... 604
r
(5) Helpfulness of talking
P
-.087
.587
.194
.219
.026
.871
-.005
.976
.175
.269
; -.007 
.964
r(6) Effectiveness of talking .233.143
-.031
.844
-.133
.402
-.181
.251
.106
.502
-.220
.162
(8) Holding back r
P
-.054
.738
.050
.751
-.014
.928
-.256
.102
-.056
.723
-.081
.611
(10) Empathy £ .402.009
-.105
.510
-.122
.442
-.207
.188
-.090
.572
-.055
.730
r
(14) Supportiveness .148.355
.138
.383
-.069
.662
-.238
.129
.058
.714
-.106
.504
r
(15) Partner criticism
P
.083
.607
.213
.175
.050
.754
.245
.119
.114
.470
.012
.940
r
(16) Partner withdrawal
P
-.120
.455
.246
.116
.178
.259
-.017
.915
.197
.211
.130
.413
*Spearman’s rho
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Time 2
At Time-2, there were a number of associations between patients’ perceptions 
of their partner’s communication behaviour and their own levels of 
psychological distress (Table 11). In particular, the more effective the patient 
found it to talk to their partner at Time-2, the more likely they were to have low 
scores on HAD-Anxiety and SCL-Depression and a higher score on self-esteem. 
The helpfulness of talking and the supportiveness of the partner were negatively 
associated with HAD-Anxiety while partner criticism was more strongly 
correlated with patients’ feelings of hostility. Finally partner withdrawal was 
associated with lower self-esteem.
TABLE 11: Correlation Matrix between Patient-assessed
Communication and Psychological Variables at Time-2 (N=42)
Self-
Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
(3) Talked about concerns r 
v ' P
.035
.828
.024
.879
.042
.792
.122
.443
-.155
.326
-.030
.850
(4) Talked about feelings £ -.077.633
-.036
.821
-.122
.443
.063
.690
-.301
.053
-.243
.121
r(5) Helpfulness of talking ^ -.044.784
-.128
.417
-.167
.291
.010
.951
-.365
.017
-.208
.185
r
(6) Effectiveness of talking .319.042
-.274
.079
-.338
.029
-.048
.761
-.396
.009
-.292
.061
r(8) Holding back ^ .162.311
-.217
.167
-.105
.508
-.145
.360
-.100
.529
-.076
.634
(10) Empathy ^ .266.093
-.059
.712
-.085
.592
-.091
.565
-.073
.644
-.085
.592
r
(14) Supportiveness .275.081
-.214
.173
-.174
.271
.036
.822
-.361
.019
-.153
.334
(15) Partner criticism
P
-.007
.967
.015
.924
.060
.707
.487
.001
-.026
.872
.080
.616
(16) Partner withdrawal r
P
-.348
.026
.293
.059
.197
.211
.214
.174
.221
.160
.142
.370
*Spearman’s rho
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3.4.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTNER-ASSESSED
COMMUNICATION VARIABLES AND PARTNER DISTRESS
Time-1
Partners were not assessed on the helpfulness or effectiveness of talking to their 
partners (i.e. the patients), nor the perceived empathy of their partners. 
However, they were assessed on variables concerning the supportiveness, 
criticism and withdrawal of their partner. As can be seen from Table 12, there 
were a number of significant associations at Time-1 between these 
communication variables and the level of partners’ psychological distress. The 
more critical and less supportive the patient, the more the partner experienced 
feelings of hostility. Partner criticism was also associated with lower self-esteem, 
and higher SCL and HAD depression scores. Finally partner withdrawal was 
associated with higher SCL-Anxiety and SCL and HAD depression scores.
TABLE 12: Correlation Matrix between Partner-assessed
Communication and Psychological Variables at Time-1 (N=42)
Self-
Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
r
(14) Supportiveness .079.617
-.238
.130
-.108
.495
-.369
.016
-.132
.404
-.259
.098
r
(15) Partner criticism
P
-.321
.038
.253
.105
.329
.034
.566
.000
.253
.105
.446
.003
(16) Partner withdrawal
P
.024
.882
.420
.006
.338
.029
.116
.464
.263
.092
.430
.004
*Spearman’s rho
Time 2
At Time-2 there were more pronounced associations between the partner’s 
psychological state and their perceptions of the patient’s behaviour (Table 13). 
Supportiveness was associated with lower SCL and HAD anxiety scores as well 
as lower SCL depression and hostility scores. Criticism was positively 
associated with anxiety, depression and hostility on both measures, while 
partner withdrawal was more weakly associated with SCL anxiety and hostility.
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TABLE 13: Correlation Matrix between Partner-assessed
Communication and Psycho ogical Variables at Time-2 (N=42)
Self-
Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
r(14) Supportiveness
P
.182
.248
-.457
.002
-.487
.001
-.444
.003
-.445
.003
-.136
.389
r
(15) Partner criticism
P
-.136
.389
.413
.007
.441
.003
.505
.001
.354
.021
.334
.031
r
(16) Partner withdrawal
P
.059
.708
.329
.033
.220
.162
.362
.019
.239
.127
.004
.979
*Spearman’s rho
3.4.3 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PATIENT-ASSESSED COMMUNICATION 
AT TIME-1 AND PATIENT DISTRESS AT TIME-2
The correlation matrix in Table 14 suggests that certain partner communication 
behaviours may be predictive of psychological distress among patients. The 
strongest association was found between “talking about one’s feelings” at Time- 
1 and lower HAD-Anxiety (p=0.005) at Time-2, while partner empathy at 
Time-1 was associated with higher self-esteem at Time-2. The other statistically 
significant correlation was between partner criticism at Time-1 and patient 
hostility at Time-2.
TABLE 14: Correlation Matrix between Patient-assessed
Communication Variables at Time-1 and Psychological 
Variables at Time-2 (N=42)______________
TIME-1 * TIME-2 Self-Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
r
(3) Talked about concerns p -.124.439
.148
.350
.052
.742
.076
.634
-.058
.714
.013
.934
r
(4) Talked about feelings p .052.745
-.176
.264
-.170
.281
.172
.275
-.427
.005
-.220
.161.
r
(5) Helpfulness of talking p -.092.566
.095
.551
-.044
.782
-.054
.736
.090
.571
-.067
.672
(6) Effectiveness of talking p .238.134
-.075
.635
-.173
.274
-.090
.569
-.047
.767
-.232
.140
r
(8) Holding back p -.006.970
-.064
.685
.087
.585
-.083
.601
.093
.559
-.022
.891
(10) Empathy p .380.014
-.139
.378
-.198
.209
-.173
.275
-.156
.324
-.239
.127
(14) Supportiveness p -.025.876
.031
.848
.083
.603
.025
.876
.005
.977
-.106 
.503 " '
(15) Partner criticism p -.112.487
.243
.121
.157
.321
.369
.016
.106
.504
.129
.414
(16) Partner withdrawal p -.108.500
.222
.158
.152
.338
.000
.998
.198
209
.273
.080
*Spearman’s rho
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3.4.4 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PARTNER-ASSESSED
COMMUNICATION AT TIME-1 & PARTNER DISTRESS AT TIME-2
A similar correlational analysis was conducted for the psychological distress of 
partners at Time-2 (Table 15). Criticism by the patient at Time-1 was predictive 
of psychological distress among partners at Time-2 on all measures. It was 
particularly associated with depression: correlations of 0.530 with SCL- 
Depression (p<0.001) and 0.455 with HAD-Depression (p=0.002). 
Supportiveness did not predict psychological distress although patient 
withdrawal was correlated with SCL anxiety, depression and hostility.
TABLE 15: Correlation Matrix between Partner-assessed
Communication Variables at Time-1 and Psychological 
Variables at Time-2 (N=42)
TIME-1 * TIME-2 * Self-Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
r
(14) Supportiveness
P
-.057
.721
-.242
.123
-.137
.386
-.261
.095
-.134
.397
.013
.936
r(15) Partner criticism
P
-.344
.026
.347
.024
.530
.000
.396
.009
.342
.027
.455
.002
(16) Partner withdrawal r
P
.100
.529
.329
.033
.317
.041
.354
.022
.293
.060
.262
.093
*Spearman’s rho
3.4.5 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN RELATIONSHIP VARIABLES AT TIME-1 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS AT TIME-2
Because there were no statistical differences between the video and control 
groups on relationship variables at Time-1, their scores were combined.
Patients
While patient subjects’ scores on the Dyadic Adjustment Scale at Time-1 were 
inversely related to their scores on SCL-Depression and SCL-Hostility at Time- 
2, there was also a paradoxical positive association between the patient’s 
perception that the relationship had improved and their HAD-Anxiety scores 
(Table 16). No other significant relationships were observed.
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TABLE 16: Correlation Matrix between Relationship
Variables at Time-1 and Psychological Variables at Time-2
among Patients
TIME-1 *  T IM E -2* Self-Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
r
(13) Relationship change p
N
-.234
.142
41
.281
.071
42
.248
.113
42
-.087
.584
42
.345
.025
42
.155
.327
42
r
(17) Happiness of 
relationship ^
.081
.617
41
-.006
.969
42
-.094
.555
42“
-.054
.732
42
-.021
.895
42
.076
.632
42
r
18) Dyadic Adjustment
Scale f.N
.264
.096
41
-.282
.071
42
-.335
.030
42
-.429
.005
42
-.218
.166
42
-.284
.068
42
r
Significant Others Scale p
N
.142
.375
41
-.095
.549
42
-.194
.219
42
-.054
.736
42
-.054
.733
42
-.139
.379
42
*Spearman’s rho
Partners
Among partners, scores on the Dyadic Adjustment Scale at Time-1 were 
inversely related to SCL-Hostility and HAD-Anxiety at Time-2 but these were 
the only statistically significant results (Table 17).
TABLE 17: Correlation Matrix between Relationship
Variables at Time-1 and Psychological Variables at Time-2
among Partners
TIME-1 *  TIME-2 * Self-Esteem
SCL
Anxiety
SCL
Depression
SCL
Hostility
HAD
Anxiety
HAD
Depression
r
(13) Relationship change p
KT
.131
.409
42
-.129
.414
42
-.199
.205
42
-.154
.331
42
-.090
.571
42
-.037
.818
42
r
(17) Happiness of 
relationship ^
.117
.460
42
-.091
.565
42
-.204 
.195 
42 ...
-.121
.444
42
-.132
.404
42
-.268
.086
42
18) Dyadic Adjustment r
Scale fN
.054
.732
42
-.118
.458
42
-.200
.205
42
-.319
.039
42
-.316
.041
42
-.192
.223
42
r
Significant Others Scale p
N
.029
.856
41
.049
.759
41
-.084 
.603 
41....
-.157
.326
41
.054
.737
41
.013 
.935 
.... 41 '
*Spearman’s rho
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3.5 Gender Differences
In order to investigate gender differences in the preferred source of support, 
comparisons were made between men and women. Females were chosen more 
often as the preferred supporter by both men and women. 65% of those who 
responded to this question (n=87) designated a female as their primary source 
of support since the cancer diagnosis, compared with only 33% designating a 
male (Chi-square=9.33, 1 df, p=0.002). Table 18 presents the gender of the 
preferred supporter by the gender of the subject. 39 (95%) of the 41 men (who 
were specific) designated a female, while only 27 (60%) of the 45 women who 
responded chose a male. This is significantly different (Pearson chi-square = 
29.183, p< 0.001).
TABLE 18: Gender of Preferred Supporter by Gender of
Subject (Time-1)
Gender of preferred 
helper 4*
MALE
SUBJECTS
n(%)
FEMALE
SUBJECTS
n(%)
TOTAL
n(%)
Both 1 (2) 0 1 (1)
Female 39 (93) 18(40) 57 (65)
Male 2 (5 ) 27 (60) 29 (33)
Total 42 45 87
Among patients, 21 (95%) of the 22 men who responded to this question chose 
their partners, while 16 (73%) of the 21 females patients specified their partners 
as their most important source of support (chi-square = 3.32, 1 df, p  = 0.068). 
Among partners, 13 (68%) of the 19 men who responded designated their 
partners, while only 8 (36%) of the 22 females chose their partners (chi-square 
= 4.19, 1 df, p= 0.041). Overall, 56% of female subjects and 83% of male 
subjects chose their partners (chi-square=5.84,l df, p=0.016). These findings 
support the hypothesis that males are more likely than females to perceive their 
spouses as their most important source of support.
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3.5.1 EFFECT OF THE VIDEO INTERVENTION ON FEMALES’ 
PERCEPTION OF MOST IMPORTANT SUPPORT
It was hypothesised that the intervention would lead more females to regard 
their spouses as their most important source of support. Female subjects in the 
two groups were compared as to whether or not they regarded their partner as 
their most important source of support at both time points. Table 19 
summarises these changes. Although there were four more women in the video 
group at Time-2 who regarded their partners as their most important source of 
support to their partners and one less woman in the control group, this 
difference did not achieve statistical significance.
TABLE 19: Effect of Video on Female Subjects’ Choice of
Partner as Main Support
VIDEO (N) CONTROL (N) Chi-square p-value
TIME 1 9 (21)43% 16 (20) 80% 3.102 0.212TIME 2 13(21)62% 15 (20) 75%
3.5.2 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCEPTION OF PARTNER 
COMMUNICATION
Male and female patients were compared on each of the communication 
variables to investigate the hypothesis that female patients will perceive their 
spouses to communicate lower empathy and supportiveness and higher criticism 
and withdrawal than male patients. The results of these comparisons are 
presented in Table 20. Male patients perceived their partners to be 
significantly more empathic (p = 0.002) than female patients. There was a 
strong, albeit non-significant, tendency for male patients to perceive their 
partners as more supportive than female patients (p = 0.055). Both these 
findings lend some support for the hypothesis. However, there was no support 
for the hypothesis that female patients would experience their partners as more 
critical and withdrawn than male patients.
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TABLE 20: Gender Differences in Patients’ Perception of
Partner communication at Time-1
MALES FEMALES MANN-WHITNEY
N MEAN | sd N I MEAN I sd z I  P*
(3) Talked about concerns 22 2.11 1.08 22 2.17 1.14 0.317 0.751
(4) Talked about feelings 21 2.51 1.19 22 I 2.10 i 1.26 -1.014 0.310
(5) Helpfulness of talking 22 0.32 .66 20 1.10 2.03 1.516 0.129
(6) Effectiveness of talking 22 13.09 5.51 20 13.00 5.38 -0.152 0.879
(8) Holding back 22 0.5 .67 22 0.95 .90 1.76 0.079
(10) Empathy 22 18.68 7.10 22 9.18 12.09 -3.04 0.002
(14) Supportiveness 22 5.05 5.58 23 3.43 .99 -1.92 0.055
(15) Partner criticism 21 0.57 .93 23 0.37 .57 -0.51 0.606
(16) Partner withdrawal 21 0.14 .36 23 0.22 .85 0.51 0.609
* two-tailed tests
3.6 Initial Video Feedback
The initial video feedback questionnaire (Appendix E) was primarily designed to 
enhance the effect of the video by helping subjects personalise and internalise its 
messages. In light of the high level of endorsement of the importance, 
relevance and potential helpfulness of the video’s main themes, the responses 
indicate that the video intervention was perceived as credible by the participants 
who saw it. Table 21 summarises these responses which were made on a visual 
analogue scale ranging from 0 (Not at all...) to 10 (Extremely...).
TABLE 21: Initial Video Feedback Questionnaire by
Patients/Partners and Gender
“The video is concerned with 
the problems of giving support 
within a relationship when one 
partner has cancer”
PATIENTS PARTNERS
Males
(n=12)
Mean
Females
(n=11)
mean
Males
(n=10)
mean
Females
(n=12)
mean
How important do you feel this 
theme is in general? 9.29 9.73 9.65 8.83
How relevant do you feel this 
theme is to your relationship 
with your partner?
7.62 8.09 8.55 7.17
How relevant to your 
relationship do you imagine 
your partner found the video?
8.04 8.36 7.75 7.25
How helpful to you would it be if 
both you and your partner could 
follow the advice in this video 
completely?
7.79 8.18 8.05 9.0 a
How supportive towards your 
partner do you feel you have 
been since the diagnosis?
9.29 7.9 9.45 9.17
(Visual Analogue Scale: 0 = Not at all..., 10 = Extremely...)
Note: a N=11
3.7 Follow-up Video Feedback Questionnaire
The Follow-up Video Questionnaire (Appendix D4) was designed to elicit more 
qualitative feedback about the impact of the video on the couple and to learn 
about what elements of the video subjects found helpful or, indeed, whether 
subjects had found it ‘harmful’. Table 22 indicates that the majority of subjects 
watched the video more than once though it was usually only watched once with 
the partner.
TABLE 22: Follow-up Video Questionnaire -  Number of times
video watched
Times watched Males (N = 19)
Females 
(N = 19)
How many times did you 
watch the video?
■ 1 9 7
... • 2 7 7
3 - 3 5
How many times did you 
watch the video with your 
partner?
1 ■ 12 12
5 4
3 2 3
Table 23 presents findings on the perceived helpfulness of the video. This 
indicates that the majority of subjects felt that the video had caused them to talk 
more as a couple. A small majority also believed that the video had caused 
them to support their partner more, though a similar majority believed that the 
video had not caused their partner to support them more. The vast majority of 
subjects (89%) believed that the video should be given to other couples when 
one of them has cancer and only one subject (a male partner) believed it should 
not, though this subject had, in fact, endorsed the video as having been 
extremely helpful on all measures and believed that it had led him and his 
partner to support each other more.
TABLE 23: Follow-up Video Questionnaire -  Perceived
Effect of Watching Video: 1
PATIENTS PARTNERS
TOTAL (%)
Males
(n=11)
Females
(n=8)
Males
(n=8)
Females
(n=9)
Do you believe that 
the video caused you 
both to talk more?
YES 7 4 4 6 21 (58)
NO 4 4 4 3 15(42)
Do you believe that 
watching the video 
led you to support 
your partner more?
YES 6 5 3 5 19 (53)
NO 5 3 5 4 17(47)
Do you believe that 
watching the video 
led your partner to 
support you more?
YES 5 5 3 3 16(44)
NO 6 3 5 6 20 (56)
Do you believe that a 
video like this should 
be given to other 
couples when one of 
them has cancer?
YES 9 8 7 7 31 (89)
NO 0 0 1 0 1 (3)
MAYBE 2 0 0 1 3(8)
The visual analogue scale responses (Table 24) revealed little information about 
the relative merits of different components of the video though males appeared 
to find the advice of the expert somewhat more helpful than females.
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TABLE 24: Follow-up Video Questionnaire -  Perceived
Effect of Watching Video: 2
How helpful was..
Males
mean
Females
mean
The advice on the video 7.16 7.36
Hearing the patients’ experiences 7.53 7.79
The advice of the ‘expert’ 8.32 7.77
The leaflet that came with the video 7.22 7.21
(Visual Analogue Scale: 0  = Not at all..., 1 0  = E xtrem ely .. .)
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4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Review of Research Aims
4.1.1 STUDY AIM 1 
To examine gender differences in the ability to communicate 
emotional and confiding support between partners and to 
measure the effect of this support on psychological adjustment 
The Couple Relationship
The first aim of this study was an attempt to extend the work of Pistrang and 
Barker (1992, 1995) who studied the nature of informal support obtained by 
women with breast cancer, but to build on this earlier work by adding the male 
patient and female partner perspective. Pistrang and Barker had found that 
women felt less understood by their partner than by friends and relatives and 
that, ideally, they would have liked to have talked more to him but held back 
from talking about their feelings in an effort to protect him. In fact, nearly 40% 
of the sample had changed their nomination from their partners to someone 
else following their cancer. Although the present study did not obtain 
retrospective data on the choice of main supporter before the diagnosis of 
cancer, it did find that female subjects were less likely than male subjects to 
designate their partner as their main source of support. Furthermore, at Time-1 
(11 weeks after their cancer diagnosis), 5 female and one male patient in the 
current study reported that they would like to have talked more to their partners, 
and there was a correspondingly stronger tendency for women to hold back 
from talking about their feelings than men (though this did not achieve statistical 
significance).
In their cross-sectional study, Pistrang and Barker had found that greater 
relationship satisfaction and helpfulness of disclosure were associated with lower 
psychological distress. The present prospective study also found that
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relationship satisfaction at Time-1 (when measured by the Dyadic Adjustment 
Scale) was negatively associated with depression and hostility among patients, 
and hostility and anxiety among partners.
The fact that the Dyadic Adjustment Scale was more predictive than the other 
relationship measures may be because it includes reflective items about the 
quality of the relationship (e.g. “H o lu  often do you discuss or have you 
considered divorce, separation, or terminating your relationship?”), items 
which may have more accurately tapped historically negative aspects of the 
relationship. This seems likely since, interestingly, the only communication 
variables consistently associated with later psychological distress tended to be 
the negative ones of partner withdrawal and criticism. This was particularly 
evident among partners which was an unexpected finding. One might speculate 
that carers who experience their patient-partners as consistently withdrawn and 
critical are apt to feel both that they are failing in their roles as carers as well as 
feeling increasingly helpless to alter the situation. This confirms earlier reports 
which suggested that negative behaviours within close relationships have a 
stronger influence over mental health than positive ones (Manne, Taylor, 
Dougherty and Kemeny, 1997; Schulz, Schulz, Schulz and von Kerekjarto, 
1996) and that a “contagion of distress” (Bolger et a/, 1996) may ultimately 
lead to an erosion of support.
In view of the large number of correlations conducted in this study, some 
caution should be exercised in interpreting the statistically significant results. In 
particular no direction of causality can be assumed from the data. As in 
Pistrang and Barker’s study, helpfulness of disclosure was associated with lower 
distress among patients at Time-2 , though the effectiveness of talking to one’s 
partner at Time-2 was more consistently associated with psychological well­
being at that time. In addition, the extent to which patients felt that they were 
able to talk about their feelings at Time-1 was negatively associated with HAD- 
Anxiety at Time-2. There were also statistically significant associations between
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partner empathy at Time-1 and the patient’s self-esteem at both Time-1 and 
Time-2.
These findings suggest that the effect of partner empathy for patients with 
cancer is to bolster their self-esteem, while talking to their partners, if this is 
experienced as effective and helpful, affords some protection to their mental 
health. Among partners, the experience of lack of support, criticism and 
withdrawal by the patient is associated with higher levels of distress though only 
criticism and withdrawal were predictive of later distress (though it should be 
noted that partners’ perceptions were not assessed for all communication 
variables).
Gender Differences
Female participants were significantly less likely than male participants to 
choose their partner as their main source of support. This finding was 
congruent with the fact that male patients assessed their partners as significantly 
more empathic than female patients, and a similar trend was found for 
perceived supportiveness though this did not quite achieve statistical 
significance. It also supports Pistrang and Barker’s contention that men may 
have difficulty in communicating about feelings when attempting to support 
their partners (Pistrang and Barker, 1992).
Criticism and withdrawal did not differentiate men and women’s communication 
behaviour, as had been found in previous studies of cancer patients (Manne, 
Taylor, Dougherty and Kemeny, 1997), arthritis patients (Manne and Zautra,
1989) and healthy couples (Fincham, Beach, Harold and Osborne, 1997).
Both variables were assessed with a single 5-point scale which may have been 
too crude to detect differences between the genders. Previous authors (e.g. 
Manne and Zautra, 1989) have used several items to assess criticism. In fact, a 
number of qualitative responses to the question “How do you think the illness or 
treatment has affected your partner?” appeared to support the contention that 
men may have been more withdrawn. None of the male comments referred to
their partners having withdrawn, but the female comments included such 
statements as:
A t times not himself -  distant, withdrawn, insecure, easily upset
As he takes things inwardly it will take time for it to surface.
Very difficult to tell because he is a very deep person, keeps things to 
himself
I think he is worried about me, but he is unable to cope with illness, 
so just blanks it out and gets on with his life as if nothing has 
happened.
Nearly all the men in this study nominated a woman as their most important 
source of support since the cancer diagnosis, while approximately two-thirds of 
women chose a man. 56% of the women chose their partners as their most 
important source of support compared with 83% of men. In the Pistrang and 
Barker study of female breast cancer patients 51% chose their partner as their 
main source of support. When the patients in the present study were examined 
separately, 95% of men and 73% of women chose their partner as their 
preferred supporter, the latter being a considerably higher figure than in the all­
female Pistrang and Barker study.
When partners were examined separately, 68% of men and 36% of women 
chose their partners (i.e. patients) as their preferred helper, somewhat lower 
proportions and a wider gender discrepancy than that reported by Keller, 
Henrich, Sellsschopp and Beutel (1996) who obtained figures of 76% and 56% 
for men and women respectively. The more striking finding, however, was that 
90% of male partners designated a female as their primary source of support 
while only 43% of female partners chose a man. Thus, confirming earlier 
studies (Northouse, Jeffs, Cracchiolo-Caraway, et al, 1995; Omne-Ponten,
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Holmberg, Sjoden and Bergstrom, 1995), it seems that, whether in the role of 
patient or partner, men turn to the women in their lives, especially their 
partners, considerably more often than women turn to men.
There are a number of ways in which gender differences have been 
conceptualised in the literature and some consideration will now be given to 
these. There is currently growing interest in the development of caring and 
supportive behaviour. Within the field of personal relationships, there is 
evidence that comforting skills are developed in a progressive manner 
throughout childhood and adolescence and are influenced by parental 
behaviour. These skills are thought to reflect the developing cognitive structures 
which are used to interpret and represent the social world (Burleson, 1990). 
Similarly, the development of self-identity in early infancy, while involving the 
distinguishing of self from other, is inherently a ‘relational self’: young babies are 
receptive and responsive to social stimulation (Barrett, 1997). Therefore, it 
may be helpful to look at developmental theories to explain gender differences 
in empathic suport.
From a feminist psychoanalytic perspective, Dorothy Dinnerstein has argued 
that the historical division of labour between female caring in the private world 
and male acting in the public world stems from “the mother’s power to foster or 
forbid, to humble or respect, our first steps toward autonomous activity” 
(Dinnerstein, 1976, p. 165). While early Freudian theory about gender 
differences rested on biological determinism, more modem theorists, like 
Dinnerstein, have argued that women’s more intimate relationship with child- 
rearing leads boys and girls to resolve their fear of maternal domination and 
need for individuation in ways which reinforce the status quo.
From the perspective of moral development, Gilligan (1982) has built on 
Dinnerstein’s work and particularly that of Chodorow (1978) and has argued 
that males and females develop different ethics based on different conceptions 
of maturity which, again, are bom from the central position of women in child­
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rearing. For the male, the focus is on individuation, autonomy and individual 
achievement while, for the female, the concern is with relationships. Boys 
develop a morality based on rights, while girls develop an ethic of responsibility 
for others. Furthermore, “since masculinity is defined through separation while 
femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by 
intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation” (Gilligan, 
1982, p .8). Girls are socialised to develop a language of emotion, relationships 
and care while, generally, boys are not.
There is also a growing interest in the application of Attachment Theory 
(Bowlby, 1988) to adult relationships, though rarely has the issue of gender 
been the focus. However, Crowell (1998) has recently argued that adult 
attachment is a function of three factors: childhood attachment relationships, 
previous peer-to-peer relationships, and the history of the current relationship 
(e.g. the partner relationship which may itself strongly resonate with childhood 
attachment relationships). Her research has revealed that men’s adult sense of 
security is more related to their early attachment relationships (e.g. mother) than 
that of women for whom their current relationship (e.g. spouse) tends to be the 
more important influence. This finding is consistent with Gilligan’s thesis that 
men’s preoccupation with autonomy leads them to place less value on current 
relationships. Indeed, couple therapists, drawing on attachment and 
psychoanalytic theory, have argued that for a relationship to be mature and 
creative requires that the couple has a capacity for self-reflection and that the 
individuals within it are able to give up earlier notions of independence and self- 
sufficiency (Morgan and Ruszczynski, 1998).
There is little doubt that the threat posed by a life-threatening illness such as 
cancer invokes powerful dependency feelings and, in attachment theory terms, 
an urgent need to return to the secure base of one’s primary attachment figure 
(Bowlby, 1979). Yet, the present study’s finding that, in such a situation, men 
turn to women more than women turn to men appears to contradict Gilligan’s 
thesis and Crowell’s findings.
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It will be recalled that Pistrang and Barker (1992) found that communication 
problems were largely to do with “men’s difficulties dealing with feelings” rather 
than an inability to understand the woman’s concerns, an observation which is 
consistent with the findings of the current study and with Gilligan’s contention 
that men’s identity is threatened by intimacy. It is thus conceivable that, when 
confronted by cancer, men predominantly turn to their current representation of 
their early attachment relationship, their partners. In fact, it is likely that men’s 
dependency needs have long been met by their partners but the 
acknowledgement of this fact would be to threaten the man’s precarious sense 
of themselves as autonomous ‘mature’ adults. Women, meanwhile, 
predominantly turn to their primary adult attachment figure which they perceive 
to be their husbands. However, as Pistrang and Barker found, women are 
sometimes disappointed by their spouses’ capacity for intimacy and empathy 
and turn instead to other females for support. Their assumptions about 
attachment are ‘shattered’. Indeed, if men have not developed an ethic of care 
to the same extent as women, as Gilligan contends, then they are less likely to 
have developed or practised the interpersonal skills of caring and comfort 
described by workers in the field of personal relationships, or those of empathy 
and supportiveness as observed in the current study.
The qualitative responses to the Initial Video Feedback questionnaire give a 
flavour of some of the men’s difficulties concerning the language of emotion.
The following comments were made by women to the Health Belief Model- 
derived question: What barriers or obstacles, if any, do you see preventing 
you and your partner following the advice in this video? There were no 
similar comments made by men about women.
My partner does not usually express his feelings or discuss things.
My partner finds it hard to express his feelings and though I am ready
to listen, he cannot put it into words how he feels.
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My partner does not always take advice if he thinks he is right, he 
does not compromise.
He sometimes finds it hard to tell me how he feels, especially when 
he knows it may upset me.
To conclude, this study found differences between men and women’s 
perceptions of their partners’ behaviour. These differences are largely consistent 
with previous studies which suggest that men demonstrate less empathy and 
support than women in equivalent roles though there was no evidence of a 
gender difference in negative behaviours such as criticism or withdrawal. 
However, some authors have speculated that, although women may perceive 
less support in the marital relationship, they may be more responsive to the 
support that is provided within an intimate relationship. Women may be more 
aware of relationship difficulties than men and may be more likely to report 
negative spouse behaviour. (Manne, Taylor, Dougherty, and Kemeny, 1997).
4.1.2 STUDY AIM 2
To devise and evaluate a preventive intervention designed to 
enhance the mutual provision of social support between patients 
and their partners.
Responses to the initial video feedback questionnaire showed that subjects who 
watched the video largely endorsed its message and regarded it as relevant to 
their relationship. Follow-up data indicated that video group subjects had 
watched the video and that eight subjects claimed to have watched it three 
times. Most subjects believed that the video had caused them and their partner 
to talk more and had led them to support their partner more, and the vast 
majority of subjects felt that the video should be given to other couples facing 
cancer. Qualitative responses to the Initial Video Feedback questionnaire also 
reinforced the impression that subjects found the video helpful.
The video was very helpful, especially to remind me not to be critical.
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The video we found was so real to us, was very grateful for the 
viewing (sic).
1 felt I couid have been any one o f these women talking. -
Very helpful -  hopefully this will make us talk about our feelings and 
help us to be together.
Qualitative information from the Follow-up Video Feedback questionnaire also 
supported this view. For example, a male partner expressed his support for the 
video thus:
I was already aware that my wife thought that I had not been 
particularly supportive. Even before the cancer I often fe lt that she 
expected me to be clairvoyant in recognising her needs and changes. 
The video helped us discuss this and for me to express that I often  
did not know what she wanted from me.
However, despite evidence that subjects had watched the video and found it 
credible, the outcome measures offered little empirical support for the 
effectiveness of the video in enhancing couple support.
In comparison with the no-video control condition, the video appeared to have 
little impact on key outcome variables. There were no significant differences 
between the groups among partner subjects on any measure of communication, 
relationship quality or psychological distress. However, there was a significant 
decline among video group partners in the perceived supportiveness of their 
partners from Time-1 to Time-2, raising the disquieting possibility that the video 
had either led patients to become less supportive, and/or partners to feel less 
supported. This finding was indirectly supported by a significant reduction in 
HAD-Anxiety among control group partners with no corresponding reduction 
among video group partners.
There were only two statistically reliable differences between the groups among 
patient subjects. Patient ratings of partner supportiveness declined somewhat in 
both groups but significantly less in the video than in the control group, whilst
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perceived happiness increased significantly more in the video than in the control 
group. In fact, patients in the control group showed a significant decrease in 
perceived partner support, and an increase in both hostility and depression from 
Time-1 to Time-2. While these findings may suggest that the video offered 
some protection against the development of these problems, they were isolated 
findings which are potentially unreliable due to the number of significance tests 
undertaken in the analysis.
The fact that the majority of the outcome variables generated data in the 
predicted direction offers some encouragement, but consistency of this sort is 
not sufficient to draw reliable conclusions; only a larger sample size could 
confirm these trends. The finding of decreases in HAD-Depression scores from 
Time-1 to Time-2 among video group patients with corresponding increases 
among the control group was encouraging. However, on this measure 
randomisation had failed: the video group had significantly higher HAD- 
Depression scores at Time-1; thus one is unable to draw any reliable conclusion 
on the basis of this finding.
The possible reasons for these findings and the methodological weaknesses of 
the study will now be examined. They are presented together because the 
issues are intimately related.
4.2 Limitations and Weaknesses of the study
4.2.1 DESIGN
Ideally, this study should have included a control video. Furthermore, the Time- 
1 questionnaires were likely to have biased participants to be more vigilant 
about their relationship. Thus, a control intervention might have refocused their 
attention on other issues, while controlling for the non-specific effect of 
receiving a video. Since it would be ethically dubious to provide a placebo video 
to couples at such a vulnerable time in their lives, a relaxation control video was
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made in parallel with the experimental video (see Note 2, page 131) though was 
abandoned due to the slow accrual of participants.
4.2.2 MEASURES
The measures used were largely appropriate to the research questions and were 
successfully piloted. However, like all self-report questionnaires, they provide 
only an indirect measure of the behaviours in question. An interview format 
could have yielded qualitatively richer data but would have been more vulnerable 
to response biases. An observational study of the communication patterns 
within couples would also have yielded more fine-grain detail, but again would 
be subject to response bias and would be highly intrusive given the distressing 
circumstances facing the couple. As there was no direct contact between the 
author and the subjects, it was hoped that responses were not unduly biased 
(e.g. by social desirability).
Most of the measures had been used before in similar studies, particularly those 
of Pistrang and Barker (1992, 1995) even though some of the questions had 
unknown reliability, albeit good face validity. Unlike these earlier studies, this 
one used a prospective design and it was hoped that the measures would be 
sensitive to change over time. However, exactly as Pistrang and Barker noted 
in their study, the qualitative feedback often indicated greater difficulties within 
relationships than were indicated in the questionnaire responses: “While women 
were willing to talk about the problems, they were loath to commit themselves, 
in numbers, to negative evaluations of their partners” (Pistrang and Barker, 
1995, p.794).
Furthermore, items on some measures turned out to be ambiguous and had to 
be discarded. For example, on question 9, patients were asked to rate how 
much they agreed with the following statements: “I’ve held back from talking to 
my partner about my concerns and feelings to do with my illness because... (a) I 
don’t want to worry him /her...” and “(c) I don’t want to upset him /her.” 
Agreement with these very similar items could be regarded as positive or
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negative depending on the nature of the relationship and the meaning ascribed 
to “worry” and “upset”.
4.2.3 RANDOMISATION
Randomisation was conducted through the process of sequential allocation in 
order to achieve similar numbers of male and females in the intervention and 
control groups. Whilst the video and control groups were similar in the majority 
of respects, randomisation failed in several important areas, seeming to bias 
against the video group which had lower scores on partner empathy, and higher 
scores on depression and hostility. In addition, 83% of the control group, over 
twice as many as those in the video group, had previously coped with a family 
history of cancer. This may have led them to resume coping strategies which 
they had previously found effective and which may have afforded them some 
protection against the stress of their situation.
4.2.4 SAMPLE SIZE AND RECRUITMENT
An audit of new patients attending the four hospitals where subjects were 
recruited for this study revealed that 323 married patients were newly diagnosed 
with colorectal cancer in 1996. This led the author to conclude with some 
confidence that recruitment would pose few problems. However, in just over 
ten months only 80 eligible couples had been identified by clinic staff and of 
these only 46 couples were successfully recruited.
The fact that only 57% of the 80 eligible couples agreed to participate raises the 
question of how representative the sample was of the general population. 
Although the age and gender of those who refused was not different from those 
who took part, it is conceivable that they were more distressed and unwilling to 
cope with the perceived added stress of a research project. Indeed, it is 
probable that couples whose relationship was struggling may have been less 
likely to participate in a study looking at “how couples cope”.
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Nevertheless, of those who received the consent information, 70% did 
subsequently participate. Rrefusal rates of up to 80% have been noted by 
others studying couples affected by cancer (Keller, Henrich, Sellschopp and 
Beutel, 1996). The present study successfully avoided the high subject attrition 
which is also typical of such studies (Baider et al, 1998) by providing detailed 
consent information and informative letters.
The total sample reported scores on the HAD which were lower than most 
published figures. At Time-1 only 9.5% of all participants achieved the cut-off 
for “case-hood” of 11 on either the anxiety or depression subscales. This 
compares with reported rates of between 15 and 20% (Massie and Holland,
1990). This supports the contention that the sample may not have been 
representative of cancer patients generally.
A much larger sample size would have been desirable in order to draw 
statistically reliable conclusions about the effectiveness of the video. While the 
majority of the change scores were in the predicted direction, most failed to 
achieve statistical significance. For example, scores on perceived partner 
empathy went up two points in the video group but remained unchanged in the 
control group (p=0.225). In order to achieve a statistically reliable difference of 
this magnitude a sample size of approximately 54 couples in each group would 
be required.3
4.2.5 SAMPLE SELECTION
A fundamental issue concerns the fact that the intervention was designed to 
have a catalytic effect on couples faced with a particularly stressful experience: 
the diagnosis and treatment of cancer in one of them. Although the author had 
no illusions that it would have a lasting effect on the relationship of couples who
3 In order to get a Z-value of 1.2 with a sample of 20 subjects in each group up to a Z-value of 
1.96 (for significance at the 5% level), a sample size of 20 (1.96/1.2)2 = 54 is needed.
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had been together for the majority of their lives, it was hoped that the video 
might provoke a temporary shift in the nature of the couple’s style of 
communication leading to higher levels of support and the prevention of 
psychological distress.
However, a fifteen minute video is inherently a weak intervention. It is unlikely 
to have had any effect on couples who were already highly mutually engaged 
and supportive of one another. Indeed, some of the qualitative feedback 
confirmed the perceived redundancy of the video’s message for some couples. 
Equally, one could speculate that the video is unlikely to have had much effect 
on relationships which were highly dysfunctional, unhappy or disengaged. For 
example, one man reported a possible barrier to following the advice in the 
video as being his wife’s presumably long-standing ‘difficult’ nature: “My wife is 
extremely assertive with an argumentative nature, she finds it extremely  
hard to be compliant ”
A more successful design might have been to select couples as being eligible for 
the study on the basis of initial scores on a measure of relationship satisfaction 
(e.g. the Dyadic Adjustment Scale). Those scoring very high on satisfaction 
could be excluded, whilst offering very low-scoring couples some form of face- 
to-face couple intervention. One difficulty with this approach is being able to 
estimate the proportion of couples falling into this “middle group”, especially 
when recruitment may already be problematic, as was the case in this study. 
Alternatively, if one assumes that the video is a weak but effective intervention, 
it could be further evaluated by giving it to a very large sample of unselected 
couples (i.e. mixed cancer sites) as a preventative measure.
4.2.6 CONFOUNDING VARIABLES
While randomisation failed in several areas, another concern was the failure to 
control for other potentially important variables. In particular, although there 
were no significant differences between the groups in terms of patients’ recent 
experience of cancer treatments either at Time-1 or Time-2, there were no
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measures of physical health, severity of illness, functional ability or length of 
hospitalisation during and prior to the study. The latter variables may have 
skewed the results. For example, an increase in symptomatology among 
patients in the video group may have swamped the effects of the video.
The letter to couples who were sent the video (page 222) included a statement 
which may have been an influence on participants (in addition to the effect of 
the video itself): “This video is designed to help you cope, as a couple, with 
the stress o f the medical treatment you are undergoing; I hope you find  it 
helpful.”
4.2.7 TUMOUR SITE
The choice of colorectal cancer for this study was governed by its high 
incidence, the fact that it is gender-neutral, and that it has rarely been the focus 
of psychosocial research. However, it is also a disease whose incidence 
correlates with age, and the resulting sample had a mean age of nearly sixty 
years old. Although older people are also rarely studied in psychosocial 
oncology, it may be that they are not the ideal group for research on 
relationships. The fact that couples had been married an average of 32 years 
bears testimony to the stability of their relationships; persistence is likely to 
predict marital stability since most marriages break down within the first few 
years and divorce decreases as the length of marriage increases. Furthermore, 
compared with younger people, older couples rate their marriages as happy or 
very happy, and are less likely to admit to experiencing either especially positive 
or negative feelings in their marriage (Bedford and Blieszner, 1997). In the 
current study this may have led to a flattening of responses and a possible 
ceiling effect on some relationship measures. In addition, where the 
relationship was poor, it may have been too entrenched to change as a result of 
such an intervention.
Some of the prescriptive advice may have been difficult to enact in an older 
population. For example, men generally have smaller social networks than
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women and, as others have found (Northouse, Jeffs, Cracchiolo-Caraway, 
Lampman et al, 1995), rarely discuss their concerns with people outside their 
family. Similarly, many elderly people iive in isolated conditions and have few 
other people on whom they can rely (Broadhead, Kaplan, James, Wagner, et al, 
1983). Thus, encouraging subjects to seek additional support from outside their 
relationship may have been desirable but unrealistic for some subjects in this 
sample.
4.2.8 THE VIDEO INTERVENTION
There are a number of ways in which the video intervention was less than ideal, 
both in terms of form and content. At a structural level, the video began too 
quickly, giving the viewer insufficient time to absorb the main themes about to 
be discussed. At a content level there were more serious flaws.
The ex-patients on the video comprised five women and one man. A more 
equal balance of the sexes would have been preferable. The video patients (with 
the possible exception of the one man), and some of the non-speaking couples, 
were also considerably younger than the research subjects and, consequently, 
the subjects may have had difficulty identifying with the characters in the video. 
The video patients were predominantly middle-class and this may have also led 
to problems of identification for some subjects. Although the evidence for the 
importance of model similarity is inconclusive (Eiser and Eiser, 1996), it is likely 
that model-target audience congruence is generally preferable.
The video contained no testimony from the perspective of the partner. Although 
the “expert” on the video attempted to stress the difficulties for the partner, this 
message is likely to have been more powerfully delivered by someone who had 
fulfilled this role. Hearing about the problematic and successful experiences of a 
partner may have led partner subjects to feel more understood and provided 
them with a model to emulate.
Because the video was structured around patient testimonies, the specific 
messages were not as clear as they might have been using a somewhat more 
didactic approach. In fact, the desired behaviours were not clarified until the 
end of the video when the main points were summarised using captions and a 
voice-over. More importantly, none of the desired behaviours were modelled 
on the video so that subjects could see exactly what was being advocated, an 
issue of importance to successful video interventions (Eiser and Eiser, 1996). 
Instead, three women spoke about having experienced poor support while only 
one woman and one man spoke about having received good partner support.
In view of the results, the video may have been asking male subjects to engage 
in supportive behaviours that they simply lacked the skills or confidence to 
perform; the video may have led them to feel even less competent.
4.3 Conclusions
“He was very upset but encouraged me to be positive, that he was
there for me, and that we would see it through together”
(Female patient, describing her husband’s reaction to her diagnosis)
This study yielded interesting and clinically useful information about gender 
differences in the transaction of support between partners in a relationship 
when one of them has been diagnosed with cancer. The Matching Hypothesis 
predicted that, in the context of a life-threatening illness, emotional empathic 
support is the optimal type of social support, and a number of empirical studies 
have confirmed this to be true. This study supports the view that there are 
gender differences in the capacity of men and women to provide this type of 
support. On average, men were perceived by their partners to be less empathic 
and supportive than women were perceived by their partners. Of course, these 
mean differences obscure the very real concern and empathic support shown by 
many men in this study towards their partners, but they nonetheless probably 
reflect widespread gender differences in society.
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The other area of clinical relevance concerned the predictive power of the 
negative communication variables of criticism and withdrawal (and, to a lesser 
extent, the quality of the relationship). This was especially true for partners: 
perceiving the patient as critical or withdrawn at Time-1 was associated with 
later anxiety, depression, hostility and lower self-esteem. This finding supports 
the view that, while the couple relationship may be an important source of 
social support, it may constitute a source of additional stress particularly for the 
patient’s partner.
As others have observed, there has been a great deal of empirical research in 
the area of social support and cancer though little of it has been theory-driven 
(Keller, Henrich, Sellschopp and Beutel, 1996). The same can be said of the 
few studies which have specifically examined gender issues. The results of the 
current study have been discussed in the context of recent theoretical and 
empirical work drawn from attachment theory. As workers in the field of 
personal relationships have noted, adult relationships can only be understood in 
terms of the developmental history of both partners and of the relationship 
itself, as well as its current context. The working models that people hold in 
regard to themselves and towards the behaviour of others, working models 
which may involve the internalisation of significant figures from the past (most 
typically the parents), are likely to have a powerful bearing on relationships 
formed in adulthood (Sarason, Sarason and Gurung, 1997). The complexity of 
measuring the nature of early attachments, as well as simultaneously tracking 
communication variables within a current attachment or relationship coping with 
a profound threat such as cancer, is not to be underestimated. However, 
progress in the understanding of gender differences in the provision of care and 
support is most likely to be derived from testable hypotheses drawn from 
developmental theories such as attachment theory.
The fact that the video intervention evaluated in this study had such limited 
effects may not be surprising in view of the limitations listed above. However, 
there were sufficient trends in the data (and the lack of contradictory trends) to
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retain some optimism about the intervention. The video was largely well 
received and endorsed by the couples who saw it, and no one complained that it 
had been actively unhelpful. Indeed, it may be that a more effective film could 
be made through a revision and expansion of the existing video, in accordance 
with the points made above. Equally importantly, it is more likely that the 
effectiveness of the video would be demonstrated if it were evaluated using a 
considerably larger sample, selected younger couples whose relationships 
warrant it, or as an adjunct to face-to-face therapeutic work with couples.
The choice of a video intervention was driven by the high incidence of 
psychological problems among patients and partners affected by cancer, and the 
need for a cost-effective intervention to help prevent such problems. The fact 
that this particular intervention appeared to lack therapeutic power is not an 
argument against the use of the medium of video. There is no published 
account of a similar intervention. Due to their complexity, human adult 
relationships may be an over-ambitious target for a video intervention, and more 
success using this medium may be derived from tackling more discrete problems 
associated with cancer (e.g. coping with the fatigue caused by radiotherapy, or 
nausea in chemotherapy).
Whatever the chances of successfully deploying a video intervention to prevent 
the psychosocial problems associated with cancer, they are likely to be 
enhanced by ensuring that the process of making the intervention is not simply 
drawn from the theoretical and empirical work of professionals, but is also 
intimately informed by the day-to-day experiences of people with cancer and 
their loved ones.
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Appendix B: Local Research Ethics Committee Approval
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T T D  TT HP Trust Headquarters
— — — — — — —  Marlborough Street
TEACHING CARE Bristol BS1 3NU
Fax 0117 925 6588
18 July 1997 Please ring direct line number:
0117 928 3613
M ATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY 
Dear Mr Brennan
E3780 An evaluation of two preventive psychosocial videos
Following viewing of the three videos by Dr. A Preece, I am pleased to advise that approval has 
been given as detailed below:
Approval under Category D and with a signed release form for that part of the study which 
makes a video of the research subjects.
Approval under Category C for that part of the study which sends a video already made to 
subjects who are not included in the video.
The Committee requires you to complete the attached end of study summary/yearly report at the 
appropriate time and return it to this office.
Yours sincerely
Naaz Nathoo
Secretary to the Research Ethics Committee
The United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust
~ 209 ~
BATH LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
Direct tel/fax: 01225 825725
1 October 1997
Royal United Hospital Bath NHS Trust
M ATER IAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Dear Mr Brennan
BA66/97-98
An evaluation of two preventive psychosocial videos (in patients and their partners with colorectal 
cancer)
This application, which included the documents listed below, was considered at the Bath Research Ethics 
meeting on 25 September 1997.
• application form
• protocol
• patient consent form
• questionnaire
This study was approved by the Committee, and may now proceed.
Any changes or extensions to the protocol, or additional investigators should be notified to the Committee 
for approval. Adverse events should also be notified to the meeting. May we remind you of the Data 
Protection Act 1984 and the need to conduct the trial in accordance with the Good Clinical Practice 
Guidelines.
The Committee is required to audit progress of research and to produce a yearly report to the Avon Health 
Authority and Department of Health. You are therefore required to provide a brief yearly report and a 
short final report.
Yours sincerely
Dr J P D  Reckless 
Chairman
Royal United Hospital 
Combe Park, Bath BA1 3NG 
Tel: (01225) 428331
~ 2 1 0 ~
WEST
SOMERSET
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
TAUNTON & SOMERSET HOSPITAL 
MUSGROVEPARK
TEL: (01823)333444 
Fax; (01823) 342799
TAUNTON 
SOMERSET 
TA15DA
Chairman: Dr D N Challacombe MD FRCP
Enquiries to the Committee Secretary Extension 2799
DNC/ejw  
18 November 1997
M ATER IAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Dear Mr Brennan
An Evaluation of Two Psychosocial Videos
At the meeting o f the West Somerset Ethics Committee held on 11 November 1997, members 
considered the above study which was deferred from the previous meeting pending a report from 
one o f our Consultant Clinical Psychologists.
Members concluded that all the concerns previously raised were satisfactorily addressed, however 
it was considered that the patient consent form should be amended to make it clear that any 
participant in the study who may caused distress by the questionnaire or video will be able to see 
and discuss the matter with either yourself or their consultant oncologist.
Subject to this amendment, approval was granted. The Committee look forward to receiving an 
upff&te in six months time.
Y\)ur§$incerely
D N  CHALLACOMBE MD FRCP 
Chairman
West Somerset Ethics Committee
- 2 1 1
East Somerset NHS Trust
Yeovil District Hospital
Higher Kingston, Yeovil, Somerset BA21 4AT
Telephone Yeovil (0935) 75122 Facsimile (0935) 26850
Please ask  for/E xt O ur ref: Your ref:
D irect D ial (0935) 7 0 7 ____
Ref: JB/CAW092 
21st November, 1997
M ATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY 
Dear Mr Brennan
RE: EC027/97 - AN EVALUATION OF TWO PSYCHOSOCIAL VIDEOS
I can now confirm the Committee’s approval to this study which is subject to the 
following conditions:-
1. The Committee will be informed of any adverse effects on any patient.
2. A copy of any publication as a result o f the study is passed to the Committee.
3. A summary o f the progress o f this study to be received by 30th September, 1998 
for inclusion in the East Somerset Committee Report to the Somerset Health 
Commission.
We wish you luck with this study.
Yours sincerely
DR JANE BALDWIN
CHAIRMAN LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
Yeovil District Hospital • Sum m erlands • Crewkerne ■ Verrington • South Petherton
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An Invitation to Participate in the Production of Prevention Videos
introduction: You are invited to take part in a short video that will be used in a research study 
to examine the effectiveness of providing psychological information to patients recently 
diagnosed with cancer. Please read through this sheet which explains why we want to do this 
research and what it would mean for you if you decide to take part.
The reason why the research is being done: There is an increasing interest in and demand for 
psychological and social support in hospital cancer care services. It is therefore important that 
research is done to see which forms of care are effective. To achieve this we need to compare 
people who are given a new information video with those who are not, but who are otherwise 
being cared for in the same way.
What taking part in the video would be like for you: If you agree to take part in the video, you 
will be asked to spend one day in Bristol during which we will film you and obtain your ideas 
about the whole project. We will be making two separate videos though it will be up to you to 
decide which of them you would like to contribute to. Video 1 will be concerned with the extent 
to which you managed to stay involved with normal activities in your life while undergoing 
treatment. Video 2 is concerned with how much support you felt you received from your partner 
following diagnosis and during treatment. In the morning we will discuss what aspects of your 
personal experiences will be most relevant to our particular area of interest. The video 
recordings will take place in the afternoon. It is important to stress that you are at liberty to say 
only what you feel comfortable saying on camera and we would encourage you not to disclose 
deeply personal or any identifying material. Any names you may wish to use (for example, your 
partner’s first name if you feel it would be natural to use a name) should be disguised. A 
cameraman & and a female camera assistant will be present along w i t h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H  and 
Lunch will be provided.
Use of the Video: You will be shown the edited video, and only if you are happy with the 
content, will it be used in the research. If you agree to its use, we will then ask you to sign a 
release form (a copy is attached). The release form will permit us to distribute the completed 
video to the patients involved in the research. Should the research provide good results we may 
also wish to present the video to others. The release form would give us permission to use the 
video in the future without seeking any further consent.
Voluntary participation: We want to make it very clear that we do not want you to feel under 
any pressure at all to participate in this research. Whether or not you take part will in no way 
affect any future care you may receive at the Bristol Oncology Centre.
Further information: Should you want any more information before making your mind up, then 
telephone if no one replies, leave a message on the answer machine,
along with a time that would be convenient for us to get back to you.
Complaints or comments: If you are unhappy about the way in which this project has been 
introduced to you or carried out, then please contact UBHT Research Ethics Com m ittee.^^l
Thank you very much for your help. 
Kind Regards
Trainee Clinical Psychologist Consultant Clinical Psychologist
~ 2 1 4 ~ Appendix C
Consent Form
Study Titles: ‘A Research Project on the Effectiveness of a Video Information Package’
‘An Evaluation of Two Preventive Psychosocial Videos’
Please complete the following questions:
Have you read this information sheet ? Yes / No
Do you feel that you have enough information about what will be asked of you Yes / No
and how the video will be used ?
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the project:
•  At any point, prior to having seen the completed video and signed 
the ‘Release’ form.
• Without having to give a reason for withdrawing
• And without affecting your future medical care Yes / No
Do you agree to take part in the video ? Yes / No
Signed....................................................................... Date...........................................
(Name in block letters)
~ 215 Appendix C
Release Form
Study Titles: ‘A Research Project on the Effectiveness of a Video Information Package’ 
‘An Evaluation of Two Preventive Psychosocial Videos’
Having consented to being filmed as part of the above study and having viewed the 
completed video, I am happy to give my permission for either James Brennan or Mark 
Bamngton to use the video in whole or part, at any point in the future for research, 
clinical or teaching purposes, without having to seek further consent from me. I 
understand that at no point will my name be revealed or any personal or identifying 
details about me or my family.
I agree with this statement Yes / No
Signed................................................................  Date.
(Name in block letters)
U B H T
TEACHING CARE
Bristol Oncology Centre
. Horfield Road
BRISTOL BS2 8ED
Tel: (0117) 928-2885
FAX: (0117) 928-3865 
Date
Dear Mr and Mrs
Thank you so much for agreeing to hear more about our research. As a 
result of your kind support we hope that we can improve the care given to new 
patients and their partners. I realise that this may be quite a stressful time for 
you both and I certainly have no wish to give you anything else to worry about. 
However, this research (which is fully supported by your oncologist) only 
involves filling out questionnaires in your own home (i.e. no contact with anyone 
else), and most people so far have found it quite interesting.
There are three stages to this research which is all about how couples cope 
when one of them has been diagnosed with cancer. The enclosed Consent 
Form goes into more detail about what the research will involve but here is a 
simple summary:
Stage 1
After we have received the enclosed Consent Form (which must be signed by 
both of you) you will each be sent a different questionnaire, depending on 
whether you are the patient or the “partner” (husband, wife or life-companion). 
This takes about 40 minutes to complete if you are the patient and about 20 
minutes if you are the partner.
Stage 2
As soon as we get the questionnaires back from you, you will be randomly put 
into one of two groups; this is like drawing names out of a hat -  neither you nor 
I will have any control over which group you go into. One group of couples will 
receive (in the post) a video, and the other group will not. For the research to 
be effective this process of putting people into groups has to be completely 
random. If you are in the group receiving the video (which is about 15 minutes 
long and entirely free), it will be sent to you in the post with a short leaflet for 
you to keep and another very short questionnaire to complete. If you are in the 
group that does not receive a video I will let you know by sending you a short 
note.
~  217 ~
Stage 3
Finally, three months later, we will ask you to complete most of the first 
questionnaires again. It will be very important to us if, having completed stages 
1 and 2, you could complete stage 3 because without it we will not be able to 
use your data.
iV vt/ \t/
' t '  ^  V
It is important to stress that all the research will be done by post. You will not 
have to come into the hospital because of the research, and the research will 
not affect your treatment in any way at all and everything you write on the 
questionnaires will be seen o n ly  by me and my research assistant. We will 
provide you with stamped addressed envelopes in which to return all the 
questionnaires, and you will be welcome to keep the video or return it to us if 
you prefer.
At this stage I would be grateful if you would read the enclosed Consent Form 
and return it to me in the envelope provided and, if possible, within the next 
two days.
Please return this slip on the Consent Form whether or not you wish to 
participate in our research!
Many thanks.
With Best Wishes
Yours Sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
- 2 1 8 -
R e s e a r c h  C o n s e n t  Form 
The Evaluation of a Psychosocial Video
You are invited as a couple to take part in a research project to find out the effect of a 
video on how couples cope with the stress of one of them having cancer. Please read 
through these notes which will explain why we are doing this research and what, in 
practice, it would mean to you if you took part.
The reason why the research is being done
There is increasing interest in and demand for psychological and social support for 
people who are being treated for cancer. It is therefore important that research is 
done to see which forms of care are the most effective and, in particular, the best 
methods of preventing psychological problems from developing. To achieve this, we 
want to evaluate a video to see if it is effective in helping couples cope with their 
situation, and thereby prevent later problems. We also need to compare the couples 
receiving videos with couples who receive routine care and do not see the video.
What taking part in the research would be like for you
The research is concerned with how both members of a couple cope when one of 
them has been diagnosed with cancer. Therefore, if you agree to take part we will 
need to collect information from both of you. We will send each of you a 
questionnaire which you will be asked to complete without discussing your answers 
with each other. The questionnaires will be sent to you with a stamped addressed 
envelope for you to return them in.
Once we have these questionnaires back, you will either be sent the video or a note 
saying that you will not be receiving one. Half of all couples will receive a video and 
half of couples will not. Whether or not you get the video will be decided purely by a 
random process, like pulling names out of a hat. You will be free to keep the video if 
you receive one. Finally, three months later, when most or all of the treatment will 
probably be over, you will both be asked to complete most of the questionnaires (again 
separately of one another), whether or not you actually received a video Once again 
they will be sent to you with a stamped addressed envelope for you to return them in.
These questionnaires take roughly 40 minutes to complete (though the questionnaires 
for the patient’s partner are much shorter). The video takes about fifteen minutes to 
watch and will require you to watch it together as a couple.
Confidentiality
All your answers are confidential and all the research will be conducted by post so you 
will not be required to see anyone to do with the research. The questionnaires will not 
have your names on them, only a code number, and they will be kept locked away.
The questionnaires will be seen only by the researcher and his assistant, and not even 
your partner will be able to see what you have written! At no point will your name or 
participation be revealed.
Voluntary Participation
Please understand that we do not want you to feel under any pressure at all to 
participate in this research. Whether you take part will not way affect the care you
- 2 1 9 -
receive at the Bristol Oncology Centre. If you do agree to participate you are free to 
change your mind and withdraw from the research project later.
Further Information
If you have any concerns or questions about this research project, or if any aspect of it 
causes you distress, you are welcome to contact me, in writing or by phone, at the 
following address: Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Bristol Oncology
Centre, Horfield Road, Bristol BS2 8ED (Tel: Alternatively, you
may contact your consultant oncologist.
Complaints or comments
If you are unhappy about the way in which this research has been introduced to you or 
carried out, then please contact the UBHT Ethics Committee:
Secretary, Research Ethics Committee, Trust Headquarters, Marlborough Street,
Bristol BS13N U  (Tel:
To summarise: The study is done entirely by post and will require no extra trips to 
the hospital; nor will you be required to meet anyone to do with the research. It will 
not affect your treatment in any way. Your answers on the questionnaires will be kept 
completely confidential and will not be revealed to anyone.
We would be enormously grateful if you felt able to help us with our research.
Yours Sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
Please cut here
CONSENT FORM
Study Title: The Evaluation o f  a Psychosocial Video 
Please complete the following questions:
Please cross out 
as necessary
Do you feel you have understood the information on this sheet? YES / NO
Do you feel you have received adequate information about this study? YES / NO
Do you both agree to take part in this study? YES / NO
Signed (by both of you ):..................................................................................................
D ate :.....................
Names in Block letters:...........................................................................................
Please keep these details about the study but return this tear-off slip in the 
envelope provided to:
Bristol Oncology Centre, Horfield Road, Bristol BS2 8ED
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U R H T  Bristol O ncology Centre
TEACHING CARE Horfield Road
------------------------  BRISTOL BS2 8ED
Tel: (0117) 928-2885
FAX: (0117) 928-3865 
Date
PLEASE READ THIS FIRST!
Dear Mr and Mrs
Thank you so much for agreeing to participate in our research. With 
your help, we hope that our research will lead to improvements in care to 
patients and their partners all over the country. We are therefore very grateful 
for your help.
You will find enclosed two envelopes, marked Patient and Partner. Please 
take the one that is for you and complete it alone. It is very important to the 
research that neither of you receive help or advice from your partner 
when you complete these questionnaires. Therefore it’s best to complete 
the questionnaires and seal them in the envelopes in separate rooms if possible! 
Some of the questions are quite personal but please remember that no one will 
be able to identify your questionnaire because it has a code that only I can 
interpret.
Please seal and return the questionnaires in the envelopes they came in within 
the next three days. As soon as we have them back you will be assigned 
(randomly) to one of two groups. One of these groups will receive a free video 
and the other group will not. I will write back to you within a week of getting 
these questionnaires to let you know the outcome.
Thank you again for your help. I look forward to getting your questionnaires 
back as soon as possible. (Please try to post them back to me within the next 
three days, if at all possible).
With Best Wishes
Yours Sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
U B H T
TEACHING CARE
Bristol O ncology Centre
Horfield Road
BRISTOL BS2 8ED
Tel: (0117) 928-2885
FAX: (0117) 928-3865 
Date
PLEASE READ THIS FIRST!
Dear
Thank you for returning the questionnaires. I hope they weren’t too 
tiring to complete.
As you can see, you have been assigned to the group which receives the video.
This video is designed to help you cope, as a couple, with the stress of the 
medical treatment you are undergoing; I hope you find it helpful. Along with 
the video are two leaflets which should be read after  you have watched the 
video together.
It is important to the research that you both watch the video and do so  
together but without others present Try to find a quiet time. Please also 
both complete the short questionnaires that are in the enclosed envelopes but, 
like the previous questionnaires, please complete these separately. Then 
please return them to me in separate envelopes without looking at your 
partner’s responses.
Again, I would be grateful if you would return these short questionnaires as soon 
as possible (within the next three days).
The next and final stage of the research will be when I contact you again in 
about three months time, with most of the questionnaires you recently 
completed. It will be vital to the research that you are able to complete these 
last questionnaires, so we really do value your continued participation in this 
important research.
Thank you again very much for your help.
With Best Wishes 
Yours Sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
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Bristol O ncology Centre
Horfield Road
BRISTOL BS2 8ED
Tel: (0117) 928-2885
FAX: (0117) 928-3865 
Date
Dear Mr and Mrs
Thank you so much for returning the questionnaires. I hope they 
weren’t too tiring to complete.
You were randomly assigned to the group which does not receive a video. 
Although you may find this a bit disappointing, it is important to stress that your 
input into this research is still extremely important. In order for us to evaluate 
the effects of the video we need to compare the couples who watch it with 
couples who do not. Therefore, without your participation the research would 
have no value.
The next and final stage of the research will be when I contact you again in 
about three months, with most of the questionnaires you recently completed. It 
will be vital to the research that you are able to complete these last 
questionnaires, so I really do value your continued participation in this important 
research.
Thank you again so much for your help.
With Best Wishes 
Yours Sincerely
U B H T
TEACHING CARE
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
U B H T
TEACHING CARE
Bristol O ncology Centre
Horfield Road
BRISTOL BS2 8ED
Tel: (0117) 928-2885
FAX: (0117) 928-3865 
Date
PLEASE READ THIS FIRST!
Dear Mr and Mrs
I do hope you remember this research project we are conducting. This is 
the last but also the most important stage of the research, so we very much 
value your continued help. All of your valuable input so far can only be used 
once we get back the enclosed questionnaires, so I cannot stress enough the 
importance of these last questionnaires to this study.
To remind you of the procedure, you will find two envelopes enclosed, marked 
Patient and Partner. Please take the one that is for you and complete it alone.
It is very important to the research that neither of you receive help nor advice 
from your partner when you complete these questionnaires. Therefore it’s best 
to complete them in separate rooms if possible. Some of the questions are 
quite personal but please remember that no one will be able to identify your 
questionnaire because it has a code that only I can interpret.
Please seal and return the questionnaires in the envelopes that they came in 
within the next three days if at all possible.
Finally, I am enormously grateful to you both for your help with this research 
project. I realise that I have asked you to complete a lot of questionnaires at a 
time which has probably been very stressful. I sincerely hope that your help 
with this project will lead to improved care for other couples facing the kind of 
stress you have coped with over the past few months.
Thank you again.
With Best Wishes
Yours Sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
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Bristol O ncology Centre
Horfield Road
BRISTOL BS2 8ED
Tel: (0117) 928-2885
FAX: (0117) 928-3865
Date
Dear Mr and Mrs
This is just a short note to thank you so much for taking the trouble to 
complete all the questionnaires I sent you. Conducting research in this area is 
delicate and time-consuming, as I am sure you can appreciate, and it is not easy 
to find couples who are kind enough to spare their time in the way that you 
have. So I am enormously grateful.
Thank you again for your generous help.
With Best Wishes
Yours Sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
U B H T
TEACHING CARE
- 2 2 6 -
Appendix D: Research Questionnaires
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This form is for the person 
who is the patient
Research Questionnaire
The
CODE:
Thank you so much for agreeing to take part in this research. As a 
result of your help we hope that this research will lead to other people 
receiving better care in the future. 
Please complete every item in this questionnaire. Read carefully the 
instructions for each section and, after you have finished, check that all 
questions have been answered.
Please find somewhere on your own to complete the questionnaire.
As soon as you have finished, seal it in one of the envelopes provided and 
try to post it within 3 days of the day you received it.
IMPORTANT
For this research to be successful, it is extremely important that you complete 
all the questions on vour own. In other words, without anyone helping you or
influencing what you write.
Please do not h e lp .o r receive help from , vour partner.
Remember: the term “your partner3’ in this questionnaire refers to the person
you are married to, or living wifli.
Some o f the questions may seem quite personal but please try  to be as honest 
as you can possibly be. Remember that your answers will be kept entirely 
confidential and, as you can see, this form contains a code (i.e. not your name) 
which only the researcher understands .
Your details will not be revealed to anyone else.
Thank you again very much for helping with this research.
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1. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS (Please answer ALL the questions)
1. Are you the patient | | or the partner of the patient | | (tick one box)
2. Are you Male | | or Female I I (tickone box)
3. Please state your a g e
4. If you have children, please state 
their sex and  a g e
(for example: girl o f 21
boy o f 18, etc.)
5. Please circle any children currently living with you at hom e
6. How many years have you been 
living with your partner? years
7. Are you married | | or “living together” EH (tick one box)
8. Have you been  previously married (or in an equivalent longterm relationship)? YES NO EH
9. Who is the major w age earner in your present relationship? Me EH My Partner EH
10. What is the occupation of the major w age earner?
11. (a) Are you currently in work Full-time EH I don ’t work [~1
(even if you have had to stop Part-time EH Unemployed EH (tick one box)
recently due  to the illness) Voluntary work EH Retired EH
(b) If you are in work, have you had to reduce 
the am ount you work because of the illness?
12. At what a g e  did you leave full-time education?
YES □  NO □
13. At what point did your education finish? During:
Secondary school EH ^ . . , .
College/technical college EH  ^c one ox^  
University/Polytechnic EH
14. Have you ever received any psychiatric or psychological treatm ent? YES EH NO EH 
If so, p lease briefly state what the treatm ent was for:
15. Are you currently receiving any medication for
anxiety EH none E] 
depression EH 
other psychiatric condition EH ...............
(tick whichever boxes apply)
16. Are you currently receiving any formal support ~ i—i n  j—, 
(e.g. counselling, therapist, self-help group) ? I—I LJ
If so, p lease specify
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17. Looking back on your life, have you had to cope with any of the following?
(a) A brother, sister, parent or child of yours being diagnosed
with cancer?  YESD N O Q
If yes, please specify, with year & illness
(b) Receiving a  diagnosis of can c e r  yourself? yES ED n o  ED
If yes, please specify year & diagnosis
(c) Receiving the diagnosis of a  potentially life-threatening r—, j—.
disease yourself? YES ■ NO
If yes, please specify year & diagnosis
(d) A period of more than one month when you have been n  _ ,—.
seriously ill? Yts |_J NO|_]
If yes, please specify year & diagnosis
(e) A period of more than two weeks when you single-
handedly had to look after som eone else who was ill or yes i—i r—i
very dependent?________________  _ ______ _
If yes, fo r how long?
(f) A period of more than two weeks when you were
separated from both your parents before you were four yes ED NO E~l
years old?
(g) A period of depression which interfered with your life
(whether or not you were given treatment for it) YES ED NO ED
(h) A period of stress or anxiety which interfered with your life
(whether or not you were given treatm ent for it) YES ED NO ED
18. Have you had any other major stresses to co p e  with over the
past six months? YES EH NO| |
If yes, p lease specify
19. When you are completely honest with yourself, who has been  your most 
important* source of support since you learned that you had cancer?
My partner [D My daughter E] My sister EH
* (Tick one
My mother Q  My son ED A m ale friend ED box only)
My father ED My brother ED A fem ale friend ED
Other {please specify
relationship to you) ' ...............................................$ex this.p e rso n :......................
- 2 -
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20. How many weeks is it since you were diagnosed with cancer? weeks
Please tick the box if you are receiving any of the following treatm ents or have 
received them over the past two months
Surgery □  
Radiotherapy Q
Chemotherapy Q  
Hormone treatm ent Q
(Tick whichever 
boxes apply)
2. CONCERNS
1. We are interested in learning about the kinds of concerns and  worries that people 
have about their can cer and  its treatm ent. Here is a  list of concerns and  worries. 
Please state how concerned you have been  about each  of these over the  past 
month, using the following answers:
Put the number in the boxes 
below which best describes 
what you have fe lt
I have not been at all concerned about this 
I've been a little concerned about this 
I've been moderately concerned 
about this
I've been considerably concerned about this 
I've been extremely concerned about this
a) Physical problems or discomfort due  to the treatm ent
b) Feeling that I’m less desirable or accep tab le  to my 
partner (or to a  potential partner)
c) The effect of my illness on people close to m e
d) Uncertainty about whether the cancer will 
recur or spread in the future
e) Other (please specify)
(Put a  number in 
every box)
2. Which one of these have you been
most concerned about? (a, b, c, d, or e)
(choose one only)
- 3 -
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Now please go  through the sam e list of concerns, and  consider how much you 
have talked about each  of these with vour partner
Please use the following answers 
by putting the appropriate 
number in the boxes below
Talked about none of what I felt 
Talked about a bit of what I felt 
Talked about some of what I felt 
Talked about much of what I felt 
Talked about all of what i felt 
Haven't had this concern
a . Physical problems or discomfort due  to the  treatment
b. Feeling that I’m less desirable or a ccep tab le  
to my partner (or potential partner)
c . The effect of my illness on people close to m e
d. Uncertainty about whether the cancer will 
recur or spread in the future
e . Other (please specify)
(Put one number 
in every box)
4. Here is a  list of different feelings you may have had since your illness.
Please say how much you have talked about each  of these feelings with your 
partner, using the sam e answ ers:
Times when I’ve felt:
a . tense, nervous, uneasy, or anxious
b. sad, discouraged, gloomy, or downhearted
c. angry, bad-tem pered, furious, or annoyed
d. positive, hopeful and  more cheerful
(Put a number in 
every box)
5. How helpful or unhelpful, to you has it been when you’ve talked about
these concerns and  feelings with your partner?
Very unhelofu
Moderately unhelpfu
Slightly unhelpfu
Slightly helpfu
Moderately helpfu 
Very helpfu
□
□
□
□
□
□
(Tick one box only)
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6. When you have talked about your concerns and  feelings with your 
partner it may have had different kinds of results. Here is a  list of 
things people m ay feel after they’ve talked. Please say how much 
e a c h  one is true or untrue for you, using the following answers:
Put the number in the boxes 
below which best describes 
what you have fe lt
Strongly true for me 
Moderately true for me 
Slightly true for me 
Slightly untrue for me 
Moderately untrue for me 
Strongly untrue for me
When I Ve talked with my partner about my concerns and feelings to do with my illness:
It gave  m e a  feeling of relief or reassurancea.
b.
c.
d .
e .
g-
h.
It m ade  m e feel more confused or less clear 
about things
It helped m e think about things 1 could do  
to feel better
It m ade  m e dwell more on my concerns 
and  feelings
It helped m e see things differently, 
more clearly, or in a  different light
It m ade m e feel worse, more worried or 
upset
It helped m e get things off my mind
It left m e thinking that there was nothing 
I could do  to feel better
(Put a number in 
every box)
7. Ideally, how much would you like to have talked about your concerns 
and  feelings with your partner? Would you like to have talked less, 
m ore or have you talked as much as you would like to have done?
I would like to have talked:
a . a  lot less about what I felt
b. a  bit less about what 1 felt
c. I’ve talked about as much as I want to
d . a  bit more about what I felt
e . a  lot more about what I felt
(lick one box only)
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8. People sometimes say that they hold back from talking about their 
concerns or feelings to do  with their ill ness,for various reasons. To what 
extent have you held back from talking to your partner about your concerns 
or feelings?
0 Not a t all
1 A little bit
Quite a  lot 
A lot
(Tick one box only)
9. Below is a  list of reasons why people may hold back from talking about their 
concerns or feelings to do  with their illness. Please tell m e how much each  
reason is true or untrue for you, using the following answers:
Put the number in the boxes 
below which best describes 
what you have fe lt
Strongly true for me 
Moderately true for me 
Slightly true for me 
Slightly untrue for me 
Moderately untrue for me 
Strongly untrue for me
I’ve held back  from talking to m y partner about m y concerns and feelings to do  
with m y illness b e c a u se :
a . I don ’t want to worry him/her
b. I don ’t think s/he would understand
c. don ’t want to upset him/her
d. S/he doesn’t like m e to talk about my concerns or feelings
e. S/he doesn’t know what to do or say when I’m upset ____
f. I think s/he would gloss over it or m ake light of it ------------
g. S/he wants to hear from m e that I’m doing well ________
h. I think s/he would criticize m e _________________________
/. Other (please specify)
(Please put a 
number in 
every box)
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10. We are  interested in how much those close to you understand your experience of 
having had  c a n c e r— that is, how much they understand your feelings, concerns, 
an d  what the experience has been  like for you. The statements below describe a 
variety of ways in which people might respond to you.
Consider each  statem ent in terms of how your partner has responded to you 
since your illness. Please say how much each  one is true or untrue for you, using 
the following answers:
Put the number in the boxes 
below which best describes 
what you have fe lt
a. S/he nearly always knows exactly what I m ean.
b. S/he may understand my words but s/he does 
not see  the way I feel
c. S/he usually senses or realises what 1 am  feeling
d. His/her own attitudes towards som e of the things
I do  or say prevent him/her from understanding me
e. His/her response to m e is usually so fixed and  
autom atic that I d o n ’t really get through to him/her
f. She/he appreciates exactly how the things I 
experience feel to m e
g. S/he just takes no notice of som e things 
that I think or feel
h. S/he does not realise how sensitive I am  
about som e of the things we discuss
i. S/he understands m e
j. S/he realises what I m ean even when I have difficulty
in saying it
(Please put a 
number in 
every box)
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11. How did your partner reac t to the news of the cancer?
How did you think the illness or treatm ent has affected him or her?
12. How stressful do you think it has been  for your partner to find out about the 
cancer?
0 Not at all stressful
1 Slightly stressful
2 Moderately stressful
3 Very stressful
4 Extremely stressful
(Tick one box only)
13. Since the illness, has your relationship with your partner changed  at all? Overall, 
would you say it has got better, worse, or hasn’t changed?
A lot worse 
A bit worse 
Hasn’t ch an g ed  
A bit better 
A lot better
1
2
3
4
5
In what way?
14. How supportive do  you feel your partner has been  to you 
since the illness was diagnosed?
(Tick one box only)
0 Not at all
1 Slightly supportive
2 Moderately supportive
3 Very supportive
4 Extremely supportive
(Tick one box only)
- 8 -
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15. How critical towards you has your partner been since the illness?
0 Not a t all
(Tick one box only)
Slightly critical 
Moderately critical 
Very critical 
Extremely critical
16. How withdrawn from you has your partner been since the illness? 
0 Not a t all
Slightly withdrawn 
Moderately withdrawn 
Very withdrawn 
Extremely withdrawn
1
2
3
4
(Tick one box only)
17. The dots on the following line represent different degrees of happiness in your 
relationship with your partner. The middle point, “happy” , represents the degree  
of happiness of most relationships. Please circle the dot which best describes the 
d eg ree  of happiness, all things considered, of your relationship.
Extremely Fairly A little 
Unhappy Unhappy Unhappy
Happy Very Extremely 
Happy Happy
Perfect
18. Please write the appropriate number 
beside e ac h  question below according 
to this scale:
a. How often d o  you and your partner quarrel?
b. How often d o  you and  your partner “get on each  other’s 
nerves”
c. How often d o  you discuss or have you considered 
divorce, separation, or terminating your relationship?
d. Do you ever regret that you married/lived together/had 
a  relationship?
e. In general, how often d o  you think that things betw een 
you and  your partner a re  going well?
- 9 -
Please complete 
every question
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3. PROBLEMS AND COMPLAINTS
Below is a  list of problems and  complaints that people  sometimes have.
For e ac h  item, select one of the numbers that best describes HOW MUCH DISCOMFORT 
THAT PROBLEM CAUSED YOU DURING THE PAST MONTH. Write one number in the sp ace  
to the right of e ach  problem.
The numbers refer to these phrases:
HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY:
1. Nervousness or shakiness 
inside
2. Loss of sexual interest or 
pleasure
3. Feeling easily annoyed 
or irritated
4. Feeling low in energy or 
slowed down
5. Thoughts of ending your 
life
6. Trembling
7. Crying easily
8. Feelings of being 
trapped  or caught
9. Suddenly scared for no 
reason
10. Temper outbursts that 
you could not control
11. Blaming yourself for 
things
12. Feeling lonely
13. Feeling down
14. Worrying too much 
about things
15. Feeling no interest in 
things
Please complete 
every question
16. Feeling fearful
17. Heart pounding or racing
18. Feeling hopeless about the 
future
19. Feeling tense or keyed up
20. Having urges to beat, injure or 
harm som eone
21. Having urges to break or 
smash things
22. Feeling everything is an effort
23. Spells of terror or panic
24. Getting into frequent 
arguments
25. Feeling so restless you 
couldn’t sit still
26. Feelings of worthlessness
27. The feeling that something 
bad  is going to happen to 
you.
28. Shouting or throwing things
29. Thoughts and  images of a  
frightening nature
- 1 0 -
4. YOUR RELATIONSHIP
Please answ er e a c h  question below  by circling the num ber which best represents 
vour feelings abou t your partner. The second  part of e a c h  question asks you to ra te  
how you would like things to b e  if they w ere exactly w hat you ho p ed  for (your ideal). 
As before, put a  circle around the  one num ber which shows w hat you feel.
Never Som etim es Always
1 a) Can you trust, talk to frankly, and
share your feelings with your partner? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2a) Can you lean on an d  turn to your 
partner in times of difficulty? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3a) Does he/she give you practical help? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4a) Can you spend time with him/her
socially? 1 2  3 4
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2  3 4
5. VIEWS ABOUT YOURSELF
Please enter the number of the response that is I
closest to how you currently feel about yourself I
regarding each of the following statements. I
1 1 feel that I am  a  person of worth, at least on an equal 
plane with o th e r s  ___ _______________________
2 I feel that I have a  num ber of good qualities _  ____
3 All in all, I am  inclined to feel that I am  a failure-------
4 I am  able to  do  things as well as most other p e o p le ____
5 I feel I do not have m uch to be  proud o f _____________
6 I take a  positive attitude towards myself _____________
7 On the whole, I am  satisfied with m y s e lf______________
8 I wish I could have more respect for m y s e lf ___________
9 I certainly feel useless a t tim es____________ __________
10 At times I think I am  no good a t a l l ___________________
5 6 7
5 6 7
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Please read each Hem and place a  firm tick in the box opposite the reply which 
comes closest to how you have been feeling IN THE PAST WEEK. 
Don’t fake too long over your replies: your immediate reaction to each item will 
probably be more accurate than a long thought-out response. 
TICK ONLY ONE BOX IN EACH SECTION
I fee! tense or wound up:
□  Most of the time
□  A lot of the time
□  From time to time, occasionally
□  Not at all
I still enjoy the things 1 used to enjoy:
□  Definitely as much
□  Not quite as much
□  Only a little
□  Hardly at all
I get a sort of frightened feeling, as if 
something awful is about to happen:
□  Very definitely and quite badly
□  Yes, but not too badly
□  A little, but it doesn't worry me
□  Not at all
I can laugh and see the funny side of things:
□  As much as I always could
□  Not quite so much now
□  Definitely not so much now
□  Not at all
Worrying thoughts go through my mind:
□  A great deal of the time
□  A lot of the time
□  From time to time but not too often
□  Only occasionally
I feel cheerful:
□  Not at all
□  Not often
□  Sometimes
□  Most of the time
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed:
□  Definitely
□  Usually
□  Not often
□  Not at all
I feel as if I am slowed down:
□  Nearly all the time
□  Very often
□  Sometimes
□  Not at all
I get a sort of frightened feeling like 
'butterflies' in the stomach:
□  Not at ail
□  Occasionally
□  Quite often
□  Very often
1 have lost interest in my appearance:
□  Definitely
□  1 don’t care so much as I should
□  I may not take quite as much care
□  I take just as much care as ever
I feel restless as if I have to be on the move:
□  Very much indeed
□  Quite a lot
□  Not very much
□  Not at all
I look forward with enjoyment to things:
□  As much as I ever did
□  Rather less than I used to
□  Definitely less than I used to
□  Hardly at all
I get sudden feelings of panic:
□  Very often indeed
□  Quite often
□  Not very often
□  Not at all
I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV 
programme:
□  Often
□  Sometimes
□  Not often
□  Very seldom
Please check that you have answered ALL the questions
Thank you again very much for vour help with this research
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This form is for the partner 
of the patient
Research Questionnaire
Thank you so much for agreeing to take part in this research. A s a 
result o f  your help w e hope that this research w ill lead to other people 
receiving better care in the future. 
Please complete e v e r y  item in this questionnaire. Read carefully the 
instructions for each section and, after you have finished, check that all 
questions have been answered.
Please find somewhere on your own to complete the questionnaire.
A s soon as you have finished, seal it in one o f  the envelopes provided and 
try to post it within 3 days o f  die day you received it.
PRE
IMPORTANT
For this research to be successful, it is extremely important that you complete 
all the questions on vour own. In other words, without anyone helping you or
influencing what you write.
Please do not help, or receive help from, vour partner.
Remember: the term “your partner” in this questionnaire refers to the person
you are married to, or living with.
Some of the questions may seem quite personal but please try to be as honest 
as you can possibly be. Remember hat your answers will be kept entirely 
confidential and, as you can see, this form contains a code (i.e. not your name) 
which only the researcher understands.
Your details will not be revealed to anyone else.
Thank you again very much for helping with this research.
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1. D em ographic questions (Please answer ALL the questions)
1. Are you the patient | | or the partner of the patient | | (tick one box)
2. Are you Male | | or Female EH (tick one box)
3. Please state your a g e
4. If you have children, please state 
their sex and  a g e
(for example: girl o f 21
boy o f 18, etc.)
5. Please circle any children currently living with you a t hom e
6. How m any years have you been 
living with your partner? years
7. Are you married | | or “living together” EH (tick one box)
8. Have you been  previously married (or in an equivalent longterm relationship)? YES EH) NO EH
9. Who is the major w age  earner in your present relationship? Me EH My Partner EH
10. What is the occupation of the major w age earner?
11. (a) Are you currently in work Full-time EH I don ’t work [~|
(even if you have had  to stop Part-time EH Unemployed EH (tick one box)
recently d ue  to the illness) Voluntary work EH Retired EH
(b) If you are in work, have you had to reduce 
the am ount you work because of the illness?
12. At what a g e  did you leave full-time education?
YES □  NO □
13. At w hat point did your education finish? During:
Secondary school EH ^  f , ,
Coilege/technical college EH  ^0 one
University/Polytechnic EH
14. Have you ever received any psychiatric or psychological treatm ent? YES EH NO EH 
If so, please briefly state  what the treatm ent was ton
15. Are you currently receiving any medication for
anxiety [HI none EH (tick whichever boxes apply)
depression EH
other psychiatric condition EH ..................... ...............................................
16. Are you currently receiving any formal support YF~ i—i NO r—,
(e.g. counselling, therapist, self-help group) ? — *—*
If so, please specify
- 1  -
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17. Looking back on your life, have you had to cope with any of the following?
(a) A brother, sister, parent or child of yours being diagnosed
with cancer?  YESD N O D
If yes, please specify, with year & illness
(b) Receiving a  diagnosis of cancer yourself? YES EH NO EH
If yes, please specify year & diagnosis
(c) Receiving the diagnosis of a  potentially life-threatening p„ n  , _ ,—.
disease yourself? YESU N O U
If yes, please specify year & diagnosis
(d) A period of more than one month when you have been  YF<,  r—1 K i n  r—,
seriously ill? Ytb U
If yes, please specify year & diagnosis
(e) A period of more than two weeks when you single-
handedly had  to look after som eone else who was ill or yES E l NO ("I 
very dependent?
If yes, fo r how long?
(f) A period of more than two weeks when you were
separated  from both your parents before you were four YES EH NO E l
years old?
(g) A period of depression which interfered with your life
(whether or not you were given treatm ent for it) YES [_] NO |—|
(h) A period of stress or anxiety which interfered with your life _
(whether or not you w ere given treatm ent for it) YES [_| NO |_J
18. Have you had any other major stresses to c o p e  with over the
past six months? YES Q  n o  EH
If yes, please specify
19. When you are completely honest with yourself, who has been  vour most 
important* source of support since you learned of your partner’s cancer?
My partner EH My daughter EH My sister EH
3k (Tick one
My mother Q  My son EH A male friend EH box only)
My father EH My brother EH A fem ale friend EH
Other \please specify
relationship to you) ^ ..............................................$ex °f person: .....................
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20. How did your partner react to the news of the cancer?
How did you think the illness or treatment has affected him or her?
21. How stressful do  you think it has been for your partner to find out about the 
cancer?
0 Not a t all stressful
1 Slightly stressful
2 Moderately stressful
3 Very stressful
4 Extremely stressful
(lick one box only)
22. Since the illness, has your relationship with your partner changed  at all? Overall, 
would you say it has got better, worse, or hasn’t changed?
A lot worse 
A bit worse 
Hasn’t changed  
A bit better 
A lot better
1
2
3
4
5
In w hat way?
23. How supportive do you feel your partner has been  to you 
since the illness was diagnosed?
(lick one box only)
0 Not a t all
1 Slightly supportive
2 Moderately supportive
3 Very supportive
4 Extremely supportive
(Tick one box only)
- 3
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24. How critical towards you has your partner been since the illness?
0 Not a t all
(Tick one box only)
Slightly critical 
Moderately critical 
Very critical 
Extremely critical
25. How withdrawn from you has your partner been since the illness? 
0 Not a t all
Slightly withdrawn 
Moderately withdrawn 
Very withdrawn 
Extremely withdrawn
1
2
3
4
(lick  one box only)
26. The dots on the  following line represent different degrees of happiness in your 
relationship with your partner. The middle point “happy” , represents the 
d eg ree  of happiness of most relationships. Please circle the dot which best 
describes the deg ree  of happiness, all things considered, of your relationship.
Extremely Fairly A little 
Unhappy Unhappy Unhappy
Happy Very
Happy
Extremely
Happy
Perfect
27. Please write the  appropriate number 
beside each  question below according 
to this scale:
a . How often do  you and  your partner quarrel?
b. How often do  you and  your partner “get on each  other’s 
nerves”
c. How often do  you discuss or have you considered 
divorce, separation, or terminating your relationship?
d. Do you ever regret that you married/lived together/had 
a  relationship?
e. In general, how often do  you think that things betw een 
you and  your partner are  going well?
- 4  -
Please complete 
every question
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3. PROBLEMS AND COMPLAINTS
Below is a  list of problems and  complaints that people sometimes have.
For e a c h  item, select one of the numbers that best describes HOW MUCH DISCOMFORT 
THAT PROBLEM CAUSED YOU DURING THE PAST MONTH. Write one num ber in the sp ace  
to the  right of e ac h  problem.
The numbers refer to these phrases:
HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY:
1. Nervousness or shakiness 
inside
2. Loss of sexual interest or 
pleasure
3. Feeling easily annoyed 
or irritated
4. Feeling low in energy or 
slowed down
5. Thoughts of ending your 
life
6. Trembling
7. Crying easily
8. Feelings of being 
trapped or caught
9. Suddenly scared for no 
reason
10. Temper outbursts that 
you could not control
11. Blaming yourself for 
things
12. Feeling lonely
13. Feeling down
14. Worrying too much 
about things
15. Feeling no interest in 
things
BI
m mH
Please complete 
every question
16. Feeling fearful
17. Heart pounding or racing
18. Feeling hopeless about the 
future
19. Feeling tense or keyed up
20. Having urges to beat, injure or 
harm som eone
21. Having urges to break or 
smash things
22. Feeling everything is an effort
23. Spells of terror or panic
24. Getting into frequent 
arguments
25. Feeling so restless you 
couldn’t sit still
26. Feelings of worthlessness
27. The feeling that something 
bad  is going to happen to 
you.
28. Shouting or throwing things
29. Thoughts and images of a  
frightening nature
- 5 -
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4. YOUR RELATIONSHIP
Please answer each  question below by circling the number which best represents 
vour feelings about vour partner. The second part of each question asks you to rate 
how you would like things to be  if they were exactly what you hoped for (your ideal). 
As before, put a  circle around the one number which shows what you feel.
1 a) Can you trust, talk to frankly, and 
share your feelings with your partner?
b) What rating would your ideal be?
Never Som etim es Always
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2a) Can you lean on and turn to your 
partner in times of difficulty?
b) What rating would your ideal be?
3a) Does he/she give you practical help?
b) What rating would your ideal be?
2
2
2
2
4a) Can you spend time with him/her 
socially? 2
2b) What rating would your ideal be?
5. VIEWS ABOUT YOURSELF
Please enter the number of the response that is 
closest to how you currently feel about yourself 
regarding each of the following statements.
1 I feel that I am  a  person of worth, a t least on an equal 
p lane with o th e r s  ,________________________
2 I feel that I have a  number of good q u a litie s__________
3 All in all, I am  inclined to feel that I am  a  failure------------
4 la m  ab le  to do  things as well as most other p e o p le ____
5 I feel I d o  not have much to be  proud o f _____________
6 I take a  positive attitude towards myself _____________
7 On the whole, I am  satisfied with myself #______________
8 I wish I could have more respect for m y s e lf___________
9 I certainly feel useless at tim es_______________________
10 At times I think I am  no good at a l l ___________________
5
5
6
6
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Please read each item and place a  firm tick in the box opposite the reply which 
comes closest to how you have been feeling IN THE PAST WEEK. 
Don't take too long over your replies: your immediate reaction to each item will 
probably be more accurate than a long thought-out response. 
TICK ONLY ONE BOX IN EACH SECTION
I feel tense  or wound up:
□  Most of the time
□  A lot of the time
□  From time to time, occasionally
□  Not at all
I still enjoy the things 1 used to enjoy:
□  Definitely as much
□  Not quite as much
□  Only a little
□  Hardly at all
I get a so rt of frightened feeling, as if 
something awful is about to happen:
□  Very definitely and quite badly
□  Yes, but not too badly
□  A little, but it doesn't worry me
□  Not at all
I can laugh and see the funny side of things:
□  As much as I always could
□  Not quite so much now
□  Definitely not so much now
□  Not at all
Worrying thoughts go through my mind:
□  A great deal of the time
□  A lot of the time
□  From time to time but not too often
□  Only occasionally
I feel cheerful:
□  Not at all
□  Not often
□  Sometimes
□  Most of the time
I can sit a t ease and feel relaxed:
□  Definitely
□  Usually
□  Not often
□  Not at all
1 feel as if I am slowed down:
□  Nearly all the time
□  Very often
□  Sometimes
□  Not at all
I get a sort of frightened feeling like 
'butterflies' in the stomach:
□  Not at all
□  Occasionally
□  Quite often
□  Very often
I have lost interest in my appearance:
□  Definitely
□  I dont care so much as I should
□  I may not take quite as much care
□  I take just as much care as ever
I feel restless as if I have to be on the move:
□  Very much indeed
□  Quite a lot
□  Not very much
□  Not at all
I look forward with enjoyment to things:
□  As much as I ever did
□  Rather less than I used to
□  Definitely less than I used to
□  Hardly at all
I get sudden feelings of panic:
□  Very often indeed
□  Quite often
□  Not very often
□  Not at all
I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV 
programme:
□  Often
□  Sometimes
□  Not often
□  Very seldom
Please check that you have answered all the questions
Thank you again very much for vour help with this research
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Please complete this entirely on your own
Facing it Together
Code:
This v ideo  is co n c e rn e d  with th e  problem s of giving support within a  
relationship w hen o n e  partner has c a n c e r .
(For each question below, look at both extremes and mark the line 
with an X  a t the poin t which best reflects what you fee l)
1 How important do you feel this theme is in general?
Not at all _______________________________________________  Extremely
important important
2 How relevant do you feel this theme is to your relationship with your 
partner?
Not at all -----------------------------------------------------------------------  Extremely
relevant important
4 How relevant to your relationship do you imagine your partner found the 
video?
Not at all _______________________________________________  Extremely
relevant relevant
5 How helpful to you would it be if both you and your partner could follow the 
advice in this video completely ?
Not at all ___________________________________________________  Bdremety
helpful he|Pful
6 How supportive towards your partner do you feel you have been since the 
diagnosis?
Not at all _______________________________________________  Extremely
supportive supportive
7 What barriers or obstacles, if any, do you see preventing you and your 
partner following the advice in this video?
8 Are there any other comments you would like to make about this video?
Thank you again for your kind help with this research
~ 249 ~
Note: This questionnaire should be completed last
THE VIDEO
Code:
1. How many times did you watch the video?
2. Of these times, how many times did you watch the video with your partner?
3. Do you believe that the video caused you both to talk together more? YES □  NO □
Comments:
4. Do you believe that watching the video led you to support your partner more? YES EH NO I I
5. Do you believe that watching the video led your partner to support you more? YES EH NO ED
6. Looking back, do you feel that the video was helpful to your relationship? YES EH NO [El
In the following questions, look at both extremes and mark anywhere along the 
line with an X, but at the point which best reflects what you feel
7. How helpful did you find the advice in the video? 
Not at all helpful ________________________ Extremely
helpful
8. How helpful was it hearing the experiences of the patients on the video?
Not at all helpful ___________________________________________________  Extremely
helpful
9. How helpful was it hearing the advice of the “professional expert”? 
Not at all helpful ______________________________________ Extremely
helpful
10. How helpful was the leaflet that accompanied the video? 
Not at all helpful ______________________________ Extremely
helpful
11. Can you suggest anything that might improve the video?
12. Do you believe that a video like this should be given to other couples when one of them has 
cancer?
13. Are there any other comments you wish to make? (please continue on reverse i f  necessary)
- 2 5 0 -
Appendix E: Leaflet— “Facing it together”
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Abstract•
Nineteen hospitalized schizophrenics were divided into 
paranoid and nonparanoid groups on the basis of their scores 
on two instruments designed to measure this distinction.
These patients were compared with a group of ten normals as 
to their tendency to make illusory correlations, a phenomenon 
in which subjects perceive a degree of order in an ambiguous 
sequence of data. It was hypothesized that paranoid schizo­
phrenics would make stronger illusory correlations than 
normals because of the predominance of their schemata when 
processing information. It was further hypothesized that 
nonparanoids would make weaker correlations than normals 
because of their impaired ability to establish conceptual 
categories with which to organize incoming information.
Of the three methods of allocation used to divide patients 
into paranoid and nonparanoid groups on the basis of their 
paranoid-nonparanoid scores, only one produced any notable 
differences between groups. These differences, while 
failing to attain statistical significance, were in accord­
ance with the hypotheses. Of the four tasks administered, 
the paranoid group made particularly strong illusory 
correlations on the one which included stimuli of relevance 
to individuals with paranoid delusions. The results were 
discussed with reference to the problems of assessing the 
paranoid-nonparanoid distinction, the study's methodological 
shortcomings, and the clinical relevance of the findings.
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DA. 1. INTRODUCTION
While thought disorder has long "been regarded as a 
primary feature of schizophrenia, it is nonetheless worth­
while asking what relevance the study of cognitive im­
pairment has for a "better understanding of schizophrenia 
(c.f. Cromwell, 1978). The clinical symptoms of schizo­
phrenia have been elusive and fluctuating, and their 
prognostic significance disappointing. One may well 
question whether the concepts of attention and information 
processing offer a more promising approach. Some, at;least, 
believe that "to explain schizophrenia, perhaps these more 
subtle, more tolerable but probably more stable, mani­
festations are more important than the variably expressed 
incursive symptoms that jar the tolerance of most people 
on earth" (Cromwell, 1978, p.220).
Cromwell (1978) identifies five distinct aims of 
cognitive research into schizophrenia. Firstly, there is 
the attempt to specify a single or'pattern of cognitive 
dysfunction from which the various symptoms resulting in 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia might be derived. Secondly 
there is the attempt to find different cognitive abnorm­
alities among different subgroups of schizophrenic patients. 
Thirdly, cognitive measures have been widely used in long- 
ditudinal studies of high-risk children in an attempt to 
identify factors which might predict later psychiatric 
breakdown. Fourthly there has been the study of vulnerability 
factors across the lifespan of the single individual rather 
than across the disturbed individual and his relatives.
These indices would occur prior to, during and after 
becoming schizophrenic. Finally, cognitive variables 
have been used to track the course of change in response 
to treatment.
We shall be examining some of the research des­
cribed under the first two of these aims and begin by a 
short and selective historical review of the cognitive 
approach to schizophrenia.
2. COGNITIVE ABNORMALITY IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
(a) Early Work
It was not until Emil Kraeplin*s famous textbook 
Psvchiatrie, Ein Lehrbuch fur studirende und arzte. published 
in six editions between I883 and 1 9 2 7* that an internation­
ally accepted nosology of psychiatry emerged. In it 
Kraeplin elevated the purely descriptive term "dementia 
praecox" to the status of a mental disease, of unknown 
origin but with specific symptoms and a predictable course. 
Kraeplin*s description of the early symptoms of dementia 
praecox emphasized a particular pattern of psychological 
deficits (Crider, 1979)* Patients showed poor ability to 
focus attention and were often distracted by momentary or 
accidental stimuli. Thought processes showed incoherence 
and looseness;:in mild cases this appeared as rapid 
transitions from one thought to another without any logical 
bridge while in more severe cases it appeared as almost 
total incoherence of speech; In addition, patients 
tended to show poor judgement, delusional beliefs, blunting 
of affect and a deterioration in self-care.
Kraeplin* s view of dementia praecox as an apparent 
dementia occurring before old age and with no associated 
brain impairment was soon overshadowed by Bleuler*s 1911 
concept of schizophrenia. While Kraeplin attempted tp iso­
late various forms of the disorder on the basis of symptom 
clusters, or syndromes, Bleuler was the first to attempt * to 
specify a single underlying defect which could account for 
all symptoms of the, disorder: "The disease is characterized 
by a specific type of alteration of thinking, feeling 
and relation to the external world which appears nowhere 
else in this particular fashion”. (Bleuler 1950, p.9)*
In coining the term schizophrenia (split-mind) Bleuler 
was suggesting therefore that the disconnectedness or 
fragmentation of thought, feeling and interpersonal inter­
action is the essence of the disorder. Thus, one of the 
fundamental symptoms of schizophrenia described by Bleuler, 
which have come to be known as his "four A's", is the dis­
ruption of the associative processes whereby the 
connections between ideas enable normals to organize and 
interrelate many single thoughts and exclude irrelevant 
thoughts (Hemsley, Note l).
Bleuler also made the important distinction between 
primary and secordary schizophrenic symptoms. Be defined 
primary symptoms as direct manifestations of the underlying 
organic disease, such as the disturbance of association, 
whereas secondary symptoms represented adjustments or 
attempts at adaptation to the primary disturbance. 'This view 
of symptoms as adjustment responses to the primary cognitive 
impairment can be seen in the work of more recent investiga­
tors (e.g. Hemsley, 1 9 7 7) and will be considered below.
Since Bleuler, other clinicians have suggested alter­
native concepts as constituting the primary cognitive dist­
urbance in schizophrenia. Perhaps most notable among these 
was the term "overinclusion" which Cameron (1939) used to 
describe schizophrenic patients* frequent inability to 
limit their attention to the relevant stimuli of a task, 
and their tendency to "overinclude" irrelevant stimuli in, 
for example, object sorting tasks.
Such formulations led to attempts to isolate specific 
performance deficits peculiar to schizophrenia, a psycho­
logical deficit being defined by Hunt and Cofer (19^) aa 
the decrement in performance or the loss of efficiency 
shown by psychiatric patients relative to normals on 
intellectual and laboratory tasks. However the early re­
search on cognitive deficits lacked an adequate model of 
normal cognitive functioning and the tasks used tended to 
be ambiguous in terms of the particular cognitive functions 
being tapped.
(b) The Information Processing Approach.
In the last few years information processing theory has 
become the dominant research paradigm for studying adult 
cognitive processes. Having its origins in normal psycho­
logy, the information processing model offers a more 
explicit relationship between task performance and inferred 
cognitive function. The major assumption of this approach 
is that perceptual and cognitive activities can be 
represented as a series of transformations of information, 
and thus the aim of this approach is to clarify the 
specific operations that occur between stimulus and response, 
and to describe the nature and limits of these processes 
(Hemsley, Note 1).
Since these stages of processing are not directly observable 
their existence must be inferred from performance on a 
number of tasks and by using a procedure of converging 
operations. More recent studies of schizophrenics' 
cognitive impairment are thus tending to employ the 
design of manipulating a single variable with the object 
of increasing the load on a particular stage of processing.
If no differential effect on reaction time is found 
between a schizophrenic and a control group it is argued 
that the particular stage is not implicated in schizo­
phrenic cognitive impairment.
In 1958 Broadbent proposed a model of information 
processing whereby a hypothetical filter mechanism was 
presumed to screen irrelevant stimuli from a limited 
capacity decision channel. The filter was seen to act in an 
all or none fashion on the basis of the physical attributes 
of classes of stimuli. This model resulted in two views 
as to the nature of cognitive disturbance in schizophrenia.
The first proposed that schizophrenics possess a defective 
filter mechanism (McGhie and Chapman, 1 9 6 1; Neale and 
Cromwell, 1970) while the second maintained that schizo­
phrenics are slow in processing information (Yates, 196 6 ).
While these two approaches to schizophrenic cognitive 
impairment generated much research it soon became apparent 
that Broadbent's (1958) model required modification. His 
more recent model (Broadbent, 1971* 1977)* building upon 
Treisman's (i9 6 0) earlier theory, emphasizes the probabilistic 
aspects of information processing. The limited capacity 
decision channel is seen to receive "evidence", not 
determinate information. The stimulus is the first of 
three variable states which occur at points along the 
information processing continuum. This simply refers to 
the state of the environment which actually occurs on a 
given occasion. The evidence, the second variable state, is 
what actually results from the stimulus and is defined as 
the particular input to the limited capacity channel. 
"Filtering" is seen as the process which determines the 
nature of the evidence resulting from a stimulus, and, like 
Treisman's concept of attenuation, is not an all-or-none 
activity; evidence from other sources only receives less
weight. Filtering causes the evidence to depend to an in­
creased extent on those stimulus events which have some 
physical feature in common.
The third variable in Broadbent*s 1971 model is 
described as "category state". Category states are the 
channel outputs which result from the input of particular 
pieces of information. "Pigeon-holing is the term coined 
by Broadbent to refer to the process whereby category states 
result from evidence. This corresponds to a change in 
response bias or the operation of a response set. Thus 
pigeon-holing increases the chances of one category state 
occurring rather than another when it is preceded by a 
larger class of evidence. Thus, listening for particular 
words, regardless of their source would involve the process 
of pigeon-holing.
This concept of pigeon-holing represented an important 
shift in the meaning or location of the mechanism of atten­
tion moving it further into the conceptual processes 
(Magaro, I9 8O). More recent theories, to be discussed 
below take this shift even further and consider attention to 
be a circular flow between percept and concept."Categorizing" 
is the process by which the nervous system adjusts so as 
to allocate certain category states to certian stimulus 
events. "Typically any of several different stimulus 
events will elicit any one category state. This may happen 
because some stimulus features will be treated as irrelev­
ant, both red and green squares eliciting the response 
’tequare". It may also happen because two or more different 
combinations of features are allocated to the same 
category; as when tall broad men and short slender ones may 
both qualify as 'Veil proportioned" although the other 
combinations would not. Thus categorizing involves both 
input and output selection" (Broadbent, 1971 p.xi).
In a review of schizophrenics* disturbances of select­
ive attention within Broadbent*s 1971 model, Hemsley (1975) 
suggested that defective filtering should act to reduce the 
discrepancy of performance on a short term memory task 
between the condition of pre-instruction as to the 
relevant material and that of post-instruction, provided 
that a clear physical cue separates the relevant and 
irrelevant items. Normal subjects show a clear advantage
of pre-instruction (stimulus set) on such tasks 
(Broadbent, 1970). Hemsley and Zawada (1976) however 
showed that while normals showed a significantly greater 
improvement with pre-instruction than the schizophrenic 
or depressed groups, the psychotic groups did not differ.
The authors suggested that the filter defect may hot be 
specific to schizophrenia but. may be more closely related 
to a severity of illness dimension "not important causally 
in many of the behavioural abnormalities seen in schizo­
phrenia" (Hemsley and Zawada, 1976, p.460).
While there is little evidence of a disturbance of 
pigeon-holing in schizophrenia in the literature, Hemsley 
and Hichardson (1980) devised a study which required subjects 
to shadow one of two simultaneously presented prose passages. 
The messages were indistinguishable on the basis of physical 
cues and therefore allowed no possibility for the operation 
of the filter mechanism. Since successful performance 
required subjects to use contextual variables in determining 
selection of the appropriate response, it thus depended 
upon the pigeon-holing mechanism whereby category state 
threshholds may be raised or lowered according to the nature 
of -the evidence derived from the preceding context. 
Schizophrenics,: depressives and normals, matched for 
verbal Intelligence Quotient and shadowing ability without 
distraction, were tested using two rates of presentation 
(60 w.p.m. and 100 w.p.m.). Results showed that schizo­
phrenics performed significantly worse than both other 
groups,a finding consistent with a defect at the pigeon­
holing stage.
The pigeon-holing mechanism is considered to operate 
not solely within laboratory tasks aimed at assessing 
selectivity but across all areas of cognitive functioning.
"In its role as a bias towards certain categories of 
responses in real life situations, rather than those biases 
imposed by task instructions, it may be viewed as a way 
of making use of the redundancy and patterning in 
environmental input to reduce information processing 
demands” (Hemsley, Note l). As Broadbent (1977) observed, 
this kind of attention "selects some of the possible inter­
pretations that a man may hold about the world and eliminates
others as candidates for use in the particular situation"
(p.110). Thus when a stimulus is expected the attentional 
biases will act to improve performance though when the 
stimulus is unexpected the normal biases may serve to impair 
performance.
While Broadbent's (1971) model has generated research 
aimed at locating the source of cognitive abnormalities 
in schizophrenia (i.e. a defect at the filtering or pigeon­
holing stages), other work has looked at the strategies of 
adaptation that the schizophrenic may employ to cope 
with these abnormalities. For example, Hemsley (1977) has 
suggested several methods- of adjustment that the schizo­
phrenic may make to a state of "information overload” 
caused by a defective filter mechanism and/or slowness in 
response selection. One such method is that of "omissions" 
whereby category state thresholds are raised generally 
and indiscriminately, seen clinically as underresponsiveness. 
Another strategy of adaptation proposed by Hemsley (1977) 
is "approximation" in which a number of stimuli receive the 
same response rather than each receiving a differential 
response.
According to the Broadbent model there are two ways 
in which such a reduction in the number of response 
alternatives may occur. In the first the learned use of 
simplified categories may result in the application of a 
simple global category to different stimulus events. For 
example, a square, rectangle and trapezium all may be 
categorized more simply as four-sided shapes. This would 
therefore constitute a problem at the categorizing stage. 
Alternatively however the problem may be occurring in the 
more rapid process of pigeon-holing. In this case the 
individual raises the category state thresholds to certain 
stimuli to such an extent that the individual fails to 
respond to them altogether. As yet it is not clear which 
or whether both of these processes may be operative in 
approximation.
According to Hemsley (1977)» the approximation mechanism 
of adaptation may be useful to our understanding of 
delusional systems. One example of schizophrenics 
approximation or simplified categorizing can be seen
in an experiment by Koh and Shears (197°) in which 
schizophrenics and normal subjects were compared on their 
preferences for musical excerpts, using both category 
ratings and magnitude estimations. Schizophrenics showed 
less consistent music preferences, but more interestingly 
they also reduced the number of response alternatives 
employed. The patients tended to be constricted or 
stereotyped in their preferences indicating that the 
patients used wider categories, employing fewer of them 
but using them more frequently than did normal subjects.
Such a finding is not inconsistent with the views of 
Magaro (1 9 8 0) whose approach will be discussed in a 
subsequent section.
Returning to Cromwell’s (1978) views on the aims 
of studying cognitive abnormalities in schizophrenia, 
we are reminded of the long-held observation that 
undifferentiated schizophrenic groups have high inter­
subject, as well as intrasubject variability on most 
measures. However, by identifying discrete subgroups 
wiihin schizophrenia the variability would be less 
within subgroups. In addition should a subgroup be found 
which differs significantly in one direction while 
another subgroup differs significantly in the opposite 
direction from a*normal control group this would represent a 
theoretically provocative finding. One would then be left 
to determine whether the index for grouping ifi identi­
fying different disorders or different cognitive styles 
which may be manifest in a single pathological state.
3 . THE PARANOID - NONPARANOID DISTINCTION IN PSYCHIATRY.
Kraeplin (1919) was explicit about distinguishing 
the paranoid from other forms of dementia praecox. He
noted that paranoia was a primary disease of the 
intellect which had the secondary phenomena of delusions. 
The main characteristic of the paranoid was ”the 
insidious development of a permanent and unshakable 
delusional system resulting from internal causes accom­
panied by a perfect presentation of clear thinking, willing 
and acting” (Kraeplin, 1976, P* 212 - 213). However 
while Kraeplin, and later Bleuler, accepted the possibility 
of a separate condition called paranoia, neither considered 
it a separate category from the nonparanoid types. The 
World Health Organization's International Classification 
of Diseases manual (1 9 7 8), however distinguishes between 
schizophrenia of the paranoid type, simple paranoid state 
and paranoia:
2 9 5 .3 Schizophrenia, Paranoid type.
The form of schizophrenia in which relatively 
stable delusions, which may be accompanied by 
hallucinations, dominate the clinical picture.
The delusions are frequently of persecution 
but may take other forms, (for example of 
jealousy, exalted birth. Messianic mission, or 
bodily change). Hallucinations and erratic^ 
behaviour may occur; in some cases conduct is 
seriously disturbed from the outset, thought 
disorder may be gross, and affective flattening 
with fragmentary delusions and hallucinations may 
develop.
297*0 Paranoid state, simple.
A psychosis, acute or chronic, not classifiable 
as schizophrenia or affective psychosis, in which 
delusions, especially of being influenced, 
persecuted or treated in some special way, are 
the main symptoms. The delusions are of a fairly 
fixed, elaborate and systematized kind.
2 9 7.I Paranoia.
A rare chronic psychosis in which logically 
constructed systematized delusions have developed 
gradually without concomitant hallucinations 
or the schizophrenic type of disordered thinking.
The delusions are mostly of grandeur (the paranoiac 
prophet or inventor), persecution or somatic 
abnormality.
Prior to 1950 researchers typically reported 
results for schizophrenia as a whole. More recently 
the paranoid - nonparanoid distinction has been in­
creasingly employed as the need for more homogenous 
groups of sohizophrenics has emerged. A subtle change 
is the use of schizophrenic and paranoid diagnostic 
labels is also evident in hospital diagnoses, probably 
occurring without awareness of the empirical results 
supporting the distinction (Magaro, 1980). American 
hospital diagnoses of schizophrenia presently tend to 
include labels of paranoid or undifferentiated rather than 
the previous labels of catatonic, hebephrenic or simple. 
Hence both in clinical research and practice there .has 
been a gradual movement towards the dichotomy of 
paranoid and nonparanoid within the general label 
schizophrenia.
Venables and O'Connor (1959) attempted to define 
these categories empirically and on the basis of studying 
one hundred male chronic schizophrenics they produced 
a scale of four items designed to identify patients 
exhibiting paranoid symptons. These are:
(1). Does he tend to suspect or to believe" on 
slight evidence or without good reason* that 
people and external forces are trying to or 
now do influence his behaviour and control his 
thinking?
(2). Does he tend to suspect or to believe on 
slight evidence or without good reason that 
some people talk about, refer to or watch him?
(3)* Does he tend to suspect or to believe on 
slight evidence or without good reason that some 
people are against him (persecuting, conspiring, 
cheating, depriving, punishing) in various ways?
(4). Does he have an exaggeratedly high opinion of 
himself or an unjustified belief or conviction
of having unusual ability, knowledge, power, 
wealth or status?
(from Venables and O'Connor, 1959» P* 817 -819)
As Berkowitz (1981) points out, however, in the past 
twenty years this scale has rarely been used.
Zigler, Levine and Zigler (1 9 7 6) observe that
"within the clinical folklore that has accompanied this 
descriptive tradition, there has been the view that the 
paranoid schizophrenic is a less disorganized and patho­
logical form than are the other types of schizophrenia"
(p.109). Goldberg, Schooler and Matteson (1 9 6 8) suggest 
that paranoid symptoms are also more amenable to 
treatment. Strauss (197*0 found that paranoid schizo­
phrenics had shorter and fewer hospital admissions than 
nonparanoid patients. Evans, Goldstein and Rodnick (1973) 
however found that paranoid patients returned to hospital 
significantly more often than nonparanoids in the six 
months after discharge though the relationship was not 
observed during the second six months.
The literature on the premorbid personality criterion 
for distinguishing between paranoid and nonparanoid 
patients has been reviewed by Cromwell (1975) sncl Houlihan
(1975)* Although there has been no consistent association 
between premorbid personality and paranoid and nonparanoid 
groups (Berkowitz, 1981), Goldstein, Held and Cromwell 
(1 9 6 8) found that while good premorbids could be either 
paranoid or nonparanoid, poor premorbids were always 
nonparanoid. Furthermore, Houlihan (1975) maintains that 
in general the results suggest that paranoid schizophrenic 
patients are less impaired than nonparanoid. Tsuang,
Fowler, Cadoret and Monelly (197*0 found that, compared to 
paranoids, nonparanoid schizophrenics had an earlier age 
of onset, spent longer in hospital, and showed more thought 
disorder and catatonic traits.
In addition to the premorbid personality criterion, 
attention must be paid to the level of pathology as 
represented by the process-reactive dimension in any 
examination of the paranoid - nonparanoid distinction. A 
study by Heilbrun and Heilbrun (1977) shows how differences 
in the paranoid condition coincides with levels of pathology. 
Using a content analysis of delusions they compared reactive 
and process paranoid schizophrenics and fpund that the 
delusions of the reactives were more integrated > varied 
in content, actively orientated towards the environment 
and less autistic. In other words the reactive paranoid
showed better organization and greater articulation but 
the greater the pathology the more the paranoid resembled 
the disorganized thought process of the nonparanoid 
schizophrenic. Thus, ’not controlling for the level of 
pathology in selecting a sample of paranoids and (non­
paranoid) schizophrenics may tend to produce samples of 
integrated and nonintegrated patients which would obscure 
the differences between the two subgroups” (Magaro, 1 9 8 0, 
p.135).
Berkowitz (1981) points to some problems which she 
claims strike at the validity of the paranoid - nonparanoid 
distinction. Firstly she points out that there has been 
little consistency in the criteria used for placing patients 
in one or other category. Much of the research to date 
has used diagnoses based upon clinical judgement, thus 
making cross-study comparisons problematic. Secondly,
'there has been a "ragbag" approach to defining the non­
paranoid group. Some studies have used nonparanoid patients 
and some hebephrenics though it is far from clear that one 
may justifiably generalize from hebephrenics to all non­
paranoids. Berkowitz*s final criticism is that the clinical 
status of patients does not appear to be stable, that 
schizophrenic patients change from a paranoid to a non- 
paranoid diagnosis. Depue and Woodburn (1975) found that 
in chronic cases paranoid symptoms tend to disappear so that 
the diagnosis of the original sample of paranoid schizo­
phrenia is changed to nonparanoid by the time of the 
second hospital admission, about six years later.
With reference to this last criticism, Berkowitz is 
correct in suggesting that if clinical status does change, 
characteristics such as premorbid personality and outcome 
cannot be sensibly examined. However, iin as far as 
changes in schizophrenic symptoms reflect changes in 
methods of adaptation to prolonged high levels of inform­
ation overload (Hemsley, 1977)» the distinction may still 
be usefully related to cognitive abnormalities.
With reference to Berkowitz*s earlier points 
concerning the literature*s lack of a consistent method of 
categorizing schizophrenic patients into paranoid and non­
paranoid groups, it must be pointed out that reliable
and valid measures do exist. For example, the Maine 
Paranoid-Schizophrenic Hating Scale, initially develop­
ed by Vojtisek (1976), is an adaptation of the Venables 
and O’Connor (1959) scale (see above) and Overall and 
Gorham’s (1 9 6 2) brief psychiatric rating scale. It 
consists of a five-item scale for paranoia and another 
five-item scale for (nonparanoid) schizophrenia. Each 
item requires rating a single symptom on a five-point 
labelled scale. The ratings are summed for each scale 
to yield a score for paranoia and a score for schizophrenia. 
The Maine Scale, was examined in three separate studies 
using hospitalized :psychiatric^ patients in which adequate 
test-retest (paranoid : r = .8 9 ; nonparanoid : r = *7 3 » 
over four days, N = 26) and independent inter-rater 
reliability (agreement rate = 85 percent) was obtained 
(Magaro, Abrams and Cantrell, 1981).
In an examination (Magaro et al, ' 1981) of construct 
validity, high scores on the nonparanoid subscale were 
associated with external locus of control, poor perform­
ance on the Stanford-Binet Vocabulary, Expanded Similarities 
Embedded Figures Test, conceptual overinclusion, slow 
reaction time, deviant word associations, and poor recall 
of word associations. Scores on the paranoid scale did 
not correlate with any of these performance measures.
These same authors studied the concurrent validity of the 
Maine Scale and found the paranoid and nonparanoid 
subscales correlated significantly with the corresponding 
scales of the Symptom Rating Scale and the Symptom-Sign 
Inventory and other instruments, but was found to be better 
able to descriminate between paranoid and nonparanoid 
schizophrenics than any of these scales.
Another potentially useful instrument for assessing 
the paranoid - nonparanoid dimension is the Delusion 
Symptom-State Inventpry (DSSI) developed by Foulds and 
Bedford (Bedfordand Foulds, 1977)- The DSSI is a self- 
report version of the Symptom-Sign Inventory (SSI)
(Foulds and Hope, 1968) consisting of eighty four items 
using a true-false format. True statements are further 
subdivided into three categories describing the degree of
distress (e.g. a bit, a lot, unbearably) that the 
reported item causes the patient. The eighty-four 
items constitute four classes containing all twelve sets 
or clusters of symptoms, each set being composed of seven 
items. Within class 3» integrated psychosis, are three 
sets of items describing delusions of persecution (dP), 
delusions of grandeur (dG) and delusions of contrition (dC). 
These in turn refer to the putative clinical syndromes of 
paranoid disorder, mania and psychotic depression. Class 
4, non-integrated psychosis, contains only one set, delusions 
of disintegration (dD) and refers to schizophrenia.
Foulds' theory of psychiatric illness, upon which the 
DSSI is based, posits that the four classes of personal 
illness, a.re of a hierarchical nature, ranging from 
dysthymic states through neurotic symptoms, integrated 
delusions to the most severe, delusions of disintegration.
The .relationship between the classes is such that when a 
patient's membership of a class is established he will 
necessarily be a member of all classes lower in the hier­
archy. This model is therefore quite different from that 
employed in the Maine Scale since any patient with a score 
of four or more on the delusions of disintegration set is 
not only classified under the non-integrated psychosis 
class (schizophrenia) but, according to the model, also 
should have scored above the cut-off to be classified 
under-the integrated psychosis class. Membership in the 
schizophrenic group therefore should not preclude 
membership in the paranoid group. The other, more obvious 
difference between the scales is that the Maine Scale is 
completed by a psychiatrist on the basis of interview and 
case-notes while the DSSI is completed by the patient on 
the basis of his phenomenological experience. Despite 
these differences, the Maine Scale has been cross- 
validated with the corresponding scales of the SSI to 
yield significant correlations (Paranoid scales: r = .6 9 ; 
p <.001; Nonparanoid scales: r = .43, p< .01; N = 47)
(Magaro, Abrams and Cantrell, 1981), thus suggesting 
that the two scales may be reflecting similar • aspects 
of the dimension in question.
Validation studies of the DSSI have included an 
investigation (Bedford and Foulds, 1977) to ascertain 
what percentage of the allocation of 16 senior psychiatrists 
and 9 experienced psychologists would agree with the 
a priori allocation of items to the clinical syndromes.
It was found that for six (including dP and dD) of the 
twelve sets all seven items were allocated by a majority 
of judges to the expected syndrome, in another study 
(Bedford and Foulds, 1978)» raters, ranging from trainee 
psychiatrists to consultants rated 96 inpatients on a 
four-point scale from 0 (absent) to 3 (outstanding) for 
each particular syndrome. Results showed that a majority 
of judges allocated 82 out of the 84 items to the same 
sets as the authors had done. Moreover there was a sign­
ificant relationship between ratings and DSSI scores on the 
delusions of persecution (p < .0 1) and delusions of 
disintegration sets (p ^ .01)• Presumably because of its 
unusual theoretical basis .the DSSI has not been cross­
validated with other psychometric instruments and there 
are no data available on its test-retest reliability.
Being of unknown reliability its use as a measure of the 
paranoid - nonparanoid dimension is therefore limited for 
the present, though as a phenomenological counterpart it 
may be fruitfully employed in conjunction with the Maine 
Scale.
4. COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE PARANOID - NONPARANOID DIMENSION.
"In general, the essence of the cognitive 
aberration seems to be disorganization in 
the nonparanoid and hyperorganization in 
the paranoidV*.
(Magaro, 1980, p.142)
"The paranoid pattern of response may 
represent an over-reactive protection 
against the underlying pressure towards 
disorganization which characterizes the 
psychosis. The hebephrenic (nonparanoid) 
apparently gives way to these forces whereas 
the paranoid attempts to organize his resources 
to fight these disruptive trends".
(Shakow,-1971, P-309)
Summarizing psychodiagnostic research on conceptual 
performance, Lothrop (1 9 6 1) noted that paranoid schizo­
phrenics consistently have been found to display less 
conceptual impairment than nonparanoid schizophrenics. On 
the whole the paranoid’s conceptual capacity remains 
relatively intact.
Payne, Caird and Laverty (1964) found that paranoids 
tend to overinclude in their conceptualizations while others 
(Abrams, Tainter and Lhamon, 1 9 6 6) have noted that they 
tend to reach erroneous conclusions quickly rather than 
waiting for more information. More recent research also 
lends weight to the notion that the paranoid differs from 
the nonparanoid by attributing meaning according to rigid 
conceptual expectations. For example, Forgus and De Wolfe 
(197*0 found that paranoids, but not nonparanoids, tended 
to respond to the Logical Consequences Test with dominant 
concepts predicted from their delusions.
Basing his ideas on the information processing 
models of Neisser (1976) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), 
Magaro (1980) proposes a formulation which he claims is 
able to account for many of the differences between 
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics both clinically 
and on laboratory tasks. A somewhat simplified 
discussion of this model therefore will be presented.
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Figure 1. Simple information processing model
(from Magaro, 1980, p.158)
Figure 1 shows a simplified flow chart of the info­
rmation processing model used by Magaro (1980), As can 
be seen, the process begins with an external stimulus 
which creates an internal representation in the organism 
through an optical transformation. This "icon" lasts 
approximately one second in most experimental conditions, 
and is nothing more than a configuration of lines and 
colours of varying width, length and contrast.
There then follows two encoding processes which may 
operate sequentially or in a parallel either-or relation­
ship. In Neisser’s (19&7) model the two processes involved 
in the encoding of the icon are preattentive processing and 
focal attention. Preattentive processing separates the Iconic 
pattern into holistic parts, creating a figure from the 
field. The sequential focal-attention process acts upon 
this segment to begin the process of analysis of attributes 
in order to construct a percept from it. The two 
processes thus sequentially transform the image into 
attributes that can be categorized as an object. Keren
(1 9 7 6) has suggested that preattentive processing and 
focal attention are related to Broadbent's (1 9 7 1) pigeon­
holing concept. One factor influencing iconic processing 
is perceptual set which biases the Initial discrimination 
of information, giving preference to information of a 
particular perceptual character.
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) have proposed the 
terms automatic and controlled processing, terms which 
parallel preattentive processing and focal attention.
They note that through repeated practice a sequence of 
memory nodes are formed that become activated by particular 
stimuli without the necessity of active control by the 
individual. At this stage the processing is automatic 
In that an element in the stimulus activates a cogit, 
the basic unit for further conceptualization. Auto­
matic processing is "not limited by memory load or the 
number of distractors but only requires an initial 
discrimination of stimulus elements into sets that are 
practiced” (Magaro, 1980, p.1 6 3 ).
Controlled processing on the other hand is a 
sequential search operation which is limited by set 
size and memory load. Controlled processing, for example, 
is required in tasks which involve a serial comparison 
of a list of words in order to find a match. The subject 
attends to and controls the process, making extensive 
use of short-term memory storage to consider all matching 
possibilities. Automatic and controlled processing thus 
act in different types of situations depending upon 
past experiences and the degree of the categorization 
of the items searched.
The difference between the Neisser and Schneider 
and Shiffrin terms is whether one assumes segmenting is 
followed by a scrutiny of the segment, or whether the 
two processes are in parallel, that is, situation 
specific. Magaro attempts to resolve this difference by 
suggesting that preattentive processing Itself involves 
prior experience because in order to separate the figure 
from the field one must have had previous experience of 
the figure.
The stage of processing following encoding is that 
of short term memory (figure 1). The encoding processes 
have acted upon the icon yielding a set of attributes. 
"Immediate memory is a short-term memory associational 
linkage, which provides the conceptual categories for 
translating attributes into recognizable forms (i.e. pro­
viding the name of a pattern)" (Magaro, I9 8O, p.l60).
Just as perceptual set may influence what is segmented 
from the field at the preattentive process stage, a 
categorical set may bias what attributes are grouped to
define the object. For example, Bruner and Minturn 
(1955) presented the number 13* When subjects had been 
pretrained on letters they saw a B but when trained on 
numbers they accurately reported a 1 3 . A perceptual 
set therefore influences the course of the preattentive 
process while a categorical set may influence the course 
of focal attention.
The simple conceptual categories formed by the 
associational linkage of attributes in short-term memory 
are known as "cogits" (Hayes-Roth, 1977)* fhe cogit is 
activated in all-or-none fashion when the cogit is 
recognized in some external event. The greater the 
experience with a cogit the greater its strength and 
probability of being activated. Thus letters are formed 
into a word and after extensive usage the configuration 
of letters becomes unitized and memory of the word becomes 
activated in an all-or-none fashion.
A configuration of cogits is assembled by associations 
which follow the same laws as a cogit in that strength is 
determined by prior experience. A single cogit within 
such an assembly of associated cogits may be activated in 
all-or-none fashion by stimulating any element of the 
association. However the greater the complexity of the 
assembly the less the strength of the cogit configurations. 
Finally, an assembly itself can become a unit with all the 
properties of a cogit. This "functionally independent 
conceptual system” termed a schemata by Magaro, is also 
strengthened or weakened by experience and activated 
in an all-or-none fashion by stimuli that include only 
a part of the information in an assembly. Thus in Magaro*s 
words:
"Information processing changes through learning 
when the elementary cogit is influenced by higher, 
order.assemblies and when higher order.assemblies 
are modified by the introduction of new cogits 
The information subsumed in a single cogit changes 
through experience and strengthens or weakens 
the assembly. As the strength of the cogit 
influences the strength of the assembly, so can 
the assembly modify the strength of the cogit.
Thus, normal information processing is a two-way 
system with reciprocal effects among the schemata, 
the category, and the percept... This
constant interaction of percept and concept 
in deriving meaning is crucial to our 
understanding of information being derived 
from a constant dialectic, which cannot be 
accurately described if only one term is 
considered in isolation”•
(Magaro, 1980, p.l62)
In Neisser’s terms, "perceiving is a constructive 
process" (Neisser, 1967* P-95)-
In Magaro*s view then information flows in a 
circular movement where concept and percept interact, 
exploring the world of stimulation. Individual 
differences in "strategies" of information processing 
emphasize expectancies at different points in the flow.
For example, individual differences may emerge in the 
proportional use of automatic or controlled processing. 
Long-term memory or schemata influence the perception or 
encoding of the stimulus when automatic processing is 
predominant; the priority of elements of the icon is 
established as in the perceptual set experiments, and the 
icon is perceived accordingly and automatically. The 
individual who relies upon controlled processing provides 
meaning by analysis of elements of the icon. However, if 
a particular category guides his search for the elements 
in similar but different fields he will come to the same 
conclusion. The validity of the category is immediately 
accepted and he enters into automatic processing. The 
category in such cases is sufficiently powerful for the 
world to be consistently perceived through such categorical 
sets. This may relate to Broadbent’s (1971) concept of 
categorizing; in his terms it would represent a reliance 
on overly inclusive and global categories.
Magaro postulates that just such a situation occurs 
in paranoid schizophrenia. He sees the paranoid as 
consistently working backwards from the schemata to the 
icon while the schizophrenic (nonparanoid) works forwards. 
The paranoid reports what is mainly influenced by the 
schemata while the schizophrenic reports what is mainly 
received on the icon. The schizophrenic will tend to use 
the preattentive process predominantly, reporting global 
percepts or elementary concepts, though is. able to employ
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the nonpreferred controlled processing to produce a 
more detailed and accurate picture of the world if he 
is required to do so. However "the schizophrenic will 
be less adept at controlled processing, and even less 
so at automatic processing, if the situation is novel and 
he, thus, has to create the automatic processing 
categories" (Magaro, 1980, pl72). Magaro considers that 
the schizophrenic does not engage in the conceptual 
process, the forming of strong assemblies and schemata.
Thus he hypothesizes that any task which relies upon 
such associated processes will show the greatest schizo­
phrenic deficit. The difficulty for the schizophrenic 
is not at the initial organization of cogit configurations, 
where each cogit is identified with a discrete memory 
representation activated by an external stimulus, but at 
the stage where the initial associations are formed. The 
consequent assemblies would therefore bie of low strength.
"In effect there would be little "practice” of 
associating two cogits, the cogit configurations would 
never gain strength, and there would not be consistent 
conceptual categories or schemata” (Magaro, I9 8O, p.1 7 2 ).
By contrast, the paranoid will tend to use controlled 
processing. That is, information is processed in an 
active search with a reliance on the category. The 
paranoid will show the least deficit when using common 
assemblies or schemata, and provided they are not 
required to use many categories or contrasting schemata, 
their schemata strength should be greater than that of 
normals. The paranoid's categorical set works in such 
a way that his controlled processing is a biased search for 
specific attributes. At this point the paranoid also is 
able to use automatic processing and "once he is 
satisfied that the categories are established, he can 
automatically assign stimuli to these categories with­
out much attention to the stimulus field... we hypo­
thesize that the paranoid functions by consistently 
mapping the world with some words or faces as parts of 
a definite set. Automatic processing could thus result 
in an unusual perspective or a delusion” (Magaro, 1980,
p.173).
A test of these ideas would thus require a task 
involving sufficient associations between stimuli and 
sufficient redundancy such that the paranoid has the 
basis and the time to establish categorical sets and 
move to automatic processing. Such processes may well 
be involved in the "illusory correlation" phenomenon.
5* ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS,
The term "illusory correlation” was coined by 
Chapman (1967) to describe the report by observers of 
a correlation between two events which in reality are 
(a) not correlated (b) correlated to a lesser extent 
than reported or (c) correlated in the opposite direction 
from that which is reported. Chapman considers racial 
and religious prejudice as well as the "halo effect” as 
examples of illusory correlations.
Chapman's first study on the subject sought to 
generate illusory correlations in the laboratory and to 
study the stimulus variables that influence it. His 163 
subj.ects were presented with three series of pairs of words 
projected on a screen. At each presentation a single pair 
was shown for two seconds. Four possible woirds could 
appear on the left and three possible words on the right. 
All twelve possible pairs occurred with equal frequency 
and in random order. Two of the twelve word pairs had 
high associative strength (e.g. hat-head or knifekfork) 
while others had minimal associative connections 
(e.g. bread-foot). Chapman tested the effects on illusory 
correlation of (a) associative strength (b) distinctiveness 
of atypically long words (e.g. building-magazine) (c) the 
length of the series of word pairs and (d) the number of 
successive testings of such series.
Chapman's results showed that for each of the nine 
word pairs for which illusory correlations were predicted, 
the reported co-occurrence was greater than the correct 
value of 33§ percent. Both pairs of words with high 
associative strength and pairs of long words were per­
ceived by subjects to have been presented more often than 
other, low association pairs. Even the shortest series 
length of 48 (four presentations of each pair) produced 
strong illusory correlations. Over three successive 
testings however the strength of the illusory correlations 
declined.
Chapman and Chapman (1 9 6 7, 1 9 6 9, 1975) went on to 
note that, despite research evidence to the contrary, 
psychodiagnosticians were convinced on the basis of their 
clinical experience that projective tests such as the 
Rorschach and the Draw-a-Person Test were reliably related
t o  th e  p e r s o n a l i t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e i r  p a t i e n t s .
T hese a u th o rs  found t h a t  th e  p o p u la r  bu t i n v a l id  s ig n s
\
o f  th e  R orschach  had a  s tr o n g  v e r b a l  a s s o c i a t i v e  c o n n ec ­
t i o n  t o  th e  supposed  sym ptom s. U sin g  n e a r ly  se v e n  hundred  
u n d ergrad u ate  s u b j e c t s  Chapman and Chapman ( 1 9 6 9 ) showed 
t h a t  "naive" s u b j e c t s  " red isco v ered "  th e  same in v a l i d  
R orschach  c o n te n t  s ig n s  even  thou gh  th e s e  r e la t io n s h ip s  
w ere a b se n t  i n  th e  e x p e r im e n ta l m a t e r ia ls .  The m isp e r c e p ­
t i o n  o f  c l i n i c a l  phenomena th ro u g h  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n  
h a s b een  in v e s t ig a t e d  by  s e v e r a l  a u th o rs  s in c e  Chapman and 
Chapman's p io n e e r in g  work ( e . g .  S ta r r  and K atk in  19^9; 
G old in g  and Rorer* 1 9 7 2 ) .  More r e c e n t ly  u se  o f  t h e  term  
h a s b een  ex ten d ed  t o  th e  s tu d y  o f  im p r e ss io n  fo r m a tio n  
(McArthur and Friedm an, 1980) and s t e r e o t y p ic  b e l i e f s  
(H am ilton  and R ose, 1 9 8 0 ) .
Among th e  v a r io u s  t h e o r e t i c a l  p e r s p e c t iv e s  w h ich  m ight 
be u sed  t o  a cco u n t f o r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  a r e  tw o w h ich  
a r e  w orth  exam in in g  ( c . f .  H am ilton  and R ose, I 9 8 O ). The 
f i r s t  would b e  to  e x p la in  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  i n  term s  
o f  an  a v a i l a b i l i t y  h e u r i s t i c  (T versk y  and Kahneman, 1973)  
in  w h ich  fre q u en cy  judgem ents a r e  b ased  on th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
i n  memory o f  in s ta n c e s  o f  th e  c l a s s  o f  e v e n ts  b e in g  
c o n s id e r e d . One f a c t o r  in f lu e n c in g  a v a i l a b i l i t y  w ould be  
th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  a s s o c i a t i v e  bond betw een  th e  tw o e v e n ts ;  
th e  s tr o n g e r  th e  a s s o c i a t i o n  th e  more a v a i la b le  i t  i s  in  
memory and h en ce  th e  more l i k e l y  i t  w i l l  be o v e r e s t im a te d  
i n  judgem ents o f  fre q u en cy  o f  c o -o c c u r r e n c e .
Schema th e o r y  (R um elhart and O rtony, 1977 ) s u g g e s t s  
an a l t e r n a t i v e  in t e r p r e t a t io n ,  and i s  an app roach  w ith  
c l o s e r  p a r a l l e l s  t o  th e  Magaro m odel d is c u s s e d  a b o v e .  
A ccord in g  t o  t h i s  app roach , know ledge i s  o r g a n iz e d  around  
g e n e r ic  c o n c e p ts ,  r e p r e se n te d  in  memory by schem as 
(sch em ata ) w h ich  s p e c i f y  th e  c o n s t i t u e n t s  ( a s s e m b lie s )  o f  
a  c o n c ep t and th e  r e la t io n s h ip s  ( a s s o c ia t io n s )  t h a t  g e n e r a l ly  
e x i s t  among them . "These schem as a r e  used  t o  s e l e c t  and 
o r g a n iz e  incom ing in fo r m a tio n  w ith  e x i s t i n g  know ledge in  
memory, and r e t r i e v e  i t  a t  a  l a t e r  p o in t  i n  t im e . In form a­
t i o n  i s  more l i k e l y  t o  be com prehended and remembered when 
i t  i s  r e le v a n t  to  schema th an  when i t  i s  not"  (H am ilton  and 
R ose, 198O, p . 8 4 3 ) .  J u s t  a s  i n  th e  Magaro m odel,
sc h e m a tic  b i a s e s  may in f lu e n c e  a t t e n t i o n a l ,  o r g a n iz a ­
t i o n a l  o r  r e t r i e v a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  a l l  o f  w h ich  a r e  se e n  a s  
c a s e s  o f  c o n c e p tu a l ly -d r iv e n  o r  sch em a -d r iv en  top-dow n  
p r o c e s s in g  (H am ilton  and R ose, I 98 O ).
S in c e  th e  p aran o id  i s  someone h y p o th e s iz e d  t o  work 
backw ards from  th e  schem ata to  th e  ic o n  and th e  non­
p a ra n o id  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  i s  e x p e c te d  t o  work from  th e  b a s i s  
o f  th e  ic o n ,  making s im p le  c o g i t  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  b u t  
f a i l i n g  to  a s s o c i a t e  them in t o  a s s e m b lie s  (M agaro, I 9 8 O), 
one w ould e x p e c t  p aran o id  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  t o  make s tr o n g e r  
i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  and nonparanoid  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  
w eaker i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th a n  a m atched group o f  norm al 
s u b j e c t s .
6 . HYPOTHESES.
(1 )  I t  i s  h y p o th e s iz e d  th a t  when c o n fr o n te d  w ith  an  
e x p e r im e n ta l s i t u a t i o n  d e s ig n e d  t o  e l i c i t  i l l u s o r y / c o r r e l a ­
t i o n s ,  p a ra n o id  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  w i l l  produce s t r o n g e r  
i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th a n  a m atched group o f  norm al 
s u b j e c t s .
(2 )  I t  i s  f u r t h e r  h y p o th e s iz e d  th a t*  g iv e n  th e  same 
e x p e r im e n ta l c o n d i t io n s ,  nonparanoid  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  w i l l  
p rodu ce w eaker i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th an  norm al s u b j e c t s .
B . .METHOD,
1 .  S u b j e c t s .
The e x p e r im e n ta l s u b j e c t s  c o n s i s t e d  o f  19 i n ­
p a t i e n t s  (14  m a le s , 5 fe m a le s )  from  th e  B eth lem  R oyal 
and .M au dsley  j o i n t  t e a c h in g  h o s p i t a l s  i n  s o u th e a s t  London, 
a l l  w ith  a  c u r r e n t  d ia g n o s is  o f  s c h iz o p h r e n ia ., .  S u b je c t s  
w ere e x c lu d ed  i f  th e y  ( i )  w ere you n ger th a n  17 o r  o ld e r  
th a n  6 0 , ( i i )  had had E .C .T . w it h in  th e  p a s t  two m onth s, o r  
( i i i ) h a d  b een  d ia g n o se d  a s  h a v in g  o r g a n ic  im pairm ent o r  . 
a h i s t o r y  o f  a lc o h o l  a b u se ;
The c o n t r o l  group was com posed cf 10 norm al s u b j e c t s  
(8  m a le s , 2 fe m a le s )  a l l  em ployed by th e  h o s p i t a l s .  Each  
c o n t r o l  s u b je c t  was p a id  £2 .0 0  f o r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  and was 
t o l d  t h a t  th e  exp erim en t was a  t e s t  o f  memory.
The p a t ie n t  group was d iv id e d  in t o  p aran o id  and non­
p a ra n o id  grou p s on th e  b a s i s  o f  two s c a l e s  d e s ig n e d  t o  
m easure t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .  The Maine P a r a n o id -S c h iz o p h r e n ic  
R a tin g  S c a le  ( V o j t i s e k ,  1976 ) (ap p en d ix  I )  c o n ta in s  a  
s c a l e  f o r  b o th  c o n s tr u c t s  and was com p leted  by  th e  p a t ie n t * s  
d o c to r  on th e  b a s i s  o f  in t e r v ie w  a n d c a s e n o te s . The o th e r  
s c a l e  u sed  was th e  D e lu s io n  Sym ptom -State ' In v e n to r y  (B ed ford  
and F o u ld s , 1977 ) w hich  i s  an 8 4 - ite m  s e l f - r e p o r t  
q u e s t io n n a ir e  g iv e n  t o  th e  p a t ie n t  t o  c o m p le te . T hree  
p a t i e n t s  r e fu s e d  to  com p lete  th e  DSSI, o s t e n s ib ly  b e c a u se  
o f  i t s  le n g t h ,  and one p a t ie n t  had d ie d  b e fo r e  c o m p le t in g  
i t .  The d i f f e r e n c e  b etw een  th e s e  two s c a l e s  and t h e i r  
p sy ch o m etr ic  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  d is c u s s e d  in  S e c t io n  A3 
(p p JS*l°). U sin g  s c o r e s  from  t h e s e  s c a l e s ,  th r e e  m ethods 
o f  d iv id in g  th e  p a t ie n t s  in t o  p aran o id  and n on p aran o id  
gro u p s was d e v is e d .
(a )  Maine S c a le  (M l). Magaro (1 9 8 0 ) s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s u b j e c t s  
s c o r in g  more th a n  or  e q u a l t o  12 on th e  p aran o id  s c a l e  
and l e s s  th an  o r  e q u a l t o  8 on th e  nonparanoid  s c a l e  
sh o u ld  be c l a s s i f i e d  a s  p aranoid ?  s u b j e c t s  s c o r in g  more 
th a n  o r  e q u a l t o  10 on th e  nonparanoid  s c a le  and l e s s  
th a n  o r  e q u a l t o  6 on th e  p aran o id  s c a l e  sh o u ld  be  
c l a s s i f i e d  a s  n on p aran o id . B ecau se su ch  a d i v i s i o n  w ould
y i e l d  o n ly  fo u r  p aran o id  and no nonparanoid  p a t i e n t s  
we have m o d if ie d  th e  s c o r in g  c u t - o f f  p o in t s .  We w i l l  
c l a s s i f y  p a t i e n t s  who sc o r e  more th a n  or  e q u a l t o  11 on 
th e  p aran o id  s c a l e  and l e s s  th a n  or  e q u a l to  9 on th e  non­
p aran o id  s c a l e  a s  paran oid  p a t i e n t s ,  p ro v id ed  t h a t  a  gap o f  
a t  l e a s t  fo u r  p o in t s  e x i s t s  b etw een  th e  two s c o r e s .  A l l  
o th e r  p a t i e n t s  w i l l  b e ..c o n s id e r e d  n o n p aran o id . Such a 
d i v i s i o n  y i e l d s  7 paran oid  and 12 nonparanoid  p a t i e n t s .
(b ) Maine S c a le  u s in g  a h ie r a r c h ic a l  m odel (M2). In  .F oulds*  
h ie r a r c h y  o f  c l a s s e s  o f  p e r so n a l i l l n e s s  (F o u ld s  and 
B ed fo rd , 1975 ) d e lu s io n s  o f  d i s in t e g r a t io n  a r e  v iew ed  a s  
th e  m ost p ro fo u n d ly  d is tu r b e d  symptoms, and a  p a t ie n t
w ith  t h e s e  symptoms, a c c o r d in g  t o  h i s  th e o r y , i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  
a member o f  a l l  c l a s s e s  low er  i n  th e  h ie r a r c h y . Thus, 
r e g a r d le s s  o f  s c o r e s  on l e s s  s e v e r e  c l a s s e s  o f  i l n e s s ,  a  
p a t ie n t  w ith  a d i s in t e g r a t io n  sc o r e  o f  g r e a t e r  th a n  th e  
c u t - o f f  i s  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  (n on p aran o id ) s c h iz o p h r e n ic .  I f  
t h i s  h ie r a r c h ic a l  m odel i s  a p p lie d  t o  th e  s c o r e s  from  th e  
Maine S c a le  and a  c u t - o f f  o f  9 o r  g r e a t e r  on th e  non­
p a ra n o id  s c a l e  i s  u se d , th e r e  a re  8 p a t i e n t s  who w i l l  
be c l a s s i f i e d  a s  non p a r a n o id . We s h a l l  r e f e r  t o  th e  
rem aind er a s  p a r a n o id .th o u g h  th e y  r e p r e se n t  s im p ly  a  
l e s s  d i s in t e g r a t e d  group th an  th e  n o n p a ra n o id s .
( c )  D e lu s io n  Sym ptom -State I n v e n to r y . As m entioned  
e a r l i e r ,  o n ly  15 p a t i e n t s  com p leted  th e  D SSI. U sin g  th e  
recommended c u t - o f f  (B edford  and F o u ld s , 1978) o f  fo u r
o r  more f o r  th e  d i s in t e g r a t io n  s c a le  th e r e  a re  8 p a t i e n t s  
c l a s s i f i e d  a s  n on p aran o id . Of th e  rem ain in g  7 p a t i e n t s  
o n ly  th r e e  s c o r e d  fo u r  or  more on th e  p aran o id  s c a l e .  None­
t h e l e s s ,  s in c e  th e  o b je c t  o f  t h i s  d i v i s i o n  i s  t o  compare 
c l e a r l y  nonparanoid  ( d i s in t e g r a t e d )  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  w ith  
o th e r  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s ,  a l l  se v e n  w i l l  be in c lu d e d  in  th e  
p aran o id  grou p .
M easures o f  th e  p r o c e s s - r e a c t iv e  d i s t i n c t i o n  were  
made u s in g  th e  U llm ann-G iovannoni s e l f - r e p o r t  s c a le  ( U llm ann  
and G io v a n n o n i, 1 9 6 4 ) . T h is s c a le  i s  w id e ly  u sed  f o r  
e s t im a t in g  prem orbid s o c i a l  com petence and i s  c o r r e la t e d  
w ith  o th e r  in d e x e s  o f  prem orbid s t a t u s  (Me C reary , 197 * 0 -
Two in d e x e s  o f  c h r o n ic i t y  w ere reco rd ed  from  th e  
p a t i e n t s '  c a s e n o te s :  months s in c e  f i r s t  a d m iss io n  to  a 
p s y c h ia t r ic  h o s p i t a l  and m onths s in c e  p r e s e n t  a d m iss io n .  
F in a l l y ,  b o th  e x p e r im e n ta l and c o n t r o l  grou p s w ere ad­
m in is te r e d  th e  M il l  H i l l  V ocab u lary  S c a le  (Form 1 S e n io r )  
a s  a  m easure o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e .
TABLE 1
D e s c r ip t iv e  D ata on th e  P a t ie n t  and Normal Groups
P a t ie n t s  (N=1 9 ) Norm als (N=1Q)
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 3 0 .1 0 8 .5 8 2 8 .7 0 1 0 .8 5
I  Q 91*58 / 9 2 . 8
P r o c e s s -R e a c t iv e  
S c a le . 1 0 .5 2 2 .7
Months s in c e  
f i r s t  p s y c h ia t ­
r i c  a d m iss io n .
8 0 .6 8 k 9 . k 2
Months s in c e  
p r e se n t  a d m iss­
io n  .
1 6 .5 8 2 5 .4 9 ■
S in c e  th e  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  group  i s  t o  be d iv id e d  in  
t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  w ays, d e s c r ip t iv e  d a ta  on th e  subgroups  
w i l l  be p r e se n te d  w ith  th e  m ain body o f  r e s u l t s  
(T a b le s  3 * 5$: and 7 ) • . T ab le  1 shows t h e s e  d e s c r ip t iv e
d a ta  f o r  th e . norm al group and th e  t o t a l  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  
g r o u p . T here was no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b etw een  th e  
tw o grou p s in  age o r  IQ.
2 .  A p p a ra tu s.
Four t a s k s  were used in  th e  p r e se n t  s tu d y . Each 
t a s k  in v o lv e d  th e  p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  12 p a ir s  o f  s t im u l i  o f  
w h ich  fo u r  "A S tim u li"  were p a ir e d  w ith  3 "B S t im u l i" . 
Each o f  th e  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  was p r e se n te d  fo u r  t im e s
J - J
( i . e .  e q u a l ly  o f t e n )  b u t a l l  w ere p r e se n te d  i n  random  
o r d e r , th e r e b y  m aking 48 random ord er p r e s e n t a t io n s  p e r  
t a s k .
In  th e  f i r s t  th r e e  t a s k s  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  w ere p r e s e n t  
ed on ca rd s  (5  in c h e s  by 8 in c h e s ) ,  an  A s t im u lu s  on th e  
to p  and a B s t im u lu s  on th e  b o tto m . On th e  f o u r th  t a s k  
A s t im u l i  were p r e se n te d  on ca rd s  w h ile  B s t im u l i  w ere  
p r e se n te d  in  th e  form  o f  th r e e  e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  produced  
t o n e s :  (H igh p i t c h  : 4 ,0 0 0  H z/seco n d ; Low p i t c h  : 800  
H z/se c?  I n t e r m it t e n t  (p u ls e )  650 H z /se c ;  two q u a r te r  
secon d  p u ls e s  p e r  seco n d ; o u tp u ts  a p p ro x im a te ly  75 <Ib 
a t  1 m e tr e ) . A l l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  were exp osed  f o r  approx­
im a te ly  two se co n d s  e a c h ,w ith  card s b e in g  p r e se n te d  
above a  s c r e e n  b etw een  th e  e x p er im en ter  and s u b j e c t .  On 
th e  e x p e r im e n te r 's  s id e  o f  th e  s c r e e n  w ere 12 s l o t s ,  
a lp h a b e t ic a l ly  l a b e l l e d  to  co rresp o n d  t o  th e  c a rd s  ( s e e  
ap p en d ix  2 ) .  The e x p e r im en ter  p r e se n te d  th e  s t im u lu s  
p a ir s  a c c o r d in g  t o  one o f  10 l i s t s  o f  48 l e t t e r s  in  
random o r d e r .
A l l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  were r a te d  a s  to  t h e i r  s t r e n g th  
o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  by 22 s u b j e c t s  (m o stly  p o s tg r a d u a te  
s tu d e n t s )  n o t  in v o lv e d  in  th e  main e x p e r im e n t. T hese  
s u b j e c t s  were ask ed  t o  r a te  on a  f i v e - p o i n t  l a b e l l e d  
s c a l e  ("1" r e p r e s e n t in g  th e  h ig h e s t  a s s o c i a t i v e  s t r e n g th )  
th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  ten d en cy  f o r  th e  f i r s t  (A) s t im u lu s  
t o  c a l l  t o  mind th e  secon d  (B) s t im u lu s . A cop y  o f  t h i s  
q u e s t io n n a ir e  w ith  th e  mean r e sp o n s e s  o f  th e  22 s u b j e c t s  
may be found i n  ap p en d ix  3*
Task 1 . The f i r s t  ta s k  in v o lv e d  th e  same s t im u l i  u sed  
by Chapman ( 1 9 6 7 ) in  h i s  f i r s t  e x p e r im e n ta l d em o n stra t­
io n  o f  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t io n s .  U n lik e  Chapman's s tu d y  
how ever v/here s t im u lu s  p a ir s  were p r e se n te d  h o r iz o n t a l ly  
( l e f t - r i g h t ) ,  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  in  th e  p r e se n t  
exp erim en t w ere p r e se n te d  v e r t i c a l l y  ( to p -b o t to m ) . The 
s t im u l i  (ap p en d ix  4 a )  were a s  f o l lo w s :
A s s o c ia t iv e  S tr e n g th  :
Bacon L ion B lossom Boat
Eggs . T ig e r Notebook (Any B s t im u lu s )
1 .1 8 1 .3 6 4 .8 2 4 .8 2
As can be se e n  from  th e  mean r a t in g s  o f  a s s o c i a t i v e  
s t r e n g t h ,  Bacon-E ggs and L io n -T ig e r  were r a te d  a s  b e in g  
h ig h ly  a s s o c ia t e d  p a i r s .  R a tin g s f o r  a l l  o th e r  s t im u lu s  
p a ir s  ranged from  4 .3 6  t o  5 .0 0 . In  a d d it io n ,  Chapman 
fou n d  t h a t  -the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s  o f  a t y p i c a l l y  lo n g  words 
( i . e .  B lossom -N oteb ook) a l s o  ten d ed  to  produce i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e l a t io n s .
T ask 2 .
A S t im u li  
B S t im u li
t
Happy
1 .9
*
Sad
1. 8
Angry
2 . 2
£
(Any B s t im u lu s )  
4 .0A s s o c ia t iv e  S tr e n g th  :
In  t h i s  t a s k  (ap p en d ix  4b) th r e e  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  were  
h ig h ly  a s s o c ia t e d .  A l l  o th e r  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  ranged  from  
3 . 4  t o  4 .8  in  a s s o c i a t i v e  s t r e n g t h .
Task 3
A S t im u li
B S t im u li
S e c r e t V ic tim E nvelope C lock
(Any
Spy K i l l e r M agazine B S t im u lu s )
2 .1 8 2 .1 8 4 .0 9 4 .8 2A s s o c ia t iv e  S tr e n g th
The t h ir d  t a s k  (ap p en d ix  4 c )  was s im i la r  t o  ta s k  1 
th ou gh  an a ttem p t was made to  u se  words o f. p o s s ib le  
r e le v a n c e  t o  in d iv id u a ls  w ith  p aran o id  d e lu s io n s .  I t  was 
s p e c u la te d  t h a t  th e  words s e c r e t ,  sp y , v ic t im  and k i l l e r  
m ight have s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  c e r t a in  p a r a n o id s  and  
th e r e fo r e  m ight be p e r c e iv e d  to  have b een  p r e se n te d  more 
o f t e n  th a n  n o n s ig n i f ic a n t  words su ch  a s  th o s e  i n  ta s k  1 . 
S e c r e t-S p y  and V ic t im - K i l le r  were r a te d  a s  h a v in g  th e  
h ig h e s t  a s s o c i a t i v e  s t r e n g th  and o th e r  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  ranged  
from  3 .00  ( v ic t im -s p y )  t o  5 -00  (c lo c k -m a g a z in e ) .
T ask 4 .
A S t im u li  :
H igh
B S t im u li  : p i t c h
A s s o c ia t iv e  S tr e n g th  : 1 .8 2
O ther s t im u lu s  p a ir s  ranged  from  3*54 t o  4 .8 2 .
T h is  t a s k  (a p p e n d ix : 4d) in v o lv e d  two se n so r y  m o d a l i t ie s  
( v i s u a l  and a u d ito r y )  i n  ord er  t o  exam ine th e  e f f e c t s  o f  
a t t e n d in g  t o  two se n so r y  c h a n n e ls . H igh p i t c h ,  low  p i t c h  
and in t e r m it t e n t  to n e s  were produced e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  and 
p r e s e n te d  s im u lta n e o u s ly  w ith  one o f  th e  fo u r  (A s t im u lu s )  
c a r d s .  Broen (1 9 7 3 ) ka s  found t h a t  a c u te  p a ra n o id s d i s ­
p la y  broad s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  en v iro n m en ta l c u e s ,  u n l ik e  c h r o n ic  
n o n p a ra n o id s who a t te n u a te  in fo r m a tio n  from  c h a n n e ls  w h ich  
a r e  n o t  o f  prim ary im p o rta n ce , th u s  a p p ea r in g  t o  m o n ito r  
in fo r m a tio n  from  o n ly  one c h a n n e l a t  a t im e . I t  was hoped  
t h a t  by  u s in g  a t a s k  in v o lv in g  two se n so r y  m o d a l i t ie s ,  
th e  ten d e n c y  f o r  n on p aran oid s t o  produce w eaker i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e l a t io n s  th a n  norm als w ould be en h an ced .
3* P r o c e d u r e .
A l l  s u b j e c t s  were t e s t e d  a lo n e  in  a q u ie t  room, w ith  
s u b j e c t  and ex p e r im en ter  s i t t i n g  a t  e i t h e r  s id e  o f  a  d esk  
on w h ich  a s c r e e n  was p la c e d . B e fo re  any ta s k  was in t r o d ­
u ced  s i x  exam ple ca rd s  w ere shown t o  s u b j e c t s  (a p p en d ix  5 )  
i n  o r d e r  t o  e x p la in  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  t a s k s  a s  w e l l  a s  to  
e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  th e  s u b je c t  u n d ersto o d  th e  c o n c ep t o f  
p e r c e n ta g e s .  No stan d ard  in s t r u c t io n s  w ere g iv e n  s in c e  
s u b j e c t s  d i f f e r e d  i n  th e  number o f  exam ples r e q u ir e d  b e f o r e  
t h e y  had c l e a r l y  u n d ersto o d  what was r e q u ir e d  o f  them . 
H owever a t y p i c a l  e x p la n a t io n  b egan  s
"I'm  g o in g  t o  show you a lo n g  s e r i e s  o f  c a r d s  
in  w h ich  ea ch  card has two th in g s  on i t ;  some­
th in g  on th e  to p  and som eth in g  on th e  b o tto m .
Your job  i s  t o  t r y  to  work o u t how o f t e n  ea ch  
o f  th e  to p  o b j e c t s  g o e s  w ith  ea ch  o f  th e  bottom  
o b j e c t s .  You*11 be s e e in g  to o  many ca rd s t o  
cou n t them a l l ,  so  d o n 't  t r y .  J u s t  t r y  t o  form  
a g e n e r a l  im p r e ss io n  o f  what you s e e .
(P r e s e n t in g  two o f  th e  exam ple ca rd s)" F o r  
exam ple h ere  are  two c a r d s , b o th  w ith  a  scjuare on
L ow...
p i t c h
2 .7 3
I n t e r ­
m it te n t
1 .4 5
Any B 
s t im u lu s
3 . 5 ^
th e  to p  and a d i f f e r e n t  o b je c t  on th e  b o tto m .
I f  I  showed you each  card  f i v e  t im e s  and a sk ­
ed you  'O f a l l  th e  t im e s  you saw a sq u are on  
th e  to p  what p e r ce n ta g e  o f  t im e s  d id  you  se e  
a  hand on th e  bottom ?' you w ould answ er '50  
p er  c e n t ' ." (Adding a t h ir d  ca rd ) " I f  th e r e  
were th r e e  ca rd s w ith  sq u a r es  on th e  t o p ,  what 
p e r c e n ta g e  o f  a l l  th e  t im e s  t h a t  you saw a  
sq u are  on th e  to p  would you  have se e n  a  p a ir  
o f  s c i s s o r s  on th e  bottom ?"
In  t h i s  exam p le, r e g a r d le s s  o f  w h eth er  th e  s u b je c t  
answ ered 33 Pe** c e n t ,  more exam ples w ould have been  g iv e n .  
A dding a card  w ith  a c i r c l e  on th e  to p  f o r  exam ple o f t e n  
c o n fu se d  s u b j e c t s  and i t  was th e r e fo r e  som etim es n e c ­
e s s a r y  t o  spend o v e r  t e n  m in u tes w ith  t h e s e  ex a m p les . 
P r e s e n t a t io n  o f  th e  e x p e r im e n ta l t a s k s  began  o n ly  when 
i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  th e  s u b je c t  had u n d ersto o d  what was 
r e q u ir e d  o f  h im . The stan d ard  in s t r u c t io n s  b e fo r e  ea ch  
t a s k  may be foun d  in  ap p en d ix  6 .
B etw een t a s k s  2 and 3 s u b j e c t s  w ere a d m in is te r e d  
th e  r e le v a n t  q u e s t io n n a ir e s ;  b o th  grou p s com p leted  th e  
M il l  H i l l  V ocab u lary  Scale- and th e  p a t ie n t  group a d d i t io n ­
a l l y  com p leted  th e  p r o c e s s - r e a c t iv e  s c a l e .  At th e  end  
o f  t e s t i n g  th e  p a t i e n t s  were g iv e n  th e  DSSI and urged  t o  
co m p lete  i t  a s  soon  a s  p o s s i b l e ; m ost were r e tu r n e d  
w it h in  two d a y s .
T e s t in g  u s u a l ly  l a s t e d  about s e v e n ty  m in u tes  f o r  
p a t i e n t s  and f i f t y - f i v e  m in u tes f o r  n o rm a ls . D uring th e  
p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  t a s k s  o c c a s io n a l  o b s e r v a t io n s  were made 
t o  check  t h a t  th e  s u b je c t  was a t t e n d in g  t o  th e  t a s k .  T h is  
was done by s l i g h t l y  m oving th e  card  b e in g  p r e se n te d  and 
c h e c k in g  f o r  th e  su b je c t's  eye  m ovement. On th e  b a s i s  o f  
su ch  o b s e r v a t io n s  i t  appeared  t h a t  a l l  s u b j e c t s  were 
a t t e n d in g  a d e q u a te ly  though  some e x p r e sse d  f a t ig u e  a t  th e  
end o f  t e s t i n g .
A f t e r  a l l  48 t r i a l s  o f  each  t a s k  had b e e n  p r e s e n te d  
th e  s u b je c t  was handed a fo u r  page b o o k le t  i n  w hich  he  
w as r e q u ir e d  t o  r a te  th e  p e r ce n ta g e  fr e q u e n c y  o f  each  
s t im u lu s  p a ir  he had s e e n . Each page c o n ta in e d  one o f  
th e  A s t im u l i  on th e  l e f t  ( e . g .  B acon) and a l l  th r e e  B 
s t im u l i  on th e  r ig h t  ( e .g .  T ig e r , E g g s, N otebook) w ith  
empty b o x es  a lo n g s id e  each  f o r  th e  s u b je c t  t o  w r ite  in
th e  p e r c e n ta g e s . The page o rd ers  o f  th e  b o o k le t s  were 
random ized su ch  t h a t  no two s u b j e c t s  r e c e iv e d  more th an  
one o f  th e  fo u r  b o o k le t s  in  th e  same o r d e r . At t h i s  p o in t  
th e  f o l lo w in g  in s t r u c t io n s  were g iv e n :
"Okay, t h a t ' s  th e  end o f  t h a t  t a s k .  Now ta k e  
t h i s  l i t t l e  b o o k le t  and , lo o k in g  a t  th e  w ord / 
f ig u r e  on th e  l e f t ,  t r y  to  remember a s  b e s t  you  
can what p e r e n c ta g e  o f  t im e s  t h i s  f ig u r e /w o r d  
occu red  w ith  ea ch  o f  th e  th r e e  w o rd s/so u n d s on 
th e  r i g h t .  ( I  s h a l l  p la y  th e  th r e e  sou n d s f o r  
you a g a in )  . Remember t h a t  th e  th r e e  numbers 
you w r i t e  down on each  page must add up t o  a 
hundred ."
Three p a t i e n t s  and one norm al s u b je c t  had shown by  
t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  th e y  d id  n o t  u n d erstan d  p e r c e n ta g e s  th ou gh  
comprehended th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  t a s k .  T h ese s u b j e c t s  were  
th u s  in s t r u c t e d  t o  w r ite  down how many t im e s ,  in  a b s o lu te  
num bers, th e y  th o u g h t th e y  had se e n  each  s t im u lu s  p a ir .  
T h ese  r e sp o n s e s  were l a t e r  t r a n s la t e d  in t o  p e r c e n ta g e s  
by th e  e x p e r im e n te r .
The c o r r e c t  c o -o c c u r r e n c e  f o r  ev ery  s t im u lu s  p a ir  
i n  each  t a s k  was o f  c o u rse  33§  p e r  c e n t .  Any two s t im u l i  
r e p o r te d  to  have c o -o c c u r r e d  w ith  a h ig h e r  fre q u en cy  th a n  
33 i  Pe r  c e n t  th e r e f o r e  w i l l  have b een  i l l u s o r i l y  
c o r r e la t e d .
C. RESULTS.
1 .  The A ssessm en t o f  P aran oid -N onp aran oid  S t a t u s ,
TABLE 2
C o r r e la t io n s  "between th e  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  
Maine S c a le  and th e  DSSI (N = 15).
Paranoid
Nonparanoid 0 . 200'
Paranoid
Disintegration 0 . 860 -
Paranoid Nonparanoid Paranoid Disintegration
Maine Scale DSSI
* p < 0 . 0 5  
** p< 0.001
@ N = 19
T ab le  2 shows th e  c o r r e la t io n s  b etw een  th e  s u b s c a le s  o f  
th e  Maine S c a le  and th e  D e lu s io n  Sym ptom -State In v e n to r y  
b a sed  on d a ta  from  th e  f i f t e e n  p a t i e n t s  who com p leted  th e  
DSSI and th e  n in e te e n  on whom a Maine S c a le  was c o m p le te d . 
A lth o u g h  th e  p aran o id  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  was s i g ­
n i f i c a n t l y  c o r r e la t e d  w ith  th e  c o rr esp o n d in g  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  
DSSI th e r e  was m ere ly  a n o n s ig n i f ic a n t  b u t p o s i t i v e  c o r r e la ­
t i o n  b etw een  th e  non paranoid  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  
and th e  d i s in t e g r a t io n  (n on p aran o id ) su b s c a le  o f  th e  D SSI. 
M oreover, th e  d i s in t e g r a t io n  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  DSSI c o r r e la t e d  
more h ig h ly  w ith  th e  p aran o id  s u b s c a le  th a n  th e  non p aran oid  
s u b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le ,  and s i m i la r l y ,  th e  non paran oid  
s u b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  c o r r e la t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w ith  th e  
p a ra n o id  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  DSSI b u t n o t  w ith  th e  d i s in t e g r a t io n  
s u b s c a le .
I n t e r e s t in g l y ,  th e  two s u b s c a le s  o f  b o th  in s tr u m e n ts  
c o r r e la t e d  p o s i t i v e l y  w ith  each o th e r ,  in d ic a t in g  t h a t  a  
h ig h  sc o r e  on one su b s c a le  ten d ed  to  o c cu r  w ith  a h ig h  s c o r e  
on th e  o th e r  s u b s c a le .  W hile t h i s  c o r r e la t io n  was r e l a t i v e l y
-rj.
s m a ll  betw een  th e  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  i t  was 
h ig h ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  b etw een  th e  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  DSSI.
The r e la t io n s h ip  b etw een  th e  th r e e  m ethods used  in  
t h i s  s tu d y  t o  a s s ig n  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  t o  p aran oid  and non­
p a ra n o id  groups was exam ined u s in g  th e  kappa c o e f f i c i e n t  
w h ich  ta k e s  in t o  a cco u n t th e  e x p e c te d  agreem en ts th a t  w ould  
o c c u r  by chance a lo n e  when a l lo c a t in g  s u b je c t s  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
c a t e g o r i e s .  Comparing th e  a ss ig n m en t o f  p a t ie n t s  a c c o r d ­
in g  t o  th e  a l l o c a t i o n  m ethods d e f in e d  above i t  was fou n d  
t h a t  Ml (b ased  upon b o th  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  Maine S c a le )  and 
M2 ( th e  Maine S c a le  u s in g  s c o r in g  m ethods c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  a 
h ie r a r c h ic a l  m odel) showed a low  l e v e l  o f  agreem ent (k = 0 . 1 9 ) .
Ml a l s o  r e la t e d  p o o r ly  t o  a l l o c a t io n s  made by  th e  DSSI 
( k - 0 .1 8 ) *  F in a l ly  M2 y ie ld e d  th e  lo w e s t  agreem ent among th e  
t h r e e  m ethods when i t  was compared v /ith  th e  DSSI (k = 0 .0 7 )  
w h ich  i t s e l f  o r ig in a t e s  from  a  h ie r a r c h ic a l  m odel (F o u ld s  and 
B ed fo rd , 1975)*’Thus, th e  th r e e  m ethods o f  a l l o c a t in g  p a t i e n t s  
t o  p aran o id  and non paran oid  c a t e g o r ie s  were p o o r ly  r e la t e d  
t o  one a n o th e r .
2:. I l l u s o r y  C o r r e la t io n s .
R e s u lt s  a r e  p r e s e n te d  a c c o r d in g  t o  th e  th r e e  m ethods by  
w h ich  th e  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  group was d iv id e d  in t o  p a ra n o id  
and nonparanoid  g r o u p s .
( a )  Maine S c a le  ( M l ) .
TABLE 3
D e s c r ip t iv e  d a ta  f o r  th e  p a ra n o id , nonparanoid  and norm al grou p s  
a c c o r d in g  t o  a l l o c a t i o n s  made by th e  Maine S c a le  (Ml ) •
Para 
N 
(M=5 
Mean
noids 
= 7 
, F=2) 
S.D.
Nonpars 
N = 
<M=9, 
Mean
maids
12
F=3)
S.D.
Non
N
(M=
Mean
mals
= 10
8,F=2) 
S.D.
Age 36.0 9*59 2 6.66 5*9^ 28.7 10.85
Mill Hill I.Q. 91.0 5-92 91-9 8 .2 6 9 2 . 8 9.95
Maine Paranoid Scale 13-6 1.8 9.5 3-58
Maine Nonparanoid Scale 7-1 1.57 10.42 3.96
DSSI Paranoid Scale 5 A 3.21 *.9 6 .4 9
DSSI Disintegration Scale 6.6 4.98 5.6 4.83
Chronicity 1 ©(in months 101.6 19.8 68.5 57.8
Chronicity 2 ©(in months 20.4 24.6 14.3 2 6 . 8
Process-Reactive Scale 11.0 3-37 10.25 2.49
© Chronicity 1 refers to months since first 
admission. Chronicity 2 refers to months 
since present admission.
T ab le  3 shows d e s c r ip t iv e  d a ta  f o r  th e  p a r a n o id , non­
p a ra n o id  and norm al grou p s d iv id e d  a c c o r d in g  to  a l l o c a t i o n s  
made on th e  b a s i s  o f  b o th  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  Maine S c a le ,  th e  . 
m ethod we have r e f e r e d  t o  a s  M l, The p a ra n o id  group  was 
fou n d  t o  be  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  o ld e r  ( t = 2 . 6 4 ;  p < 0 . 0 2 )th a n  th e  
n on p aran o id  group b u t n o t  th e  norm al g ro u p . As one m igh t  
e x p e c t  from  th e  n a tu r e  o f t h i s  s c o r in g  m ethod, th e  p a r a n o id  
grou p  sc o r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h ig h e r  ( t= 2 . 8l ;  p < 0 . 0 2 ) on th e  
p a ra n o id  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  th a n  d id  th e  n o n -  
p a ra n o id  g ro u p . T here were no o th e r  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  b etw een  th e  g r o u p s .
TABLE b
Mean fre q u en cy  e s t im a t e s  o f  c r i t i c a l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  f o r  
th e  p a r a n o id , non p aran oid  and norm al grou p s a c c o r d in g  t o  
a l l o c a t i o n s  made by th e  Maine S c a le  (Mil) .
Task
No
Stimulus Pair 
(A) (B)
Paranoids 
(N = 7)
Nonparanoids 
(N = 1 2 )
Normals 
(N = 1 0 )
Respon. 
Resp< 
F =
se X # 
anse 
P =
Group 
Resp 
F =
VA
onse 
p *
(a) BACON - EGGS 55-6 49.0 4? . 8 1 2 . 1 8 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 2 0 5 0 .8 1 6
l(b] LION - TIGER ' 2 6 . 7 40.2 3 6 . 6 0.384 0.541 0.956 0 . 3 9 7
(c) BLOSSOM.- NOTEBOOK 38.4 3 6 . 5 35.2 1.145 0.294 0.075 0 . 9 2 8
(a] 1 - HAPPY 38.0 34.8 37.8 1 . 5 0 0 0 . 2 3 2 0.119 o .ess
2(b] I - SAD 33*7 41.8 38.1 2.450 0.129 O . 4 3 8 0 . 6 5 0
(c] * - ANGRY 29.1 34.9 41.8 O . 7 4 7 0.395 1.200 0 . 3 1 7
(a) VICTIM - KILLER 34.1 40.2 43.2 2.639 0 . 1 1 6 0 . 2 9 6 0 . 7 4 6
3(b) SECRET - SPY 4 9 . 1 4 5 .O 35.9 6.819 0 . 0 1 5 0.651 0 . 4 3 8
(c) ENVELOPE-MAGAZINE 42.0 39.0 42.8 3.850 0.061 0.089 0 . 9 1 5
(a] ••♦
_ Inter- 
“ mittent 53.7 39.2 35-1 5.830 0 . 0 2 3 2.577 0 . 0 9 5
Mb) ! _ High ” -pitch 35-4 37.6 42.0 3.192 0.086 O.3 8O 0 . 6 8 7
<c) pr _ Low pitch 34.9 3 6 . 8 39.3 1.590 0.218 0.138 0 . 8 7 2
Kean « 39.22 39.58 39.63 * d.f. = 1,26.
T ab le  b shows th e  mean fr e q u e n c y  e s t im a t e s  o f  th e  
s t im u lu s  p a ir s  f o r  w hich  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  w ere p r e ­
d i c t e d  ( i . e .  h ig h  i n  a s s o c i a t i v e  s t r e n g th  o r  a t y p i c a l l y  lo n g  
w o r d s ) . The groups are  d iv id e d  a c c o r d in g  t o  a l l o c a t i o n s  
made by th e  Maine S c a le  u s in g  ou r  m o d ifie d  s c o r in g  c r i t e r i a .
R e s u lt s  were a n a ly se d  u s in g  a r e p e a te d  m easures a n a ly s i s  
o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  th e  c r i t i c a l  r e sp o n se  ( th e  s t im u lu s  p a ir  f o r  
w h ich  an i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n  was p r e d ic te d  -  e . g .  b a c o n -e g g s )  
v e r s u s  th e  mean o f  th e  o th e r  two p o s s ib le  r e sp o n se s  (b a c o n -  
t i g e r ,  b a c o n -n o te b o o k ) . The group by r e sp o n se  in t e r a c t io n  
was a l s o  exam ined .
T ab le  4 shows im p r e s s iv e ly  t h a t  a l l  grou p s made i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e l a t io n s  ( i * e .  a  r e sp o n se  g r e a te r  th a n  3 3 *3%) in  th e  p r e ­
d ic t e d  s t im u lu s  p a i r s .  On o n ly  two fre q u en cy  e s t im a te s  d id  
a  group n o t  resp on d  w ith  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s ;  th e  p a ra n o id  
grou p  u n d e re stim a ted  th e  fre q u en cy  o f  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  1 (b ) 
and 2 ( c ) ,  i l l u s o r i l y  c o r r e la t in g  in s te a d  L ion -E ggs ( ^ 0 . 7 1 $ )  
and th e  f ig u r e  o f  s t im u lu s  p a ir  2 (c )  w ith  Sad (4^.71  $ ) .
Three s t im u lu s  p a ir s  ( 1 ( a ) ,  3(i>) and M a ) ) ,  were found  
t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h e i r  o th e r  p o s s ib le  
r e s p o n s e s  a c r o s s  a l l  g ro u p s , and on a l l  th r e e  o c c a s io n s  th e  
p a ra n o id  group had th e  h ig h e s t  mean. There were no s i g n i f i c a n t  
r e s u l t s  f o r  th e  group X resp o n se  in t e r a c t io n .
On o n ly  h a l f  o f  th e  tw e lv e  c r i t i c a l  r e sp o n s e s  d id  th e  
p a ra n o id  group o b ta in  a h ig h e r  mean th a n  th e  non paranoid  group  
and on o n ly  s i x  o f  th e  c r i t i c a l  r e sp o n s e s  d id  th e  n o n p a ra n o id s  
o b ta in  lo w e r  means than  th e  n o rm a ls. In d eed  th e  a v era g e  mean 
f o r  a l l  c r i t i c a l  r e sp o n s e s  a c r o s s  a l l  t a s k s  was th e  same f o r  
a l l  grou p s (p a ra n o id : 3 9 *22$ ;  non paranoid : 3 9 *58$ ; norm al: 
3 9 * 6 3 $ ) .  T h u s ,a c c o r d in g  to  t h i s  d i v i s i o n  o f  th e  p a t i e n t s  
th e r e  was l i t t l e  o v e r a l l  d i f f e r e n c e  b etw een  th e  grou p s in  
t h e i r  ten d e n c y  t o  make i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t io n s .  There was a l s o  
no ap p aren t tr e n d  f o r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t e n d e n c ie s  f o r  grou p s  
t o  make s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  on some ta s k s  th a n  
o t h e r s .
(b )  Maine S c a le  u s in g  a  h ie r a r c h ic a l  m odel (M2).
T ab le  5» b e lo w , shows d e s c r ip t iv e  d a ta  f o r  th e  th r e e  
grou p s d iv id e d  a c c o r d in g  t o  th e  Maine S c a le  u s in g  a  
s c o r in g  method c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  a h ie r a r c h ic a l  m odel (M2).  
P a t ie n t s  o b ta in in g  a sc o r e  o f 9 o r  g r e a te r  on th e  n on p aran o id  
s u b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  were c l a s s i f i e d  a s  non­
p a ra n o id  and th e  rem ainder w ere c l a s s i f i e d  a s  p a r a n o id .
TABLE 5
D e s c r ip t iv e  d a ta  f o r  th e  p a ra n o id , non paranoid  and norm al 
groups a c c o r d in g  to  a l l o c a t io n s  made by th e  Maine S c a le  
sc o re d  a c c o r d in g  t o  a h ie r a r c h ic a l  m odel (1/12) •
Para 
N = 
(M=8 , 
Mean
noids
11
F=3)
S.D.
Nonpar*
N
(K=6 ,
Mean
moids 
= 8 
F=2) 
S.D.
Non
N
(M=
Mean
uals 
= 30 
B,F=2) 
S.D.
Age 32.45 8.64 26.87 7 . 8 8 28.7 1 0 . 8 5
Mill Hill I.Q. 90.09 7*31 93.62 7-29 9 2 . 8 9-95
Maine Paranoid Scale 10.27 3 . 6  6 1 2 . 0 3.50
Maine Nonparanoid Scale 6.73 1 . 1 0 1 2 . 6 2 2.97
DSSI Paranoid Scale 2.87 3-72 7.57 6.35
DSSI Disintegration Scale **.75 4 . 9 5 7-28 4.42
Chronicity 1. (in months) 74.45 4 7 . 4 0 89.25 54.09
Chronicity 2. (in months) 20.54 2 6 . 7 8 11.12 >4.23
Process-Reactive Scale 10.82 3.12 10.12 2 . 3 6
Not s u r p r i s in g ly  th e  group o f  p a t i e n t s  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  
non paranoid  by t h i s  method o b ta in ed  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h ig h e r  
( t = 6 . 0 8 ;  p < O . O l )  s c o r e s  on th e  nonparanoid  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  
Maine S c a le  th a n  th e  p aran o id  grou p . The th r e e  grou p s d id  
n o t d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y . on any o th e r  in d ep en d en t v a r ia b le .
T ab le  6 , b e lo w , shows th e  mean fre q u en cy  e s t im a t e s  o f  
th e  c r i t i c a l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  f o r  th e  th r e e  grou p s d iv id e d  
a c c o r d in g  to  a l l o c a t i o n s  made by th e  M2 m ethod. W hile  
a l l  groups made i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  o n ly  th r e e  r e sp o n s e s  
( 1 ( a ) ,  3 (b)  and M a ) )  w ere s t a t i s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from  th e  
means o f  th e  o th e r  two p o s s ib le  s t im u lu s  p a i r s .
The non paranoid  group made i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  on 
o n ly  s i x  o f  th e  tw e lv e  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  f o r  w h ich  th e y  were  
p r e d ic t e d .  The p a ra n o id s  by c o n tr a s t  made i l l u s o r y  c o r r ­
e l a t i o n s  on t e n  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  and norm als made them  on a l l  
t w e lv e .  Two group X r esp o n se  in t e r a c t io n s  ( 3 ( a )  and 3 ( ^ ) )  
a t t a in e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  and a n o th e r  ( 2 ( a ) )  app­
roach ed  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  On a l l  th r e e  th e  p a ra n o id  group  
made s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th an  th e  o th e r  two 
g r o u p s .
The p aran o id  group made s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  
th a n  n on p aran o id s on s i x  o f  th e  tw e lv e  c r i t i c a l  s t im u lu s  
p a i r s .  On a l l  o c c a s io n s  th a t  th e  nonparanoid  group made
TABLE 6
Mean fr e q u e n c y  e s t im a t e s  o f  c r i t i c a l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  f o r  
th e  p a r a n o id , n on p aran o id  and norm al grou p s a c c o r d in g  ‘
t o  a l l o c a t i o n s  made by M2.
Task
No
Stimulus £air 
(A) (D)
Paranoids 
(N = 11)
Nonparanoids 
(N = 8)
Normals 
(N = 10)
Respon 
Respo 
F =
se X 
nse * 
P =
Group 
Respon 
F =
X 
se 
P =
(a) BACON - EGGS 51.09 51.87 4 7 . 8 12.180 0.002 O.O67 0.935
Kb ) LION - TIGER 37.2? 32.37 3 6 . 6 0.384 0.541 O .1 3 4 0.875
( O BLOSSOM- NOTEBOOK 35.36 39.75 35-2 1.145 0.294 0.215 0.808
(a) t - HAPPY 4 3 . 0 9 26.25 37.8 1.500 0 . 2 3 2 3.001 0.06?
2(b) * - SAD 43.27 3 2 . 6 38.1 2.450 0.129 0.819 0.452
(c) * - ANGRY 29.27 37-6 41.8 0.747 0.395 1.552 0.231
(a) VICTIM - KILLER 4 9 .O 22.87 43.2 2.639 0 . 1 1 6 3.550 0.043
3(b) SECRET - SPY ' 5 6 .2? 33.12 35-9 6.819 O.O1 5 4.122 0.028
Cc) ENVELOPE- MAGAZINE 47.0 3 0 . 6 42.8 n  C c n  J • '-O'' 0 . 0 6 1 1.405 0 . 2 6 3
(a) «♦
_ Inter- . 
~ mittent 44.45 4 4 . 7 5 35.1 5.830 0 . 0 2 3 0.690 0.423
4(b) I _ High . pitch 35.73 38.25 42.0 3.192 0.086 0.401 0.673
(c) 3] _ Low pitch 32.9 40.5 39.3 1.590 0.218 0.585 0.564
Mean < 42.06 35.87 39.63
* d.f. = 1.26.
i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t io n s  th e y  were s t r o n g e r  th a n  th o s e  o f  th e  
p a ra n o id  grou p . On n in e  r e s p o n s e s  th e  p aran o id  group  made 
s t r o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t i o n s . th a n  th e  norm als and on 
e ig h t  r e s p o n s e s  th e  n on p aran oid  group  made w eaker i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e l a t io n s  th a n  th e  n o rm a ls . F u rth erm ore, when th e  means 
o f  th e  group  means w ere c a lc u la t e d  th e  p aran o id  group  showed  
th e  s t r o n g e s t  o v e r a l l  ten d en cy  t o  make i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  
(^ 2 . 06$ )  and th e  n o n p a ra n o id s group  th e  w ea k est te n d e n c y  
('3 5 *87$ )  a  f ig u r e  a p p ro a ch in g  3 3 *3 /^  w h ich  r e p r e s e n t s  r e a l i t y  
and a  f a i l u r e  t o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  make i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  on 
th e  p r e d ic t e d  s t im u lu s  p a i r s .  The norm al g r o u p ’ s o v e r a l l  
mean fr e q u e n c y  e s t im a t e  a c r o s s  a l l  c r i t i c a l  r e s p o n s e s  was 
3 9 *63$  w h ich  f a l l s ,  a s  p r e d ic t e d ,  b etw een  th e  two g r o u p s .  
However b e c a u se  t h e s e  a v era g e  group  means c o n ta in  c o n s id e r a b le  
v a r ia n c e  th e y  a re  n o t  d i f f e r e n t  t o  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e x t e n t .
Two i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t io n s ,  w h ich  we s h a l l  term  i d io s y n ­
c r a t i c  b e c a u se  th e y  were n o t maae . cn  th e  p r e d ic te d  s t im u lu s
p a i r s ,  a re  w orth  m en tio n in g . The nonparanoid  group i l l u s o r i l y  
c o r r e la t e d  th e  A -s t im u lu s  o f  s t im u lu s  p a ir  2 ( a )  w ith  Angry 
(4 4 .7 5 7 0  r a th e r  th an  Happy. The o th e r  id io s y n c r a t ic  i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e l a t io n  was made by th e  p a ra n o id  group w h ich  on t a s k  
2 ( c )  r ep o r te d  h a v in g  o b serv ed  th e  A -s t im u lu s  w ith  Sad 
( 4 6 . 4 5%) r a th e r  th an  th e  p r e d ic te d  A ngry.
F in a l ly  th e r e  was a  s tr o n g  ten d en cy  f o r  th e  p a ra n o id  
group  t o  make s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th an  o th e r  
g ro u p s on t a s k  3 • w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  t a s k  3 was 
d e v is e d  w ith  th e  o b je c t  o f  in c lu d in g  words o f  p a r t i c u la r  
r e le v a n c e  to  p aran o id  p a t i e n t s .  However th e r e  was no te n d ­
en cy  f o r  th e  non paranoid  group t o  make w eaker i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e la t io n s  on ta s k  4 a s  had b een  p r e d ic te d  f o r  a t a s k  i n ­
v o lv in g  two se n so r y  m o d a l i t i e s ,
( c )  D e lu s io n  Sym ptom -State I n v e n to r y .
TABLE 7
D e s c r ip t iv e  d a ta  f o r  th e  p a r a n o id , nonparanoid  and norm al 
groups a c c o r d in g  t o  a l l o c a t i o n  made b y  th e  D SSI.
Parai
N
(M*5
Kean
10 ids 
= 7 
F=2) 
S.D.
Nonpara 
N = 
(M=7, 
Mean
inoids
8
F=l)
S.D.
Norn 
N = 
(M=( 
Mean
aals 
10 . 
, F=2 ) 
S.D.
Age 3 0 .0 6 . 8 5 2 9 . 1 2 1 0 .8j 28.7 10.85
Mill Hill I.Q. ?2 .29 5.91 9 2 . 1 2 6 . 6 0 9 2 . 8 9.95
Maine Paranoid Scale 9.43 3.91 11.87 3.94
Maine Nonparanoid Scale 8.14 1.86 10.37 3-81
DSSI Paranoid Scale 2.43 2.88 7.37 6 .3 2
DSSI Disintegration Scale 1.86 1.46 9.50 3.42
Chronicity 1. (in months) ?3 *43 46.5 8 0 . 7 5 49.36
Chronicity 2. (in months) 3-43 2.82 17.62 28.62
Process-Reactive Scale 11.86 2.34 9.8 7 3.27
T ab le 7 p r e s e n ts  d e s c r ip t iv e  d a ta  f o r  th e  th r e e  grou p s  
d iv id e d  a c c o r d in g  t o  a l l o c a t i o n s  made by th e  D SSI. S in c e  
any p a t ie n t  s c o r in g  fo u r  or more on th e  d i s in t e g r a t io n  sub­
s c a le  o f  th e  DSSI was a s s ig n e d  to  th e  nonparanoid  group  
i t  i s  th e r e fo r e  n o t s u r p r is in g  th a t  t h i s  group  o b ta in e d  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h ig h e r  ( t = 5 . 4 7 ;  p < O . O l )  mean sc o r e  th a n  th e  
p aran o id  group on th e  d i s in t e g r a t io n  s u b s c a le .  T here were  
no o th e r  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw een  th e  
g r o u p s .
TABLE 8
Mean fr e q u e n c y  e s t im a t e s  o f  c r i t i c a l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  f o r  th e  
p a r a n o id , non paranoid  and norm al grou p s a c c o r d in g  t d  a l l o ­
c a t io n s . made by th e  DSSI.
Task
No
Stimulus Pair 
(A) (B)
Paranoids 
(N = 7 )
Nonparanoids 
(N = 8 )
Normals 
(N = 10]
Responi
Respons
p =
>e X 
;e *
P =
Group 
Respon: 
F =
X
se
P =
(a) BACON - EGGS 5 1 . 0 49.0 47.8 9.318 0 .0 0 6 O.O32 O . 9 6 9
1 (b) LION - TIGER 3 1 . 0 *5.5 3 6 . 6 1.279 0.270 0.947 0,403
(c) BLOSSOM- NOTEBOOK 31-7 42.1 35.2 1-357 0.257 1.076 0.3 68
(a) t - HAPPY 34.3 3 8 . 6 37.8 1 . 7 1 0 0.204 0.184 O . 8 3 3
2 (b)
*
- SAD 48.6 33-2 38.1 3013 0.032 1.532 0 . 2 3 8
(c) i - ANGRY 33*6 43.0 41.8 7.418 0 .0 1 2 1.305 0.291
(a) VICTIM - KILLER 4 3 .O 30.0 43.2 1.928 0.178 1.134 0.339
3(b) SECRET - SPY 46’. 1 33.7 35-9 2.667 0.117 I . 5 3 0 0.239
(c) ENVELOPE- MAGAZINE 32.7 39.5 42.8 2 . 1 1 3 0 . 1 6 0 0.556 r> cflt “ •
(a) •
•
Inter­
mittent 40.0 ' 45.4 35.1 1 0 .2 0 0 0.004 1.929 0.169
Mb) 1 _ High pitch 33-8 40.6 42.0 4.120 O.O55 O .6 5 3 0.531
(c) I _ Low pitch 37'.4 39 i2 39.3 3.219 0 .0 8 7 0.034 0.967
Mean: 3 8 . 6 0 39.98 39.63 * d.f. = 1 ,2 2 .
T ab le  8 p r e s e n t s  th e  mean fre q u en cy  e s t im a te s  o f  th e  
c r i t i c a l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  f o r  th e  th r e e  groups d iv id e d  
a c c o r d in g  to  a l l o c a t i o n s  made by  s c o r e s  on th e  d i s in t e g r a ­
t i o n  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  DSSI. W hile th e  m a jo r ity  o f  c r i t i c a l  
r e s p o n s e s  f o r  a l l  th r e e  groups r e p r e se n te d  i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e l a t io n s ,  th e  p aran o id  group made o n ly  n in e  w h ile  th e  
non paran oid  and norm al groups made t e n  and tw e lv e  r e s p e c t ­
i v e l y .  Three c r i t i c a l  r e sp o n se s  ( 1 ( a ) ,  2 ( c )  and 4 ( a ) ) ,  
were s t a t i s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h e i r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a t  th e  
0 .0 5  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
On e ig h t  o f  th e  tw e lv e  c r i t i c a l  r e sp o n s e s  th e  non­
p aran o id  group made s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th a n  
th e  p aran o id  groups though th e  a v era g e  o f  t h e i r  mean 
fr e q u e n c y  e s t im a te s  ( 3 9 -98# ) was o n ly  f r a c t i o n a l ly  h ig h e r
th a n  th a t  o f  th e  p aran o id  g r o ]p (3 8 . 6# )  and v e r y  s im i la r  
to  t h a t  o f  th e  norm al group ( 3 9 . 63# ) .  On s i x  c r i t i c a l  
r e sp o n s e s  th e  non paranoid  group made s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e la t io n s  th a n  th e  norm al grou p .
F in a l ly  th e r e  was some ten d en cy  f o r  th e  n on paranoid  
group to  make s t r o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th a n  th e  
p aran o id  group on t a s k s  1 and 4 .  There was a l s o  a ten d e n c y  
f o r  th e  p a ra n o id  group t o  make s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la ­
t i o n s  th an  th e  n on p aran oid  group on t a s k  3 w hich  in c lu d e s  
s t im u l i  o f  p o s s ib l e  r e le v a n c e  to  p aran o id  p a t i e n t s .
D. DISCUSSION.
!•_ The A ssessm en t o f  P aranoid -N onparanoid  S t a t u s .
A lth ou gh  th e  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  c o r r e la t e d  
p o s i t i v e l y  w ith  th e  c o rr esp o n d in g  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  DSSI, th e y  
a l s o  c o r r e la t e d  p o s i t i v e l y  w ith  th e  o th e r  s u b s c a le s .  T h is  
was l a r g e ly  due to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  DSSI 
c o r r e la t e d  e x tr e m e ly  h ig h ly  w ith  each  o th e r  (r= 0 . 8 6 ) .
The h ig h  i n t e r c o r r e la t io n  o f  th e  p aran o id  and d i s ­
i n t e g r a t io n  s c a l e s  o f  th e  DSSI s u g g e s t s  t h a t  e i t h e r  th e  
p a t i e n t s  w ere p o o r ly  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  on t h i s  d im en sio n  or  t h a t  
th e  DSSI p o o r ly  d is c r im in a te s  p a t i e n t s  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h i s  
d im e n sio n . W ith reg a rd  t o  th e  l a t t e r  n o t io n  i t  seem s 
p la u s ib l e  t h a t  some p a t ie n t s  may have com p leted  th e  DSSI 
w ith  a  p o s i t i v e  r e sp o n se  s e t  ( I . e .  r esp o n d in g  tr u e  t o  m ost 
i t e m s )  w h ile  o t h e r s ,  perhaps p a r a n o id s , may have resp on d ed  
w ith  a  n e g a t iv e  r e sp o n se  s e t  ( i . e .  d en y in g  m ost i t e m s ) .
S in c e  th e  DSSI la c k s  a l i e  s c a le  i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  t o  answ er  
t h i s  q u e s t io n  w ith  th e  p r e se n t  d a ta .
The in t e r c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  th e  sub s c a l e s  o f  th e  Maine 
S c a le  was r e l a t i v e l y  low  ( r= 0 .2 0 )  and u s in g  our m o d if ic a t io n  
o f  i t s  s c o r in g  m ethods (Ml) t h i s  s c a le  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  p a t i e n t s  
in t o  two d i s t i n c t  g r o u p s . I t  was a l s o  b a sed  upon a  p sy ­
c h i a t r i s t ’ s  a s se s sm e n t  o f  th e  p a t i e n t ’ s  m en ta l s t a t e  r a th e r  
th a n  th e  s e l f - r e p o r t  o f  th e  p a t im t . S in c e  th e  DSSI la c k s  
b o th  a  l i e  s c a l e  and r e l i a b i l i t y  d a ta  and r e l i e s  upon th e  
p a t i e n t ’ s  own r e p o r t  i t  would seem  a d v is a b le  t o  p la c e  g r e a t e r  
r e l ia n c e  on d a ta  g e n e r a te d  from  th e  Maine S c a le  th a n  d a ta  
from  th e  DSSI.
On th e  w h ole  th e  two in s tr u m e n ts  were p o o r ly  r e la t e d  
t o  one a n o th e r . T h is  f in d in g  i s  -th ere fo re  a t  odds w ith  
th o s e  o f  Magaro e t  aJL (1981) i n  a s  f a r  a s  th e y  r e p o r te d  a  
h ig h  a s s o c i a t i o n  betw een  th e  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  Mane S c a le  and  
th e  c o r r e sp o n d in g  s u b s c a le s  o f  th e  o r ig in a l  S S I . In  th e  
p r e s e n t  stu d y  th e r e  were n o t o n ly  s i z a b le  c o r r e la t io n s  
b etw een  th e  p a ra n o id  su b s c a le  o f  one in stru m en t and th e  non­
p aran o id  o r  d i s in t e g r a t io n  s c a le  o f  th e  o th e r  in s tr u m e n t  
b u t a l lo c a t io n s  made by th e  two s c a l e s  r e la t e d  p o o r ly  t o
50
one a n o th e r , a l b e i t  u s in g  m o d ifie d  s c o r in g  p r o c e d u r e s . I t  
m ust be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  o f  th e  th r e e  m ethods o f  a l l o c a t i o n  u sed  
i n  th e  p r e s e n t  s tu d y  o n ly  Ml g e n e r a te d  grou p s o f  p a ra n o id  
and non paran oid  p a t i e n t s .  The DSSI and M2 b o th  a s s ig n e d  
p a t i e n t s  t o  a  group o f  d is o r g a n iz e d  or  d i s in t e g r a t e d  n o n -  
p a r a n o id s  and a  group o f  l e s s  d is o r g a n iz e d  or  l e s s  d i s ­
in t e g r a t e d  p a t i e n t s ,  w h eth er th e y  were p aran o id  o r  n o t .
Of p a r t i c u la r  i n t e r e s t  was th e  la c k  o f  any r e l a t io n s h ip  
b etw een  th e  two m ethods o f  a l l o c a t i o n  u s in g  a  h ie r a r c h ic a l  
m odel o f  i l l n e s s ,  M2 and DSSI. I t  ap p ears from  ou r  d a ta  
t h a t  th e  n on p aran oid  su b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  m easures  
a  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s tr u c t  from  th a t  b e in g  m easured by th e  d i s ­
in t e g r a t i o n  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  D SSI. A ga in , s in c e  th e  DSSI 
i s  b o th  o f  unknown r e l i a b i l i t y  and i s  a  s e l f - r e p o r t  m easure  
one m ust g iv e  more w e ig h t t o  th e  M2 d i v i s i o n  o f  p a t i e n t s  in t o  
n on p aran o id  and n o n d is in te g r a te d  g r o u p s .
R etu rn in g  t o  B e r k o w itz 's  (1 9 8 1 ) c r i t i c i s m s  . o f  th e  u se  
o f  th e  p a ran o id -n on p aran o id  d i s t i n c t i o n  i t  may be  s a id  t h a t  
n e i t h e r  s c a l e  i d e n t i f i e d  two d i s t i n c t  grou p s when o r th od ox  
s c o r in g  p ro ced u res  were em ployed; m ost p a t i e n t s  f a i l e d  t o  
q u a l i f y  f o r  e i t h e r  grap  . The DSSI in  p a r t i c u la r  app eared  
t o  b e  a  p o o r  d is c r im in a to r  o f  th e  d im en sion  and i n  a s  f a r  a s  
i t  r e l i e s  upon s e l f - r e p o r t  and la c k s  b o th  a l i e  s c a l e  and 
r e l i a b i l i t y  d a ta , i t s  u s e fu ln e s s  ap p ears l im it e d  f o r  th e  
p u rp ose  i n  q u e s t io n .  The Maine S c a le  how ever d id  i d e n t i f y  
g ro u p s o f  p aran o id  and nonparanoid  p a t i e n t s  a f t e r  i t s  
s c o r in g  c r i t e r i a  had been  m o d if ie d . I t  a l s o  d is c r im in a te d  
a  group  o f  n on p aran o id s and a  group  o f  n o n d is in te g r a te d  
p a t i e n t s .  However i t  rem ains t o  b e  se e n  what c l i n i c a l  o r  
o th e r  c o r r e l a t e s  e x i s t  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e s e  a l l o c a t i o n  m ethods 
i n  term s o f  t h e i r  c l i n i c a l  or  r e s e a r c h  u s e f u ln e s s .
2 .  I l l u s o r y  C o r r e la t io n s .
R e g a r d le ss  o f  th e  method o f  d iv id in g  p a t i e n t s  in t o  
p a ra n o id  and nonparanoid  g r o u p s , th e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  
c o n v in c in g ly  d em on stra te  th e  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n  phenom enon, 
th u s  c o n fir m in g  th e  f in d in g s  o f  Chapman (19 67 ) .  A l l  g ro u p s  
made i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  on th e  m a jo r ity  o f  p r e d ic te d  
s t im u lu s  p a ir s  o f  a l l  t a s k s .
Perhaps in h e r e n t  in  any t a s k  d e s ig n e d  t o  g e n e r a te  
i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  i s  an e x p e c ta t io n  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e
s u b je c t  t h a t  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  w i l l  n o t  o c cu r  w ith  e q u a l  
fr e q u e n c y . However i t  i s  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  a  t a s k  c o u ld  be 
d e v is e d  w h ich  e r a d ic a t e s  t h i s  e x p e c t a t io n .  Moreover., 
s e v e r a l  s u b j e c t s  r e p o r te d  th a t  th e y  were aware t h a t  c e r t a in  
s t im u lu s  p a ir s  w ere h ig h ly  a s s o c ia t e d  and t h e r e a f t e r  
a ttem p ted  n o t  t o  b e  in f lu e n c e d  by t h i s  o b s e r v a t io n . They 
n o n e t h e le s s  r e p o r te d  h a v in g  ob served  t h e s e  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  
w ith  a  h ig h e r  fr e q u e n c y  th a n  o th e r  s t im u lu s  p a i r s ,  a t t e s t i n g  
t o  th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n  phenomenon.
Among a l l  th e  a n a ly s e s  o f  v a r ia n c e  perform ed on th e  
d a ta  th e r e  were v e r y  few  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s .  
H owever, g iv e n  th e  sm a ll numbers in  ea ch  group t h i s  la c k  
o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  i s  perhaps n o t s u r p r is in g .
D iv id in g  th e  sc h iz o p h r e n ic  group a c c o r d in g  t o  th e  
M aine S c a le  (Ml) d id  n o t  y i e l d  any c o n s i s t e n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b etw een  th e  grou p s i n  th e  s tr e n g th  o f  th e  i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e la t io n s  th e y  p ro d u ced . I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  
t h i s  m ethod o f  d iv id in g  p a t i e n t s  was th e  o n ly  one w hich  
o s t e n s ib l y  produced p a ra n o id  and non paranoid  g r o u p s .
T hus, t h i s  method o f  a l l o c a t io n  a f fo r d e d  no su p p o rt f o r  th e  
e x p e r im e n ta l h y p o th e s e s .
The DSSI method o f  a l l o c a t i o n  t o  grou p s o f  d i s i n t e g ­
r a te d  and n o n d is in te g r a te d  p a t ie n t s  a l s o  y ie ld e d  few  
d i f f e r e n c e s  b etw een  g r o u p s . O v e r a ll  group  means (a c r o s s  
a l l  t a s k s )  were w it h in  one and a  h a l f  p e r c e n ta g e  p o in t s  o f  
one a n o th e r  and o f  t h e s e  th e  p aran o id  group  had th e  low ­
e s t  o v e r a l l  mean. There was a p r e d ic te d  ten d en cy  f o r  th e  
p a ra n o id  group t o  make s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  on  
t a s k  3 w h ich  was d e s ig n e d  to  in c lu d e  w ords o f  r e le v a n c e  
t o  p a ra n o id  p a t i e n t s .  However on t a s k s  1 and 4 th e  nonr- 
p a ra n o id  group ten d ed  to  make s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  
th a n  th e  p aran o id  g ro u p . I t  had b een  p r e d ic te d  t h a t  non­
p a r a n o id s  would make w eaker a s s o c ia t io n s  betw een  a s s o c ia t e d  
s t i m u l i  when two s t im u l i  were o f  d i f f e r e n t  se n so r y  
m o d a l i t ie s  su ch  a s  t a s k  C le a r ly  th e r e  was no su p p o rt in  
th e  p r e s e n t  s tu d y  f o r  su ch  an h y p o t h e s is .
The o n ly  d i v i s i o n  o f  th e  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  group w h ich  
produced  any n o ta b le  d i f f e r e n c e s  b etw een  groups was t h a t  
w h ich  a l lo c a t e d  p a t i e n t s  a c c o r d in g  t o  s c o r e s  on th e  nonpar­
a n o id  s u b s c a le  o f  th e  Maine S c a le .  T h is  method o f  a l l o c a t i o n
(M2) produced p red om in an tly  n o n s ig n if ic a n t  tr e n d s  in  th e  
p r e d ic te d  d i r e c t i o n s .  A lth ou gh  th e r e  was c o n s id e r a b le  v a r ­
ia n c e  a c r o s s  r e s p o n s e s , th e  p aran o id  g r o u p ’ s  o v e r a l l  mean 
was 6 .1 9  p e r c e n ta g e  p o in t s  h ig h e r  th a n  t h a t  o f  th e  non­
p a ra n o id  g r o u p . A ls o ,  a s  p r e d ic t e d , th e r e  was a  ten d e n c y  
f o r  th e  non p aran oid  group t o  produce w eaker i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e la t io n s  th a n  th e  norm al grou p . M oreover, th e  non­
p a ra n o id  group  made i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  on o n ly  s i x  o f  
th e  tw e lv e  p r e d ic te d  s t im u lu s  p a ir s ,  th ou gh  on a l l  s i x  
th e y  made s t r o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  th a n  th o s e  o f  th e  
p a ra n o id  g r o u p . An i n t e r e s t i n g  f u r th e r  ex a m in a tio n  w ould  
be t o  d e term in e  w h ich  ite m s  o f  th e  Maine S c a le  were r e sp o n ­
s i b l e  f o r  th e  g r e a t e s t  p a r t o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  o f  th e  main  
e f f e c t  ( i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t i o n s ) .
A gain  th e r e  was a  n o ta b le  ten d en cy  f o r  th e  p a ra n o id  
group  t o  make p a r t i c u la r ly  s tr o n g  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  
on t a s k  3 w h ich  in v o lv e d  s t im u l i  r e le v a n c e  t o  p a t i e n t s  w ith  
p a ra n o id  d e lu s io n s .  T h is  i s  a  c u r io u s  f in d in g  when one 
c o n s id e r s  t h a t  on b o th  o c c a s io n s  i n  w hich  i t  o c c u r s  th e  
m ethods o f  a l l o c a t i o n  u sed  (M2 and DSSI) d id  n o t  produce  
gro u p s o f  p a ra n o id  p a t i e n t s  b u t grou p s o f  n o n d is in te g r a te d  
p a t i e n t s ,  o n ly  some o f  whom sc o r e d  h ig h ly  on th e  p aran o id  
s u b s c a le s .  H owever, th e  s t r e n g th  o f  t h i s  ten d e n c y  f o r  
p a r a n o id -r e le v a n t  w ords to  e l i c i t  s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e la t io n s  i n  p a r a n o id s  th a n  in  n on p aran o id s s u g g e s t s  th a t  
th e  p aran o id  group  formed, o r  a lr e a d y  h e ld ,  s tr o n g  schem ata  
w ith  w h ich  t o  c a t e g o r iz e  th e s e  s t i m u l i .  T h is  f in d in g  i s  n o t  
in c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th o s e  o f  S c h n e id er  ( 1 9 7 6 ) who compared  
th e  p erform an ces o f  groups o f  p a t ie n t s  on d ic h o t i c  shadow­
in g  ta s k s  under d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t io n s .  He found  t h a t  when 
d i s t r a c t i o n  m a te r ia l  p e r ta in e d  t o  th e  p a r t i c u la r  d e lu s io n s  
o f  in d iv id u a l  d e lu s io n a l  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s ,  th e  p a t ie n t s *  shadow­
in g  perform ance was more im paired  th a n  when th e  d i s t r a c t i o n  
m a te r ia l  was o f  a  more n e u t r a l  n a tu re  ( i . e .  p h y s i c s ) .  He 
co n c lu d ed  t h a t  h i s  e v id e n c e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  **some o f  th e  
memory t r a c e s  t h a t  d e lu s io n a l  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  ju d ge a s  
r e le v a n t  a r e  seldom  judged a s  r e le v a n t  by n o rm a ls” (S ch n eid er*
1 9 7 6 ,  p 1 7 2 ) .
To su m m arize , when p a t ie n t s  were a l lo c a t e d  a c c o r d ­
in g  t o  Ml o r  th e  DSSI th e r e  were n e g l ig i b le  group  
d i f f e r e n c e s  on th e  mean s tr e n g th  o f  t h e i r  i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e la t io n s .  When p a t ie n t s  were a l lo c a t e d  t o  non­
p a r a n o id  and n o n d is in t e g r a te d .groups a c c o r d in g  t o  M2, th e  
n o n d is in t e g r a t e d  group ten d ed  t o  make s tr o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  
c o r r e l a t i o n s  on average  th an  th e  nonparanoid g r o u p . W hile  
t h i s  r e s u l t  may r e p r e se n t  l i t t l e  more th an  a chance  
f i n d i n g  i t  rem a in s th e  o n ly  n o ta b le  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw een  th e  
g r o u p s and i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  ou r  h y p o th e se s . The non­
d i s i n t e g r a t e d  group  th u s appeared to  perform  i n  th e  f a s h io n  
i n  w h ich  p a r a n o id s  would be ex p ected  to  perform  a c c o r d in g  
t o  M agaro’ s  (1 9 8 0 )  v iew s?  h av in g  e s t a b l i s h e d  c a t e g o r ie s  
o r  sch em a ta  w ith  which t o  o rg a n ize  incom ing s t im u l i  th e y  
moved t o  a u to m a tic  p r o c e s s in g  whereby th e y  a u t o m a t ic a l ly  
a s s ig n e d  m ost s t im u l i  to  th e se  c a te g o r ie s  w ith o u t  much 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  s t im u lu s  f i e l d .
The n o n p a ra n o id s by c o n tr a s t  made i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t io n s  
on o n ly  s i x  o f  th e  tw e lv e  p r e d ic te d  s t im u lu s  p a i r s .  Thus 
th e y  f a i l e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c a te g o r ie s  w ith  w hich  t o  p r o c e s s  
t h e s e  h ig h  a s s o c ia t io n  s t im u lu s  p a ir s .  A gain  t h i s  f in d in g  
i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w it h  our m ain h y p o th e s is  and M agaro’ s  v ie w  
t h a t  i n  n o n p a ra n d id s " th ere  would be l i t t l e  ’p r a c t ic e *  o f  
a s s o c i a t i n g  two c o g i t s ,  th e  c o g i t  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  w ould  
n e v e r  g a i n  s t r e n g t h ,  and th e r e  would n o t  be c o n s i s t e n t  
c o n c e p tu a l  c a t e g o r ie s  or  schemata" (M agaro, 1 9 8 0 , p . 1 7 2 ) .
The r e s u l t s  th u s  su g g e s t  t h a t  p a ra n o id s r e c a l l e d  th e  
in fo r m a t io n  p r e se n te d  w ith  an ex a g g era ted  r e sp o n se  b i a s .  
B road b en t (1 9 7 1 ) has p o in ted  ou t th a t  p r o c e s s e s  o f  r e ­
t r i e v a l  from  memory in v o lv e  su ch  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  s e l e c t i o n :  
" J u s t  a s  i n  p e r c e p t io n , s e l e c t i o n  may be th ro u g h  th e  c h o ic e  
o f  a l l  i t e m s  p o s s e s s in g  a . p a r t ic u la r  f e a t u r e ; o r  i t  may 
b e b y  t h e  s e t t i n g  up o f  an outp ut v o ca b u la ry  o n ly  members 
o f  w h ich  w i l l  b e  u sed , and w hich sh ou ld  be d i s t in g u i s h e d  
by co m p lex  co m b in a tio n s o f  f e a t u r e s .  The f i r s t  i s  a  
f i l t e r i n g  m echanism ; th e  l a t t e r  co rresp on d s t o  p ig e o n ­
h o l in g  i n  p e r ce p tio n "  (B roadbent, 1 9 71 , p . 3 3 9 ) .  The 
argum ent, th e r e f o r e  i s  th a t  p aran o id s may be e x p e c te d  t o  
show e x a g g e r a te d  resp on se  b ia s e s  in  r e c a l l ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n
s t r o n g e r  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e l a t io n s .  In  o th e r  words t h e i r  r e sp o n se  
b ia s  tow ard s th e  B acon-E ggs s t im u lu s  p a ir  would be s tr o n g e r  
th a n  t h a t  tow ards B a c o n -T ig er  o r  B acon-N otebook .
In  H em sley 's  (1977)  term s th e  a p p ro x im a tio n  s t r a t e g y  
i s  u sed  p red o m in a n tly  by p a ra n o id s and norm als t o  adapt 
and "make se n s e  of" th e  la r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  in fo r m a tio n  
in v o lv e d  i n  ea ch  t a s k .  The more d i s in t e g r a t e d  non p aran oid s  
a r e  l e s s  a d ep t a t  em p loy in g  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  and th u s  p e r c e iv e  
l e s s  o rd er  in  th e  in fo r m a tio n  p r e s e n te d . However i t  i s  im­
p o r ta n t  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  i f  t h i s  M2 d i v i s i o n  o f  p a t i e n t s  has  
i n  f a c t  i d e n t i f i e d  d i f f e r e n t  subgroups of- s c h iz o p h r e n ia  th e y  
may d i f f e r  o n ly  i n  a s  f a r  a s  th e y  are  c h a r a c te r iz e d  by t h e s e  
d i f f e r e n t  c o g n i t iv e  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  a d a p ta t io n . Furtherm ore  
t h i s  d i v i s i o n  o f  s c h iz o p h r e n ia  i s  o n ly  u s e f u l  i n  a s  f a r  a s  
i t  h a s  o th e r ,  p r a c t i c a l  c o r r e l a t e s .
Our f in d in g s  are n o t  in c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  H adley (197*0 who h as rev iew ed  
r e s e a r c h  in t o  th e  p e r s o n a l .c o n s tr u c ts  o f  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s .  He 
n o te d  t h a t  p a ra n o id  (n o n -th o u g h t-d is o r d e r e d )  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  
h ave b een  fou n d  t o  have r e l a t i v e l y  t i g h t  c o n s t r u c t s  which a re  
in v a r ia b le  in  I n t e n s i t y  ( r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  c o g n i t iv e  s i m p l i c i t y ) . 
In  p e r c e iv in g  a n o th e r  p e r so n  th e  c o g n i t iv e ly  s im p le  p e r so n  
may n o t  o n ly  form  s u c c e s s iv e ,  c o n t r a s t in g  im p r e ss io n s  b u t  
he may a ttem p t a r e s o lu t io n  o f  th e  in c o m p a t ib i l i t y  by  
c o n s tr u in g  th e  p r o b le m a tic  in d iv id u a l  i n  o n ly  one o f  th e  
c o n t r a s t in g  r o l e s .  B a n n is te r  ( 1 9 6 2 ) found t h a t  n o n -th o u g h t  
d is o r d e r e d  s c h iz o p h r e n ic s  ten d  t o  a l l o c a t e  e le m e n ts  a t  one 
p o le  r a th e r  th a n  th e  c o n t r a s t  on ea ch  c o n s tr u c t  d im e n sio n . 
R ad ley  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h i s  may r e f l e c t  an a ttem p t by th e  
in d iv id u a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a c o h e r e n t im p r e ss io n  o f  th e  p e r so n  
by fo c u s in g  on  one a s p e c t  o f  h i s  b e h a v io u r  and ig n o r in g  
e v id e n c e  to  th e  c o n tr a r y . "T his s t r a t e g y  o f  c o n s tr u in g  i s  
one i n  w hich  th e  p erso n  i s  a c t i v e l y  s e e k in g  v a l id a t io n  f o r  
h i s  c h o se n  c o n s t r u c t io n  { c a te g o r y , schem ata^ , w h ile  s im u lt ­
a n e o u s ly  a v o id in g  e v id e n c e  su p p o r t iv e  o f  th e  c o n t r a s t in g  
c o n s t r u c t io n " .  (H a d ley , 197^* p . 3 2 2 ) .
S e v e r a l  sh o rtco m in g s o f  t h i s  s tu d y  w arran t d i s c u s s io n .  
F i r s t l y ,  a s  h a s b een  m entioned  b e f o r e ,  th e  s tu d y  la c k e d  
s u f f i c i e n t  numbers o f  s u b j e c t s  w i t h in  groups i n  o r d e r  f o r  
c l e a r  d i f f e r e n c e s  b etw een  grou p s t o  em erge. I t  i s  l i k e l y  
t h a t  la r g e r  g ro u p s o f  s u b j e c t s  w ould r e f l e c t  any d i f f e r e n c e s  
more c l e a r l y .  S e c o n d ly , and p erh ap s more im p o r ta n t ly ,
n e i t h e r  d ia g n o s t ic  in stru m en t u sed , g e n e ra ted  c le a r ly -  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  grou p s o f  p aran o id  and n on p aran o id  s u b j e c t s  
from  th e  n in e te e n  p a t ie n ts ,w h e n  orth od ox  s c o r in g  m ethods 
w ere a p p l ie d .  Only a f t e r  th e  c u t - o f f s  f o r  th e  Maine S c a le  
had b een  a l t e r e d  (Ml) were th e r e  groups' o f  p a ra n o id  and 
non paranoid  p a t i e n t s .  The o th e r  two m ethods g e n e r a te d  a  
grou p  o f  d i s in t e g r a t e d  o r  nonparanoid  p a t i e n t s  and a group  
o f  n o n d is in te g r a te d  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  p a t i e n t s .
A fu tu r e  s tu d y  exam in in g  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  w ith  
p a t ie n t  groups m igh t do w e l l  t o  a v o id  th e  u se  o f  p e r c e n ta g e s  
b y  s u b j e c t s  r e p o r t in g  fre q u en cy  e s t im a t e s .  F or  many s u b j e c t s  
p e r c e n ta g e s  were a  f a m i l ia r  c o n c e p t b u t n o t  one w hich  th e y  
h a b i t u a l ly  em p loyed . A p o s s ib le  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  was th e  f a c t  
t h a t  many s u b j e c t s  became "stuck" in  a  r e sp o n se  p a t t e r n  
( e . g .  a lw ays r e sp o n d in g  w ith  and 20$  i n  v a r io u s
o r d e r s )  s in c e  t h i s  r e q u ir e s  l e s s  e f f o r t  th a n  w ork in g  ou t  
th e  p e r c e n ta g e s  t o  a c c u r a te ly  r e f l e c t  o n e ’ s p e r c e p t io n  o f  
th e  freq u en cy  o f  s t im u lu s  p a ir s .  T h is  s te r e o ty p e d  resp on d ­
in g  on th e  o th e r  hand may a l s o  be r e f l e c t i n g  a  ten d e n c y  t o  
u s e  s im p l i f ie d  c a t e g o r iz in g  su ch  a s  was d em on stra ted  in  
Koh and Shears* (1970 )  s tu d y , d is c u s s e d  i n  s e c t i o n  A 2 ( b ) .
In  fu tu r e  r e s e a r c h  th e  u se  o f  a b s o lu te  num bers, w h ich  l a t e r  
may be c o n v e r ted  in t o  p e r c e n ta g e s , may be a more a p p r o p r ia te  
m ethod o f  o b ta in in g  fre q u en cy  e s t im a t e s .
A nother m e th o d o lo g ic a l c r i t i c i s m  w h ich  may be l e v e l l e d  
a g a in s t  th e  p r e s e n t  s tu d y  i s  th e  la c k  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
exp osu re  tim e  f o r  ea ch  s t im u lu s  p a ir .  A lth ou gh  an  e f f o r t  
w as made by  th e  e x p e r im en ter  t o  m a in ta in  th e  same exp osu re  
t im e  f o r  a l l  s t im u lu s  p a ir s  ( i . e .  th e  e x p e r im e n te r  used  
c o v e r t  c o u n tin g  t o  pace h i m s e l f ) , sin e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  t im e -  
c o n t r o l le d  method o f  p r e s e n t a t io n ,  su ch  a s  a  t im ed  s l i d e  
p r o j e c t o r  would have b een  p r e f e r a b le .  F urtherm ore th e  
e x p e r im en ter  was n o t  b l in d  t o  th e  s t im u lu s  p a ir  b e in g  e x p o se d , 
th u s  r e in f o r c in g  th e  need  f o r  a s ta n d a r d iz e d  m ec h a n ica l means 
o f  p r e s e n t a t io n .  F in a l l y ,  a lth o u g h  many o f  th e  Maine S c a le  
q u e s t io n n a ir e s  w ere com p leted  by th e  p a t ie n t s *  d o c to r s  a f t e r  
th e  p a t ie n t  had b een  t e s t e d ,  s e v e r a l  w ere com p leted  b e fo r e  
th e  p a t ie n t  was t e s t e d .  Thus th e  ex p er im en to r  was n o t  
b l in d  to  th e  p a t ie n t * s  d ia g n o s is  f o r  a l l  s u b j e c t s .
To r e c a p i t u la t e ,  i t  w i l l  r e q u ir e  a  f u r t h e r  s tu d y  w ith  
l a r g e r  grou p s t o  d eterm in e  w h eth er  th e  tr e n d s  foun d  i n  th e  
p r e s e n t  stu d y  r e p r e s e n t  more th a n  chance f i n d in g s .  I f  t h e s e  
t r e n d s  a re  con firm ed  i t  w i l l  a l s o  he n e c e s s a r y  t o  exam ine  
t h e  M2 method o f  a l l o c a t i o n  in  o r d e r  t o  d is c o v e r  w h eth er  i t  
h a s  any p r a c t i c a l  u se  a s  a  d im en sion  o f  s c h iz o p h r e n ia  w ith  
c l i n i c a l  o r  e x p e r im e n ta l c o r r e l a t e s .
M oreover, i f  fu tu r e  r e s e a r c h  d e ter m in e s  t h a t  th e  p r e s e n t  
t r e n d s  have v a l i d i t y  th e n  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  p r e s e n t  s tu d y  
may he o f  more th a n  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r e s t .  H em sley (1 9 7 7 ,  
1 9 7 8 ) ,  h as p o in te d  ou t t h a t  e n v iro n m en ta l f a c t o r s  may p la y  
a n  im p o rta n t r o le  i n  d e ter m in in g  th e  form  o f  s c h iz o p h r e n ic  
sym p tom ato logy . "In  th o s e  p a t i e n t s  i n  whom th e  b a s ic  c o g ­
n i t i v e  d is tu r b a n c e  rem a in s , any a ttem p t t o  m a n ip u la te  se co n d ­
a r y  a b n o r m a lit ie s  by su ch  op eran t p ro ced u res  m ight b e  e x ­
p e c te d  t o  r e s u l t  e i t h e r  i n  a s h i f t  t o  a  new method o f  a d a p t­
a t i o n  o r  in  an in c r e a s e  i n  ’error*  r e sp o n s e s  m a n ife s t  a s  an  
in c r e a s e  in  f l o r i d  sym ptom atology su ch  a s  in c o h e r e n c e  o f  
sp e e c h " . (H em sley, 1977* p . 1 7 2 ) .  In  o th e r  w ords a tte m p ts  
a t  m o d ify in g  th e  d e lu s io n s  o f  p aran o id  p a t i e n t s  in  whom th e  
b a s i c  c o g n i t iv e  d is tu r b a n c e -  rem ains w i l l  l i k e l y  be f r u i t l e s s  
and may w e l l  le a d  t o  more f l o r i d  sym ptom s.
In  th o s e  p a ra n o id  p a t i e n t s  i n  whom th e  prim ary c o g n i t iv e  
d is tu r b a n c e  has d im in ish e d  th e r e  may s t i l l  rem ain  seco n d a ry  
a b n o r m a lit ie s  w h ich  no lo n g e r  s e r v e  t h e i r  fo r m e r ly  a d a p tiv e  
f u n c t i o n s .  The p a t i e n t  may s t i l l  em ploy an a p p ro x im a tio n  
s t r a t e g y  a s  he p r o c e s s e s  in fo r m a tio n  from  h i s  en v iro n m en t, 
o r  may c o n tin u e  t o  u se  a  sc h e m a ta -d r iv e n  form  o f  p r o c e s s in g  
w hereby he i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t e s  s t im u l i  from  th e  w orld  around  
him  i n  accord an ce  w ith  h i s  d e lu s io n a l  b e l i e f s .  Chapman*s 
( 1 9 6 7 ) o r ig i n a l  s tu d y  on i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  foun d  t h a t  
t h e  amount o f  i l l u s o r y  c o r r e la t io n s  d e c l in e d  w ith  s u c c e s s iv e  
t e s t i n g s ,  though  i t  was n o t  c le a r  what mechanism was a t  work 
su c h  t h a t  s u b je c t s  b egan  t o  p e r c e iv e  r e a l i t y  more a c c u r a t e ly .  
P resum ably  how ever, i f  i t  were l o g i c a l l y  o r  e m p ir ic a l ly  dem­
o n s t r a te d  to  a p a t i e n t  who no lo n g e r  • s u f f e r e d  th e  prim ary  
c o g n i t iv e  d is tu r b a n c e  t h a t  e v e n ts  i n  h i s  environm ent a r e  n o t  
c o r r e la t e d  in  th e  way he p e r c e iv e s  them  t o  b e , some im­
provem ent may be a c h ie v e d . In  p e r so n a l c o n s tr u c t  term s t h i s
may be seen as a controlled loosening of his formerly tight 
construct system.
Watts, Powell and Austin (1973) have demonstrated the 
effectiveness of such a treatment with three paranoid 
schizophrenics. The patients' illness had ranged in duration 
from six to twelve years and by the time they, were seen by 
the authors their general functioning was much improved.
It appears that their remaining problems consisted primarily 
of paranoid beliefs. The authors developed with the patients 
a hierarchy of target beliefs. It was made clear to the 
subject that he "was only being asked to consider the facts 
and arguments discussed with him.. • The first move in dis­
cussing each belief statement was therefore to ask the sub­
ject what his evidence for it was". (Watts et a.1, 1973» 
p.3 6 0). Other interpretations and explanations of the 
patients* evidence were discussed and argued without the 
subject being pressed into acceptance of any of them. The 
subject himself was eventually encouraged to voice the argu­
ments against his own beliefs. This treatment was successful 
in producing a significant reduction in the subjects' ratings 
of the strength of their paranoid beliefs.
One of the most interesting results of this study was 
the fact that disintegrated schizophrenics as defined by our 
M2 method of classification, showed a tendency to recall what 
they had seen more accurately than normals. There is currently 
much debate in the field of cognitive abnormalities in 
schizophrenia as to the significance of cognitive deficits 
(Chapman and Chapman, 1973)* Schizophrenics are inferior 
to normals on most laboratory tasks while paranoids perform 
better than nonparanoids but not as well as normals (Shakow, 
1971). By contrast, the present study predicted, on the 
basis of a model of schizophrenia, that a subgroup would 
show a different, indeed a superior performance to that of 
normals. Any abnormalities of this kind that are found are 
less open to alternative explanation (i.e. motivation, drug 
effects, institutionalization) than are deficits. It is 
likely that such an approach may be a fruitful path to 
follow in future research in this area.
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APPENDIX 1
The Maine Scale
(from Vojtisek, 1976)
PI Does the patient tend to suspect or believe on slight 
evidence or without good reason that people and ex­
ternal forces are trying to or do now influence his 
behaviour, control his thinking?
1. No unjustified suspicions
2. Will admit suspicion when pressed
3. Easily admits suspicion
4. Openly states others are trying to control him
5 . Has firm conviction that he is influenced or 
controlled,
P2 Does he tend to suspect or to believe on slight ev­
idence or without good reason that some people are 
against him (persecuting, conspiring, cheating, 
depriving, punishing) in various ways?
1. No unjustified suspicions expressed
2. When pressed expresses belief that he is conspired 
against
3 . Frequently inclined to suspect
4. Frank inclination to believe in persecution
5. : .Strongly expresses conviction of persecution
P3 Does he have an exaggeratedly high opinion of himself 
or an unjustified belief or conviction of having un­
usual ability, knowledge, power, wealth, or status?
1. No expressed high opinion of himself
2. When pressed expresses a high opinion of himself
3 . Frequently expresses a high opinion of himself
4. Open conviction of unusual power, wealth, etc.
5- Strongly expresses conviction of grandiose or 
fantastic power, wealth, etc.
P4 Does he tend to suspect or believe on slight evidence 
or without good reason that some people talk about, 
refer to or watch him?
1. No unjustified suspicions
2. Will admit suspicion
3 . Easily admits suspicion
4. Openly states that he is watched
5 . Has firm conviction of being watched
P5 Compared to others, how openly hostile is he? Does he 
show hostility or a high degree of ill will, resent­
ment, bitterness, or hate?
1. No open hostility
2. Relatively little hostility
3 . Some hostility 
4• Rather hostile
5. Very hostile
N1 Does he have perceptions (auditory, visual) without 
normal external stimulus correspondence?
1. None
2. When pressed admits hallucinations
3 . Easily admits hallucinations
4. Openly admits frequent hallucinations 
5- Openly hallucinates
N2 On the basis of the integration of the verbal productions
of the patient, does he exhibit thought processes that
are confused, disconnected or disorganized?
1. As normal
2. Slight disorganization
3 . Mild disorganization
4. Marked disorganization 
5* Complete disorganization
N3 How incongruous are his emotional responses? (e.g. giggling 
or crying for no apparent reason or not showing any emotion 
when emotion would be appropriately shown)
1 • As normal
2. Slightly different from normal 
3* Responses somewhat incongruous
4. Distinctly incongruous 
5* Very markedly incongruous
N4* Ho w well orientated is he as to time? For instance does
he knows (a) the season (b) the month; (c) the calendar
year; (d) the day of the week; (e) how long he has been 
in hospital?
1 . As normal
2. Occasional confusion
3 . Slight confusion
4. Frequent confusion
5 . Marked continuous confusion
N5 Does he assume or maintain peculiar, unnatural, or 
bizarre postures?
1. None
2. On rare occasions
3 . For short periods
4. Frequently
5 . All the time
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APPENDIX ? oy
Associative Strength Questionnaire with mean 
responses of 22 subjects.
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APPENDIX 4 m  
A-Stimuli used in Task 4
APPENDIX 5 
Example Cards,
o o o
APPENDIX 6 
Instructions preceding each task
Introduction.
"The general idea of my research is to see how 
different people perform on various tasks I give them.
Now I hope to give you four tasks which are all fairly 
similar to one another. You may feel a bit lost at times 
during the tasks but try to keep concentrating until the 
task is over".
Task 1.
"The first task involves looking at a number 
of cards on which you will see two words. Your task will 
be to try to roughly work out how often each word on the 
top occurs with each word on the bottom. You will see far 
too many cards to count so don't bother to try. Just do 
your best to form a general impression of what you see".
Task 2.
"The second task involves looking at a number of 
cards on which you will see a figure of a man and a word .
Your task will be to try to roughly work out how often each 
figure occurs with each word. You will see far too many cards 
to count so don't bother to try. Just do your best to form 
a general impression of what you see".
Task 3.
"The third task again involves looking at a 
number of cards on which you will see two words. Your task 
will be to try to roughly work out how often each word on 
the top occurs with each word on the bottom. You will see 
far too many cards to count so don't bother to try. Just do 
your best to form a general impression of what you see" •
Task
"The fourth task involves l<?oking at a number 
of figures which I will show you, at the same time as 
listening to different sounds. Your task will be to try 
to roughly work out how often each sound occurs with each 
figure. You will see far too many pairs of sounds and 
figures to count them, so don't bother to try. Just do 
your best to form a general impression of what you see 
and hear".
APPENDIX 7 
Raw data for each subject
Key to Raw data
Task A-Stimuli B-Stirnuli
I 2 3
a BACON
BLOSSOM EGOS NOTEBOOK TIGERJL
c LION
d BOAT
a i
b
2 £ HAPPY SAD ANGRY
c
o
<r-
A
d ■*
a ENVELOPE
VICTIM MAGAZINE KILLER SPYSECRET
d CLOCK
a
••«
t
b
4 Intermittent High Low
c I (Vtones)
d 3]
Subject Ho 1
Maine P
Maine N
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 52
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
P/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 35
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 50 30 20
b 25 50 25
c 10 60 30
a 20 40 40
2
a 10 40 50
b 50 25 25
c 10 40 50
d 3° 30 40
3
a 30 20 50
b 40 15 45
c 40 20 40
d 40 10 50
4
a 30 40 30
b 40 50 10
c 30 20 50
d 10 50 40
Subject No 2
Maine P
Maine K
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age
22
Sex Female
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
?/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 98
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
a 100 0 0
1 b 33 33 33
c 0 50 50
d 25 25 50
a 25 25 50
2 b 20 50 30
c 50 0 50
d 0 100 0
a 25 75 0
3
b 50 50 0
c 25 50 25
2 40 40 20
a 33 33 33
4 b 30 50 20
c 10 10 80
d 20 20 60
yo
Subject Ho 3
Maine P
Maine K
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 33
Sex Female
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
P/R scale
Mill Hill IQ 108
Task A-stinuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 40 20 40
b 33 33 3?
c 20 30 50
d 20 40 40
2
a 70 15 '15
b 70 15 15
c 20 40 40
d 40 40 20
3
a 60 20 20
b 15 70 15
c 33 33 T-S
d 60 20 20
4
a 53 33 71s j
b 15 70 15
c 33 33 33
d 33 33 33
Subject Ho 4
Maine P
Maine 11
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 24
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
P/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 103
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a
5° 25 25
b 33 33 33
c 50 25 25
d 25 50 25
2
a 50 25 25
b 25 50 25
c
25 25 50
d 25 50 25
3
a 30 40 30
b 30 40 30
c 10 40 50
d 33 53 33
4
a 30 30 40
b 20 35 45
c 30 50 ?0
d 30 40 30
Subject Ho 5
Maine P
Maine 11
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 43
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
P/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 79
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 38 28 34
b 32 37 32
c 31 29 40
d 32 37 32
2
a 19 34 47
b 31 35 33
c
45 23 34
d 36 34 30
3
a 54 27 19
b 30 36 33
c 36 33 31
d 43 29 29
4
a 36 39 25
b 38 29 53
c 42 33 25
d 27 41 32
Subject Ho 6
Maine P
Maine K
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 23
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
P/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 86
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 C. 3
1
a 40 30 50
b 33 33 35
c 0 50 50
d 33 33 33
2
a 35 35
b 33 33 33
c 33 33 33
d 100 0 . 0
3
a 30 60 10
b 33 33 33
c 40 20 40
d 35 33 33
4
a 40 40 20
b 40 30 30
c 40 30 30
d 40 20 40
Subject No. 7
Maine P
Maine N
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 23
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
P/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 87
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 50 25 25
b 25 50 25
c 25 50 25
d 25 25 50
2
a 50 25 25
b 0 50 50
c 25 25 50
d 25 50 25
3
a 33 33 33
b 0 75 25
c 25 25 50
d 25 50 25
4
a 50 25 25
b 33 33 33
c 11 54 35
d 25 25 50
Subject No 8
Maine P
Maine II
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 21
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
P/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 105
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 10 40 50
b 20 30 50
c - 33 33 33
d 25 50 25
2
a ?? 33 33
b 30 40 30
c 33 33 33
d 30 40 30
3
a 50 30 20
b 25 50 25
c 50 30 20
d 30 30 40
4
a 33 33 53
b 20 30 50
c 25 50 25
d 33 33 33
(y
Subject No
9
Maine P
Maine II
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 20
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
T/R scale
Mill Hill IQ 86
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 50 25 25
b 33 33 33
c 33 33 33
d 33 33 33
2
a 28 23 -13
b 33 33 7? y; *
c 33 33 33
d 25 25 50
3
a 50 25 25
b 33 33 33
c 25 50 25
d 33 33 XX y y
4
a 53 53 35
b 33 33 77y y
c 50 25 2?
d 53 XXyy 33
Subject Ho 10
Maine P
Maine II
DSSI P
DSSI D
Age 21
Sex Male
Chronicity 1
Chronicity 2
?/R scale
Kill Hill IQ 91
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 50 30 20
b 25 20 55
c 30 40 30
d 10 60 30
2
a 60 30 10
b 15 50 55
c 25 30 45
d ?3 3? 35
3
a 70 15 15
b 30 30 40
c 15 40 45
d 10 35 55
4
a 33 33 33
b 20 60 20
c 15 15 70
d 60 20 20
Subject No 11
Maine P 13
Maine 11 9
DSSI P 15
DSSI D 3
Age 22
Sex Female
Chronicity 1 80
Chronicity 2 1
P/R scale 11
Kill Hill IQ 92
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 40 20 40
b 35 33 33
c 40 20 40
d 40 20 40
2
a 33 33 33
b 40 50 30
c 40 20 40
d 20 40 40
3
a 40 40 20
b 20 50 30
c 33 33 33
d 33 33 33
4
a 50 25 25
b 40 20 40
c 20 40 40
d 40 40 20
Subject Ho 12
Maine P 16
Maine II 13
DSSI P 18
DSSI D 13
Age 22
Sex Kale
Chronicity 1 96
Chronicity 2 A
P/R scale 9
Kill Hill IQ 86
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
a 35 33 y y
1 b 33 35 33
c 33 33 33
d 33 33 35
a 25 25 50
2 b
33 33
c 33 33 35
d 55 55 33
a 40 20 40
b 48 4 48
5
c 33 33 ** y y
d 33 53 XXyj
a 35 33 33
b 33 33 35 -
4 c 25 25 50
d 33 33 XX
ou
Subject No
13 Subject No 14 Subject No 15Maine P 15 Maine P 10 Maine P 15Maine IT 6 Maine K 5 Maine N Q
DSSI P 8 DSSI P — DSSI P 0
DSSI D 11 DSSI D — DSSI D 3
Age 27 Age 30 Age 40
Sex Male Sex Female Sex Kale
Chronicity 1 77 Chronicity 1 148 Chronicity 1 116
Chronicity 2 56 Chronicity 2 72 Chronicity 2 5
P/R scale ' ' ~ 4 P/R scale 7 P/R scale 14
Kill Hill IQ 89 Kill Hill IQ 82 Kill Hill IQ 96
Task A-stimuli 33-stirniili Task A-stimuli B-stimuli Task A-stimuli B-stimulil 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1
a
17 17 66
1
a ?R 43 28
1
a 50 25 25
b 25 25 50 b 43 28 28 b 33 33 33
c 50 49 • 1 c 28 28 43 c 33 33 ✓✓
d 25 50 25 d 43 28 28 d 50 25 25
2
a 50 25 25
2
a 60 20 20
2
a 25 25 *50
b 25 25 50 b 0 0 100 b 33 33 33
c 15 50 35 c 0 100 0 c 33 33 33
d 33 33 33 d 33 33 33 d 50 25 25
3 •
a 75 20 5
3
a 100 0 0
5
a 25 50 25
b 80 10 10 b 0 100 0 b 33 33 33
c 15 5° 35 c 0 0 100 c 25 25 50
d 75 10 15 d 0 100 0 d 33 33
4
a 50 15 35
4
a 0 0 100
4
a 50 25 2S
b 25 50 25 b 100 0 0 b 33 53 XT,
. ' c 10 40 50 c 0 100 0 c 35 3? 53
d 15 35 50 d 0 100 0 d 25 50 25
Subject No 16 Subject No 17 Subject No 18
Maine P 15 Maine P 12 Maine P 16
Maine II 6 Maine K 7 Maine K 8
DSSI P — DSSI P - DSSI P 7
DSSI D — DSSI D — DSSI D 13
Age 39 Age 40 Age 51
Sex Kale Sex Female Sex Male
Chronicity 1 93 Chronicity 1 131 Chronicity 1 101
Chronicity 2 53 Chronicity 2 24 Chronicity 2 1
P/R scale 10 P/R scale 12 P/R scale 13
Kill Hill IQ 84 Kill Hill IQ 84 Kill Hill IQ 92
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli Task A-3timuli B-stimuli Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3 1 2 3 . 1 2 3
a 100 0 0
1
a 50 25 25
1
a 75 15 10
1 b
0 0 100 b 10 70 20 b 20 75 5
c 50 25 2? c 60 20 20 c 25 25 50
d 25 50 25 d 30 40 30 d 50 25 25
2
a 50 50 0
2
a 25 50 25
2
a 50 25 25
b 50 50 0 b 6 31 62 b 50 25 25
c 0 10C 0 c 25 51 44 c 50 25 .25
d 50 50 0 d 32 28 AO d 25 25 50
3
a 50 50 0
3
a 17 33 5°
3
a 50 0 50
b 0 50 50 b 23 31 46 b 50 25 25
c 0 0 100 c 27 7 66 c 50 25 25
d 50 50 0 d 64 14 22 d 50 25 25
4
a 100 0 0
4
a 46 36 18
4
a 25 25 50
b 0 50 50 b 44 37 19 b 25 25 50
c 0 50 50 c 30 60 10 c 25 50 25
d 0 50 50 d 43 38 19 d 25 50 25
81
Subject Ho 19
Jiaine P 11
Maine H 5
DSSI P 7
DSSI D 3
Age 33
Sex Male
Chronicity 1 113
Chronicity 2 3
P/R scale 13
Mill Hill IQ 100
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 57 36 7
b 44 33 22
c 27 54 18
d 37 .37 25
2
a
33 27 '40
b 35 42 25
c 18 54 27
d 46 31 23
3
a 37 37 25
b 27 40 33
c 29 35 35
d 46 23 51
4
a 55 11 33
b 22 33 44
c 36 27 -36
d 33 44 22
Subject Ho 20
Maine F 10
Maine N 8
DSSI P 0
DSSI D 0
Age 27
Sex Male
Chronicity 1 31
Chronicity 2 1
P/R scale 15
Kill Kill IQ 90
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 50 25 25
b 31 47 22
c 25 25 50
d 33 33 33
2
a 50 0 50
b 0 100 0
c 0 50 50
d 50 25 25
3
a 5° 0 50
b 0 50 50
c 25 0 75
d 0 50 50
4
a 50 25 25
b 50 25 25
c 25 50 25
d 33 33 33
Subject Ho 21
Maine P 7
Maine K 11
DSSI P 4
DSSI D 3
Age 30
Sex Kale
Chronicity 1 124
Chronicity 2 3
P/R scale 9
Kill Hill IQ 93
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
a
50 ?5 28
1 b 33 33 33
c 33 33 33
d 50 25 25
a 36 30 ■34
2 b 40 25 35
c 39 24 37
d 35 28 37
a 29 36 35
3 b 28 55 37
c 43 25 27
d 29 28 44
a 5° 26 24
4 b 40 33 27
c 25 40 35
d 10 29 31
Subject Ho 22
Maine P 7
Maine K 7
DSSI P 0
DSSI D 6
Age 22
Sex Male
Chronicity 1 12
Chronicity 2 4
P/R scale 12
Kill Hill IQ 91
Task A-stimuli B-stirauli
1 2 3
1
a 50 25 25
b 40 35 25
c 20 20 60
d 33 33 33
2
a 60 20 20
b 20 60 20
c 20 20 60
d 50 25 25
3
a 80 20 0
b 15 80 5
c 20 20 £6
d 15 10 75
4
a 60 20 20
b 40 30 30
c 20 40 40
d 33 33 33
Subject Ho 23
Maine P Q
Maine H 14
DSSI P 3
DSSI D 7
Age 30
Sex Male
Chronicity 1 144
Chronicity 2 71
F/R scale 7
Kill Hill IQ 83
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3
1
a 67 53 0
b 43 28 28
c 20 60 20
d 25 25 50
2
a 33 33 33
b 30 40 30
c 25 25 50
d 50 33 17
3
a 28 28 43
b 27 36 36
c 40 30 .30
d 28 43 28
4
a 37 37 25
b 37 37 25
c 44 22 33
d 25 37 37
Subject Ho 24
Maine P 9
Maine II 7
DSSI P 0
DSSI D 4
Age 30
Sex Male
Chronicity 1 63
Chronicity 2 1
P/R scale 12
Kill Hill IQ 104
Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 5
1
a 25 50 25
b 33 33 33
c 0 0 100
d 0 70 30
2
a 33 33 33
b 33 33 33
c 33 33 y +
d 53 33
5
a 10 30 60
b 0 60 40
c 60 20. 20
d 33 33 33
4
a 50 25 25
b 25 50 25
c 33 21J J
d 33 33 33
Subject Ho 25 Subject No 26
Maine P 5 Maine P 5
Maine K 8 Maine K 7
DSSI P 1 DSSI P 0
DSSI D 1 DSSI D 0
Age 22 Age 36
Sex Kale Sex Female
Chronicity 1 41 Chronicity 1 9
Chronicity 2 2 Chronicity 2 9
P/R scale 9 P/R scale 12
Kill Hill IQ 94 Kill Hill IQ 81
Task A-stimuli B- stimuli Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3 1 2 3
a 10 60 30 a 100 0 0
1 b 45 10 45 1 b 33 33 33
c 35 55 10 c 33 33 33
d 10 35 55 d 33 33 33
a
3° 30 40 a 33 33 33
2 b 30 60 10 ? b 50 50 0
c 70 15 15 c 33 33 33
d ?o 25 25 d 33 33 33
a 15 70 15 a 33 33 3^
3
b 20 60 20 5 b 33 33 33
c 15 15 70 ‘ c 33 33 33
d 30 40 30 d 33 33 33
a 20 60 20 a 33 33 33
4 b 20 60 20 4 b 33 33 33
c 20 20 60 c - 53 33 33
a 50 25 25 " d 33 33 33
Subject No 28 Subject No 29
Maine P 15 Maine P 8
Maine H 16 Maine 11 12
DSSI P 13 .DSSI P 10
DSSI D 10 DSSI D 12
Age Age 34
Sex Female Sex Kale
Chronicity 1 16 Chronicity 1 137
Chronicity 2 2 Chronicity 2 2
P/R scale 9 P/R scale 13
Mill Kill IQ 95 Kill Hill IQ 97
Task A-stimuli B--stimuli Task A-stimuli B-stimuli
1 2 3 1 2 3
a 25 25 50 a 100 0 0
1 b 33 35 33 1 b 25 75 0
c 25 50 25 c 25 0 75
d 33 33 33 d 0 50 50
a 33 33 33 a 25 0 75
2 b 25 25 50 2 b 75 25 0
c 33 33 33 c 0 25 75
d 33 3? 33 d 7^ 25 0
a 33 33 33 a 0 50 50
3
b 50 25 25 X b 50 0 50
c 33 50 17 c 50 0 50
d 12 12 75 d 50 0 50
a 33 33 33 a 75 25 0
4 b
50 25 25 / b 0 75 25
c 33 33 33 c 25 25 50
d 25 50 25 d 25 0 75
Subject No I27
Maine P 13
Maine N 17
DSSI P _
DSSI D ' —
Age 20
Sex Male
Chronicity 1 1
Chronicity 2 1
P/R scale 9
Kill Hill IQ 107
Task A-stimuli B-ctiniuli
1 2 3
1
a 50 0 50
b 50 50 0
c 50 50 0
d 50 25 25
2
a 0 50 '50
b 0 50 50
c 50 50 0
d 5° 50 0
5
a 50 5° 0
b 50 0 50
c 25 50 25
d 0 50 50
4
a 30 30 40
b 25 50 25
c 25 25 50
d 0 50 50
